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The Downer family represents three generations spanning three centuries of key 
growth and development periods in Australian history. These have included 
Federation and Australia’s national formation, post-World War Two 
immigration expansion of the nation and more recently for Alexander Downer 
the development of the Australian- American international relationship. In 
examining these generations of the Downer family this study has identified an 
influential leadership credo around nation building. Through this family political 
experience a credo has formed embracing the values, mores and themes which 
have influenced Alexander Downer’s approach to policy. Each generation has 
promoted the idea of a bigger Australia expounding policies supporting a larger 
immigration policy. International relations have also been revealed as a source 
of promoting the Australia nation. 
Although from a conservative family with continuous British affiliations, the 
Downer family has often been associated with progressive legislative policies. 
Alexander Downer has described his political philosophy arising from this 
background as progressive conservatism. One of the central aims of this study is 
to assess the veracity of this self description and its contribution to the family 
credo. Were the policy positions which he inherited from his family and which 
influenced him in his career enough to confirm this political philosophy? 
This thesis has found a complex amalgam in the policy outcomes achieved. In 
the career of John Downer his approach to immigration was initially a dissenting 
voice when all those around him supported the Immigration Restriction Act of 
1901 with its narrow racial provisions. By the end of his term as a South 
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Australian Senator he had joined many of those he had formerly opposed. John 
Downer was an early advocate of female suffrage and introduced important 
areas of legislation in South Australia regarding married women's property 
rights. However at the last hurdle he stumbled and reversed his position voting 
against female suffrage in 1894. These final positions regarding immigration and 
female suffrage militate against the case for a thoroughgoing progressive 
conservatism. 
Similarly, Alick Downer in humanising the White Australia Policy by legislating 
for the removal of the Dictation Test was always doing so from the belief that 
the White Australia Policy should not in any fundamental sense be challenged. 
Further complicating this were the progressive reforms he simultaneously 
pursued to increase the mobility freedoms of Indigenous peoples in the 
Emigration Act. 
This thesis also identifies how the intensity of Britishness, which fuelled the 
Anglo-Australian world view of the Downers, abated following Alick Downer’s 
failure to adjust to changing circumstances within England in the late 1960s. 
Subsequently Alexander Downer moderated his expectations of the Anglo-
Australian relationship in his term as Foreign Minister in Australia only to find 
in his final years as High Commissioner to Great Britain a revival of his hopes 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
Some of you may know that my father was the High Commissioner in London 
between 1964 and the end of 1972. For him, very much a son of the British 
Empire, this was a sad period. In the late 1960s, the Wilson government decided 
to withdraw from east of Suez. My father saw this as the ultimate statement of 
British decline. Britain no longer wanted to be a great global power and was 
retreating into a regional player. For his generation, the decision by the British 
government to join the EEC was the ultimate symbol of British withdrawal from 
the world to Europe.1 
Following the defeat of his daughter in the often-acrimonious 2018 by-election for the 
Federal seat of Mayo, his former electorate, Alexander Downer stated, ‘Our family have 
been nation-builders, we've helped to make this nation great. You can abuse us and you 
can criticise us and we'll take it … because nation-building is in our blood.’2 Nation 
building has been a core element in the Downer family political credo. Standing behind 
Australian political families is often a set of values or mores sometimes shaped by their 
family’s shared understanding. David Kemp has defined this as what our political 
leaders have believed, and what their purposes and values have been: their credos. He 
has suggested that one way of understanding or appreciating leaders in political life is to 
take a step back and look at the forces that have influenced and are influencing their 
lives. Under this analysis, historical circumstances may vary but values, imagined or 
otherwise, through areas such as family influence often endure. To fully appreciate what 
is driving certain leaders within their political contexts, one may need to take a more 
sustained look at the development of the values which influence their policy formation. 
 





Alexander Downer’s approach to policy, in this sense, can be best understood as part of 
a family tradition, spanning three generations in South Australian politics, which shared 
a clear understanding. 
When asked by Robert Manne in December1994 ‘What were the formative 
influences on your political worldview?’ Alexander Downer replied, 
emphasising the importance of family political perspectives, ‘my family have 
been a fundamental influence on the way I see the world both politically and 
philosophically.’3Alexander Downer has consistently stated the importance of 
the influence of his family as nation builders. This has helped shaped the 
Downer family leadership credo analysed in this thesis.  
South Australia provided the social and political landscape that the Downer 
family inherited and in which this political credo was conceived. From South 
Australia John Downer’s advocacy of the High Court, as self-sufficient within 
the Australian system away from the Privy Council, is evidence which 
Alexander Downer recognises as a distinctively nation building exercise. To 
understand this Downer credo and how it evolved, one needs to have a full 
appreciation of the original circumstances and political conditions of the 
Downers’ South Australia. South Australia was the only colony not to embrace 
convict transportation; however, there is another sense in which the State’s 
development diverged from that of the eastern seaboard. Douglas Pike observes 
 
3 Manne, Robert, A conversation with Alexander Downer, Quadrant, Vol. 38, No. 12, 




that South Australia provided an opportunity for British subjects, emboldened by 
the reforms of the 1832 Reform Act, to dissent from traditional English social 
structures and seek opportunities they were being denied in Britain.4 Pike argues 
that the 1832 election and Reform Act gave to the middle classes a sense of a 
new future, but simultaneously prevented them from implementing it as a result 
of the political machinations of the British parliament. However, once they 
recognised the potential liberties embodied in the reforms from rigid class 
structures, they considered more seriously the opportunities in the colonies, 
where South Australia presented itself as a prime candidate. Reforms to social 
structures, such as gender and voting reforms, were increasingly available to 
South Australians and leaders such as John Downer sought to contribute to 
judicial and immigration policy in national life. 
The development of South Australia therefore reflects a continuity in which 
British ideas were evolving in an emerging society. The Downers were part of 
this development and were connected to the process. Alexander Downer has 
described the importance within his family of understanding how societies such 
as South Australia evolve:  
I have been brought up to understand the world in that way that is looking at 
society in terms of an evolving organism with the political process assisting with 
that evolution. Sometimes when it works at its best the political process 
correctly anticipates changes and therefore helps to organise society to 
 
4 Douglas Pike, Paradise of dissent: South Australia 1829-1857, second edition, Halstead 
Press, Kingsgrove, 1967, p. 8. 
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accommodate that change.’5 
The origins of South Australia, understood through Wakefield’s model of 
systematic colonisation, also contained within them the influences of the 
Benthamite movement, which Pike further argues provided a stimulus to this 
thinking and facilitated political and social changes in South Australia.6 Jeremy 
Bentham had originally written extensively about the undesirability of Sydney as 
a colony. He influenced the Chartists to advocate new measures, primarily 
located around electoral reforms, many of which would dominate the South 
Australian electoral administration from the 1850s onwards. At the head of the 
queue were the secret ballot and universal male suffrage. For Utilitarianism it 
was imperative that the suffrage be urgently widened. In 1819, Bentham had 
published his argument for connecting Utilitarianism with electoral expansion in 
the paper ‘Radical Reform Bill’. In addition to an expansion of the franchise, he 
proposed secret ballots and proportionate electoral districts. This is the context 
into which South Australia grew and with it the Downers. 
From the distance of Britain, Jeremy Bentham had advocated for women to 
obtain the franchise as early as 1818. In his tract entitled Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, he also asserted that women should be 
involved in both the legislature and the executive. In 1818, he defended a 
woman’s right to divorce. Perhaps of even more significance, Bentham, as the 






proponent of women’s rights, publishing On the Subjection of Women in 1869. 
South Australia was one of the first colonies, if not global legislatures, which 
began to implement these gender reforms.  
John Stuart Mill, originally a Benthamite, argued that the social-political 
environment developing in South Australia would amplify the libertarian 
instincts of Australia. Tocqueville had argued, for another context, that ‘the 
American is the Englishmen left to himself’ and Mill was arguing something 
similar for the new Colony. Far away from the English conditions that had 
brought about the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, the Colony of South 
Australia would soon flourish and then stall. 
John Downer was an early advocate for women’s rights and, although the 
Constitutional Amendment (Adult Suffrage) Act was passed in 1894, many of the 
early reforms, including women’s property rights in marriage, were initiated by 
Downer in 1883. John Downer often took contrary positions on issues such as 
gender rights, and his positions on race and immigration in the First Parliament 
were often seen as competing with the race consensus around a white Australia 
for Federation. However, this thesis argues that these positions held by Downer 
were in fact more convoluted than first inspection may indicate. In both areas, 
women’s rights and race attitudes around immigration, Downer held quite 
ambiguous positions which will be analysed against published Parliamentary 
evidence. 
 The Downers’ political credo developed in the context of the evolution of South 
Australia’s political and social culture. It was in this context that Alexander 
13 
 
Downer’s grandfather, John Downer, began his political career. His positions on 
gender issues and immigration often politically isolated him. John Downer’s 
views on women and his initial opposition to the racial intolerance of the 
Immigration Restriction Act meant he was often in direct conflict with his peers 
who would later judge his worthiness for a High Court position. In this quest he 
was unsuccessful. If Downer could not be trusted to align with such an 
emblematic policy as the Immigration Restriction Act, how could he be 
dependable in interpreting the Constitution?  
The primary instrument to discriminate against non-white immigrants without 
overtly using race was the Dictation Test. Downer found himself somewhat 
marginalised on the immigration issue. The national drive towards Federation 
had swept with it grand notions of a national vision and a burgeoning sense of 
national opportunities based on a unity of purpose around racial homogeneity. 
The notions of Britishness and finding a way as Australians to express pride in 
now being independent Australian Britons, as Deakin described it, contained a 
dimension of race. Imperial patriotism had become an extension of Australian 
nationalism, as Hancock later defined it, and with that came a sense of 
responsibility to maintain racial purity.7 Alfred Deakin, as Leader of the House, 
was supporting the Immigration Restriction Bill, as he viewed it as fundamental 
in an emerging Australian purpose that races should in no circumstance be 
allowed to intermarry and break down what had hitherto been achieved. 
There is also a sense in which Alick Downer, John Downer’s son, was 
 
7 W.K. Hancock, Australia, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1966, p. 68. 
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influenced by John Downer in the debate over the Immigration Restriction Act. 
In his discussion, Alick Downer referred to John Downer’s position: 
I thought it was unnecessary; and I entertained a general notion–
something like that held by Mr Chamberlain about the English 
Traditions–that Britishers generally consider themselves strong enough 
to hold their own. It was a wrong opinion, no doubt, but the feeling I 
had was that if a better man could meet me on my own ground I did not 
care much what his colour was, I thought he was entitled to win.8 
To understand the family credo one needs to be aware of the origins and depth 
of the influence of Britishness for the Downers. Alexander Downer has 
identified within his family background how this has contributed to the 
leadership credo Downer describes as the way ‘the Downers also saw 
themselves as British in a broad cultural sense and were proud of their British 
heritage.’ 9Within the literature surrounding a detailed understanding of this role 
of Britishness stands John Bannon’s study, Supreme federalist: The political life 
 
8 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Australia, Senate, 14 November 1901, p. 7239. 
Downer argued: ‘My honourable friends may talk as much as they like about keeping out 
every drop of tainted blood, and all that sort of rubbish, but they will still have to do what 
force of circumstances may compel them to do at the moment’. And earlier in the same 
Debate: ‘Victoria has not suffered from coloured immigration. New South Wales has not 
been burdened with any importations of people from eastern countries. Even as far as 
Queensland is concerned, the increase has been so small, taking into account the splendid 
conditions existing there’. 




of Sir John Downer.10 This study captures the Britishness of the Downers and 
helps explain the paradox of a reformer who championed female suffrage but 
who was also an advocate of British race patriotism. Bannon argues that Downer 
was a reformer, but ‘it was always in the context of the British Empire and his 
English origins.’ His dream of the expanding empire of English-speaking 
peoples may be seen as an instance of what Neville Meaney has described as ‘a 
certain Britishness’ in the context of which the Anglosphere is being extended 
beyond the British nation.11 
It is important to contrast this particular type of Anglo/English conservatism 
with the emerging nationalism of the Australian Legend, as evidenced in 
writings published in the Bulletin, as Downer’s son and grandson would be the 
faithful custodians of the Anglophile tradition.12 It provides a direct line from 
Henry Downer, who originally emigrated to South Australia in 1838, through to 
Alexander Downer’s grandfather Sir John Downer (1842-1915).  
Bannon’s study is primarily concerned with Sir John Downer’s dual career 
ambitions as Premier of the colony in South Australia and as a State Senator 
advocating a Federal structure for Australia.13 The study covers John Downer’s 
 
10 J.C. Bannon, Supreme federalist: The political life of Sir John Downer, Wakefield 
Press, Kent Town, South Australia, 2009. 
11 Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia: Some reflections’, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 31 No. 2, 2003. 
12 Russel Ward, ‘Australian legend revisited’, Historical Studies 18, No. 71, 1978.   
13 For a discussion of the role of South Australian political leaders in the Federal 
Conventions on the Constitution, including John Downer in 1891 and 1897/1898, see 
R.L. Reid, ‘South Australian politicians and the proposals for federation’, Melbourne 
Studies in Education 4, No. 1, 1960.  
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political career, in particular his achievement of being elected Premier of South 
Australia on two separate occasions, firstly from 16 June 1885 to 11 June 1887 
and secondly from 15 October 1892 to 16 June 1893. The study examines the 
two relatively short periods of Downer’s Premierships. Bannon describes this in 
the following way: ‘These two terms as Premier in times of economic recession 
would be terminated in particularly cruel circumstances’.14 The second term of 
Premiership in particular would prove to be quite short-lived, from 15 October 
1892 to 16 June 1893, following the success of his long-time rival Charles 
Cameron Kingston,15 who was able to succeed in the election of 1893 and 
sustain himself in power until the end of the decade.16 
John Downer had been a delegate at one of the important early Federal meetings 
at the Australian Inter-Colonial Conference in Sydney 1883 and would 
ultimately become one of the first Senators from South Australia sworn in by the 
Governor-General on 30 March 1901. One of the central research questions 
pursued by Bannon is whether: 
Downer’s life should be viewed by history as one of substantial 
 
14 J.C. Bannon, Supreme federalist, p. 92. 
15 J.C. Bannon, ‘The final ascent of Charles Cameron Kingston’, in Marian Sims (ed.), 
1901: The forgotten election, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 2001, pp. 71-80.  
16 One of Charles Kingston’s Convention achievements centred around raising awareness: 
constitutional work to date had received ‘scant parliamentary attention, and even less 
public notice’ because ‘it lacked the true democratic inspiration’. Conservatives, he 
suggested, were seeking to use the process for their own interests. He asked, ‘are there 
none supporting it [federation] in the hope that it may prove a check to democratic 
advance?’ What was needed, he argued, was that ‘public thought must be aroused, reason 
appealed to, and sentiment awakened’ (Graeme Osborne, ‘“We have enemies to oppose”: 
Communication, class and the federation of Australia’, Media History 8, No. 1, 2002).  
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achievement in the course of political reform in the founding of the 
Commonwealth, or as one of political impotence and promise unfulfilled. 
The answer can only be found by putting his career and character in 
perspective in the context of the times.17 
Downer was a substantial contributor to the federal movement as he viewed this 
as his contribution to the nation’s development. This forms a significant 
component of the Downer family credo self understanding and John Bannon has 
concluded: ‘There is an abundance of evidence to demonstrate that his 
contribution entitles him to recognition as one of the key founders of the 
Commonwealth of Australia’.18 He had been invited to attend the first Imperial 
conference organised in London in 1887, whilst he was simultaneously the 
Premier of South Australia. He was one of only two State Premiers invited to 
attend. Bannon then goes on to note that in 1891 Downer was also selected as 
part of a seven-man delegation from the South Australian Parliament to a 
national Australasian convention, chaired by Sir Henry Parkes in Sydney. In a 
parallel somewhat reminiscent of another Conservative leader, Robert Menzies, 
in 1941, when he was also absent in England for a sustained period of time and 
lost the Prime Ministership, John Downer on his return to South Australia found 
he had forfeited support for his Premiership. Whilst Downer was achieving 
considerable success in advancing Australia’s federation ambitions in London, 
his departure from South Australia was yielding unintended consequences. 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 J.C. Bannon, Supreme federalist, p. 3. 
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When the newly knighted Sir John Downer returned to South Australia in June 
1887, he would discover that his Party had lost power. During this time, his 
opponent Thomas Playford reserved special words of derision for Downer for 
failing to deal with the pressing concerns of a Colony in decline from economic 
depression. 
Playford argued: ‘He left the ministers and us. Things were bad enough when he 
went away. No question of policy was to arise in his absence?’ and further 
elaborated in the following words: ‘Here we have the Colony in a great state of 
depression with people looking for the Government to propound some policy to 
give confidence to the country and yet we find the head of the Government 
leaving the Colony’. Bannon goes on to argue that Playford ridiculed Downer 
for contributing to the opening of the Conference, but not being in attendance at 
the opening of a more urgent crisis in South Australia. Bannon also titles sub-
chapter within the book ‘Fatal Absence – what had happened’.19 The local 
newspaper, the Adelaide Advertiser, reported: ‘The ministerial benches 
presented a too painful blank. Goliath was away and David sent in its place and 
David looked uncomfortable’.20 After all, the Victorian Premier had not vacated 
his duties to travel to England. In attempting to provide a national public service 
in the vision of a united federal Australia, Downer had lost his Premiership upon 
return. His sense of disappointment was compounded by the loss of his brother 
who, he was informed when he arrived home on 12 June 1887, had died in the 
 
19 Ibid, p. 92. 
20 Adelaide Advertiser, 7 June 1887, p. 5.  
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early hours of Monday 23 May from tuberculosis at the age of 39. 
Bannon identifies that Downer’s contribution during this time in England was 
received by the Party with somewhat lukewarm comments, the implication being 
that he could have done more for his Party’s political purposes by being in 
Australia at the time. John Downer was then elected as a delegate to the Federal 
Convention on 4 March 1897 and invited to attend the Federal Convention in 
Adelaide from 2 March until 23 April 1897. 
Bannon makes the point that, ironically, whilst being absent in 1887 and 
ignoring his constituency, he had nevertheless been cultivating successful long-
time relationships with future Prime Ministers, Barton and Deakin, on the ship 
voyage to England, which would yield considerable success for him in these 
Federal Conventions. Following these achievements, he was invited to attend the 
next Federal Convention in Sydney between 2 and 24 September 1897. There 
continued a series of Federal meetings which would ultimately result in 
Federation and his election to the Senate of Australia in 1901. Bannon describes 
a series of meetings which included the Federal Convention in Melbourne 
between 20 January and 17 March 1898. 
Bannon concludes that Downer’s motivations were to contribute beyond 
‘parochial self-interest’ to the public service of the nation. Bannon summarises: 
It was against this background that John Downer came to the federal 
movement. He was in office as South Australia’s Attorney General at an 
opportune time and recognizing that the federal cause involved far more 
than parochial self-interest he made it his chief priority. John Downer 
20 
 
was present at the conception of the movement and assisted at its birth.21 
Whilst John Downer represents the original inspiration for the Downer credo, it was in 
his father, Alick Downer, that Alexander found the most defining influence. In his 
maiden speech to the House of Representatives on Thursday 28th February 1985, 
Downer declared the following as his first major Parliamentary statement on the 
importance to him of family in credo: 
I would like to pay a brief tribute, in this case to my own father, who sat in this 
House before me, until 1964. He represented the seat of Angas in South 
Australia and part of that seat is now covered by my own electorate. I would like 
to say for the record that he provided a great deal of inspiration and had a great 
influence on me and it is partly through his influence and encouragement that I 
stand in this House today.22 
Alick and Alexander Downer shared a common belief in two central policy positions. 
At the heart of their belief in nation building were their approaches to immigration and 
international relations. In their view, two policy areas needed to be promoted: 
immigration, with a stronger, bigger Australia; and the advancement of Australia’s 
international presence at every opportunity through both foreign ministry and family 
British High Commissioner roles. 
 
21 J.C. Bannon, Supreme federalist, p. 39. 




Downer argues that his father’s immigration policies were directly influential for him as 
he was driven by the perceived need to ‘bring more people in to build up the population 
as we are never going to be a great nation when we only have eight million people 
living here.’ A ‘great nation’ for Downer was a result of expansionary immigration 
policies. Downer further argued:  
When I was in the Howard Government, I was much in favour of rebuilding 
immigration, building the country and building the nation through immigration. 
If I hadn’t supported this it wouldn’t have happened. John Howard was not 
always a supportive of my approach to immigration. It's not only about 
immigration; it's about building a strong economy and strengthening foreign 
policy, in particular international relations.23 
Downer’s long tenure as Foreign Minister in the Howard Government 1996-2007 
provided him with the platform to express this family political credo of nation building 
by expanding Australia’s international presence. However, whereas his father pursued 
this through the Anglo-Australian relationship, Alexander Downer’s pathway was more 
aligned with the United States. Downer has suggested:  
Throughout the history of my family in Australia we've always had this idea of 
nation building, of building a bigger Australia. That we should build a nation of 
great liberal democratic values and build a nation of great prosperity, a nation 
which is fair. And if Australia is to have international influence with these 
 
23 Personal interview, Paul Brown, January 2015. 
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values it needs to build a large nation with international presence.24 
In accordance with this political credo, Alick Downer consolidated the policy of 
a larger Australia by widening immigration sources, albeit in a gradual, 
calibrated manner. Downer had envisaged a population of over thirty million 
into the first decade of the twenty-first century: ‘Repeatedly I urged an objective 
of a thirty million population between 2000 and 2010’.25 He foresaw this ‘big 
Australia’ being built on further migrant diversification. A cornerstone address 
in relation to this proposal was the Roy Milne Memorial Lecture of 29 July 
1960. In this address, contrary to the advice of his own Department of 
Immigration, Downer advocated a further major expansion of non-European 
migration. In attempting to go beyond British migration, he argued: ‘If Australia 
is to survive in the form most of us would like, it can only do so, paradoxically, 
by undergoing alterations in outlook and customs which our European migrants 
bring.’26 
Alexander Downer’s concept of nation building was the family credo, the outgrowth of 
his grandfather and fathers’ views on the interconnectedness of Australian life with the 
lives of significant world nations. The bigger Australia he advocated, clearly articulated 
by his father and aspired to by his grandfather at the time of Federation, is evident in his 
own speeches, examined in this thesis. Whereas his father pursued the policy of 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Alick Downer, The Downers of South Australia, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 2012, p. 
117. 
26 Alick Downer, Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, 29 July 1960. 
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international connections mainly through an Anglo-Australian perspective, Alexander 
Downer’s disillusionment with British politics led him to express these values more in 
the context of the Australian-American relationship. In appealing for a greater role for 
Britain in world affairs Alexander Downer referred to his father's view of the declining 
position of Britain. Citing the decision of the Wilson government to withdraw from east 
of Suez in the late 1960s, he referred to his father's description, summarising: ‘my father 
saw this as the ultimate statement of British decline.’27 Alexander Downer was 
acknowledging the formative influence of his father on his own argument that Britain 
should return to a more prominent  position in world affairs, which was consistent with 
his view of a ‘Big Australia’ policy or the nation building policy he had been pursuing 
as foreign minister. Alexander Downer argued that ‘Britain no longer wanted to be a 
great global power and was retreating into a regional player.’28 Thus, Alexander 
Downer’s policy positions and his father’s were consistent, both nationally and 
internationally. They were formative for Alexander Downer in terms of the way he 
viewed policy decisions as Foreign Minister and later in his role as High Commissioner 
to Britain. 
Chapter Five of this thesis examines the formative contribution of Alick Downer’s 
immigration policies in post-World War 2 Australia and how his conception of the 
family tradition of nation building led him to maintain the policy position on the growth 
of southern European immigration originally introduced by the Labor Party after 1945. 
Migration growth trends in the 1950s had become increasingly dependent on southern 
 




European immigration. The numbers of migrants from the United Kingdom had 
declined appreciably since the 1930s. In 1933 the Australian Census recorded migrants 
from the United Kingdom as 70.2% of the total intake. However, by 1963 the number 
had fallen to 40%. Alick Downer was aware of these trends and the necessity to 
maintain southern European immigration exemplified by the fact Italian migrants were 
only 3% of the Australian population in 1933 but had risen to 12.8% by 1961. There 
was a similar trend with Greek migrants who had only represented 0.9 percent of the 
population in 1933. For Australia's immigration growth to continue, and Downer’s 
vision of a big Australia to be realised, it was vital that gains made by introducing 
southern European migrants were not reversed. This study argues further in Chapter 
Five that at the heart of Downer’s success as Immigration Minister was his ability to 
withstand the calls from the Labor Opposition to rescind the original decision to open 
up migration from Italy and Greece. 
Had Alick Downer acquiesced to the Labor Party's view that southern European 
immigration was starting to outlive its usefulness by the late 1950s, the notion of a 
bigger Australia would have been challenged by a decline in the net annual growth rate 
of the Australian population. Downer’s belief in a larger Australia was as much a 
product of his continued support for British immigration as his rejection of any revision 
of southern European immigration criteria. Nation building for Alick Downer, therefore, 
was realised through the ongoing successes of Greeks and Italians contributing to the 
Australian population and infrastructure growth at a time when leading Labor leaders 
were questioning their original decision to encourage southern European immigration. 
Labor’s Leslie Haylen encapsulated this consideration of a return to a preference for the 
British migrant over the southern European when he stated in the House of 
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Representatives: ‘The number one priority was given to the British migrant because he 
did not need to be assimilated at all.’29 
Chapter Five analyses Alick Downer’s influence during his time as a cabinet 
minister in the Menzies government, as Minister for Immigration, and then in 
his period as Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1964 
to 1972. Alexander Downer’s father’s career influenced him in two distinct 
areas. His father had completed the dismantling of the Dictation Test in 1959, 
originally suggested by his predecessor Athol Townley, and repealed the 
Emigration Act, which had prevented Indigenous Australians from leaving 
Australia without Federal Government permission. Alexander Downer 
contended: ‘My father had achieved, despite fervent opposition to his reforms to 
the White Australia Policy, what the Curtin and Chifley Governments before 
him had not considered.’30 
Downer’s contributions to humanising the Immigration Restriction Act through 
the introduction of the Migration Act in 1959 are best viewed as a part of an 
incremental change in which internal factors combined with international 
pressures to form a steady stream of changes, mostly minor and yet cumulative. 
This thesis refers to the work of Gwenda Tavan, Matthew Jordan and Sean 
Brawley, who have all identified areas such as bureaucracies, internal pressure 
groups such as the Immigration Reform Group with incrementalism and the role 
 
29 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 September 1958, 
No. 38, p. 1275. 
30 Paul Brown, Interview with Alexander Downer, Sydney, 28 February 2015. 
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of international change, particularly the declining importance of Britain. 
Under this analysis, Alick Downer is pictured as somewhat conflicted. On the 
one hand, he initiated these important reforms to the administration of the 
immigration policy but, when given the opportunity to make further reforms, 
such as allowing non-Europeans to gain citizenship within five years rather than 
fifteen years, as presented by Head of the Department of Immigration Tasman 
Heyes, he deferred the opportunity for another three years. By that time he was 
no longer Minister for Immigration. 
As Carl Bridge and Phillip Buckner have identified, Britishness knows no 
particular political home and this was no more evident for Alick Downer than in 
his battle to maintain southern European immigration.31 Downer’s conservative 
values sometimes meant maintaining southern European immigration, which had 
been accepted by the community but, in this case, was threatened with removal 
by the ALP in 1958. Following changes to Labor policy in the July 1958 
National Conference in Brisbane, a new direction was being pursued which 
Downer struggled to rebut and which would further slow the dismantling of the 
White Australia Policy. 
When Downer was appointed Minister for Immigration on 20 March 1958, he 
inherited a different immigration policy consensus than the one that existed 
when he began his parliamentary career in 1949. A policy reversal had occurred 
between the two Parties. In the previous years, the Liberal Party had somewhat 
 
31 Carl Bridge and Philip Buckner, ‘Reinventing the British World,’ The Round Table, 
Vol. 92, No. 368, 2003, p. 81. 
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relaxed its opposition to Asian immigration as a result of Ministerial discretion 
exercised by Ministers Harold Holt, Athol Townley and Alick Downer, and had 
increased the ratio of southern European to northern European immigration. In 
contrast, the Australian Labor Party, following its National Conference in July 
1958, was calling for a reduction in immigration and a return to an exclusive 
concentration on British migrants. It also began to oppose southern European 
immigration, which Downer had to struggle over five fiercely contested years to 
maintain. This will be presented as further evidence of the complex stance taken 
by Alick Downer towards immigration. 
Alexander Downer has described the policy reform in immigration as formative 
for his own approach to policy as these changes were even more important, 
given the nature of the opposition from ‘his opponents and the reactionaries in 
both Parties.’32 The opposition to Alick Downer also came from inside his own 
Party, but, perhaps more surprisingly, some of the fiercest opposition came from 
Labor Parliamentary leaders, such as Clyde Cameron, who proudly declared in 
the Australian Parliament ‘the ALP does not believe it should apologise to 
anybody for wanting to keep Australia British any more than we would expect 
 
32 Paul Brown, Interview with Alexander Downer, Sydney, 28 February 2015. 
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the Poles wanting to keep Poland Polish.’33 For Alick Downer, the struggle for 
immigration reforms was made all the more difficult because of the considerable 
ALP understanding of the significance of Britishness, as exemplified by the 
following statement from Cameron:  
What does the Labor Party mean when it emphasizes that it wants to 
keep Australia British? We mean that we want to maintain the British 
tradition of freedom and equality under the law, which our forebears 
acquired after a long and very, very bitter struggle. An achievement 
which we are determined to maintain and not to allow to slip through our 
fingers.34 
The other key dimension of nation building in the formation of the Downer family credo 
was their shared belief around the relationship between the state and the individual. The 
pervasive influence of Menzies’ views on personal freedoms, freedom of speech and 
individual liberalism are central to understanding Alexander Downer’s approach to 
foreign policy. Alexander Downer has identified Menzian liberalism as fundamental to 
his conception of the tension between the state and the individual and the impact this 
would have on international relations. The Downers have seen the world from a largely 
 
33 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 September 1958, 
Migration Bill, Second Reading, No. 38, p. 1256. Cameron went on to argue: ‘It is our 
duty to hand down to our children that great tradition which we have inherited from our 
parents, and we can only do it by bringing into the country sufficient people who respect 
and cherish the British tradition of justice and equality within the law, or what is known 
as the British way of life. I am sure that upon reflection, immigrants of non-British stock 
themselves will agree that it is the maintenance of this very tradition that is their 
guarantee, and the guarantee of their children; that there will be no violent upheavals in 
this country, and that they and their children will be able to live and work in peace and 




binary perspective on foreign policy, characterising the free world in terms of a struggle 
for the defence of personal freedoms and liberal democratic values against forces 
dedicated to their minimisation. Menzies and his influence upon the Downers, in 
particular Alick Downer and subsequently Alexander Downer, are examined in Chapter 
Four. 
The attraction of Menzian liberalism emerged from Alick Downer’s experiences 
as a prisoner of war in Changi during World War 2 and his close personal 
relationship with Robert Menzies. From this, a distinctive brand of individual 
liberalism emerged and was adopted by the Downer family. Alick Downer, as 
one of Menzies’ 49ers, was a consistent supporter of this brand of liberalism 
with its emphasis upon the individual in contrast to the role of the state. Chapter 
Four explores Menzian liberalism and its contribution to the formation of the 
Downer political credo, in particular the meaning of their shared British race 
patriotism. The first section of Chapter Four examines how Alexander Downer 
was influenced by Menzies in the belief that the British liberal political heritage 
had given Australia the critical institutions for liberal democracy based on ‘the 
interdependence of a free press, freedom of association and political liberty.’35 
The themes of individual freedom and liberalism as expressed in the speeches of 
Downer are examined in the chapter. One of the clearest expressions by Downer 
of Menzies’ influence was given at the 25th Annual Robert Menzies Lecture 
 
35 The Hon. Alexander Downer, Speech at the Earle Page Annual Politics Dinner, 
University of New England, 17 May 2005. 
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marking the anniversary of Menzies’ passing.36 This is Downer’s most 
comprehensive statement of the rationale behind liberalism and is analysed in 
this thesis as a core document. 
As a Burkean conservative, Menzies provided the blueprint for conservative 
change for the Downers. Menzies argued for a process like Common Law where 
changes had evolved in a process of building upon ‘precedent on precedent, until 
at long last all the basic elements in the laws of contract and civil wrongs and the 
like were hammered out and took form and obtained an accepted authority’. 
37 
This gradual approach to change was very much at the heart of the Menzian 
view of the White Australia Policy. In many senses this was a foundational 
policy for Menzian liberalism. There is little evidence to suggest that Menzies 
was at any point movable on the centrality of the White Australia Policy. In 
particular, the evidence presented by Matthew Jordan, discussed in this thesis, is 
that Menzies’ intransigence was the key hurdle for more Liberal reformers such 
as Harold Holt who, upon his appointment as Prime Minister in January 1966, 
moved to reform the policy. Where Alick Downer fits on this spectrum is a more 
complex question as he at times appeared to be interested in humanising the 
policy by means of some liberal reforms, but always with the underlying belief 
that the White Australia policy was an important cornerstone for both the 
 
36 The Hon. Alexander Downer, ‘Challenges of building an open society’, Speech at the 
25th Annual Menzies Lecture Parliament House, Melbourne, 10 October 2002. 




Australian community and the Liberal Party. 
The second section of Chapter Four investigates the influence of Menzies on 
Alick Downer. This influence begins with the recruitment of Alick Downer into 
Menzies’ first ministry in 1949 and his gradual rise to the position of Minister 
for Immigration in 1958. The foundation principles of the 1949 election, based 
upon individual liberty and personal responsibility, reverberated with Alick 
Downer’s experience as a prisoner of war in Changi, Singapore. Menzies’ 
influence on the Downer family during Alick Downer’s eight-year tenure as 
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1964 to 1972 is also analysed. 
During this period, Menzies’ relationship with Downer centred around the issue 
of Britain joining the European Economic Community and the associated 
implications for Australian defence as Britain withdrew from Singapore and 
other Asian countries. Menzies’ influence is examined through both the 
relationships he had with the family in South Australia and the impact these had 
on Alexander in England whilst he was being educated at Radley College and 
Newcastle University from 1964 to 1973. 
The method for examining the impact of Menzies’ liberalism upon Alexander 
Downer is an analysis of the Downer Papers, parliamentary debates and personal 
interviews, as well as the major speeches of Alexander Downer. Downer’s 
connections to Menzies are most evident in the way he used major speeches in 
his career as Foreign Minister to connect to the principles of individual 
liberalism expounded by both his father and Menzies. Chapter Four examines 
Menzies’ speeches, in particular his ‘forgotten people’ speeches on radio, and 
how they were interpreted by Downer. 
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Downer’s identification with Menzian individual liberalism and restrained 
government intervention was further complicated by Menzies’ apparent social 
conservatism, which is examined in Chapter Four. Here, the contradictions 
inherent in Menzies’ position as an economic liberal and a social conservative 
are evident. Menzies had formally announced his reforming credentials in 1938, 
when he had been successful in having legislation passed for the first National 
Insurance Act around unemployment. He had been so committed to the program 
that, when the Earle Page-led Country Party decided not to support it, he 
resigned as Deputy Leader of the United Australia Party 
Closely associated with Alexander Downer's perception of nation building were 
the mechanisms by which he attempted to implement changes in foreign policy. 
In this sense East Timor serves as a model to understand more about Downer’s 
conservatism and his perspective on the nature of change. In February 1998, 
Alexander Downer, as Australian Foreign Minister, delivered a paper to the 
Australian National University entitled ‘Reshaping Australia’s Institutions of 
Diplomacy’, which would prove to be predictive of the East Timor crisis which 
lay ahead. Anticipating changes in the Australian-Indonesian relationship, 
Downer outlined a conservatism which he argued would produce ‘enduring’ 
changes and create the ‘lasting institutions’ necessary for countries such as East 
Timor.38 This conviction reached back to his most fundamental instincts, which 
evolved from both his family and his educational influences in South Australia 





Liberal Tradition’, stated that the nature of Australia’s involvement in East 
Timor should ‘evolve pragmatically in response to social development and 
need.’39 When Downer asked the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to 
conduct a survey of the East Timorese people in July 1998, he found that 82 per 
cent of the population wanted not limited autonomy, but complete independence 
from Indonesia. This contextual imperative reflected his Burkean values and the 
call for local communities to provide their ‘enduring authority’ to act. Moreover, 
it authorised support for the East Timorese in their quest for national self-
determination. 
Chapter Six examines the second stage of Alick Downer’s career as Australian 
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. It focuses on how his perception of 
nation development was always qualified by his commitment to the ‘Old 
Commonwealth’. Alexander Downer has described him as a ‘Son of Empire’40 
and his efforts to build Australia’s influence in this role could only be 
understood through this unchallengeable loyalty. If the first stage of Alick 
Downer’s career as Minister for Immigration was characterised by moments of 
liberal or humanising reforms, the later stages of his career as High 
Commissioner raise questions around his unyielding commitment to the Old 
Commonwealth, when both the Wilson and the Heath Governments were 
seeking change. His time as High Commissioner coincided with the secondary 
and tertiary education of Alexander Downer in Britain from 1964 to 1973. 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Alexander Downer, Valedictory Speech, Policy Exchange, London, 28 March 2018. 
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Alick Downer was tormented by the changes in Anglo-Australian relations in 
the 1960s. His position of resistance to change was not always representative or 
in complete alignment with the views of at least four of the five Australian 
Prime Ministers in office in Australia during his time as High Commissioner. 
While there is evidence of a more flexible interpretation of the Anglo-Australian 
relationship on the part of the three prime ministers following Menzies in the 
Liberal-Country Party Coalition up to 1972–Holt, Gorton and McMahon–and 
clearly by the Whitlam government, Alick Downer maintained a strong 
resistance to change. In addition, the Australian electorate were being attracted 
to an alternative narrative for Australian national identity, culminating in the 
Whitlam government’s election on 2 December 1972. These trends were unable 
to convince Downer of the merits of a new direction for Australia’s relationship 
with Britain. He believed that Australia could only grow through a fidelity to the 
mother country and that Australian national development could not abandon this 
embrace. 
Chapter Six analyses the reasons for this particular interpretation of nation building and 
examines Alick Downer’ relationship with British Labour Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson which led to what he interpreted as almost a personal betrayal. Downer had 
commenced his appointment in 1964, the same year as Harold Wilson’s election as 
leader of a Labour government. Wilson had gained power partly on a mandate which 
rejected Britain’s entry to the European Economic Community (EEC). Wilson’s volte 
face on this position and the impression this left on the Downers is examined in this 
chapter, together with reaction to policy changes on the devaluation of sterling. The 
withdrawal of troops East of Suez, an event which led to a bitter response from the 
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Downers and was perhaps even more important for Alexander Downer as a future 
Australian Foreign Minister, is also analysed. Why did Alexander Downer, in his tenure 
as High Commissioner, then turn away from Britain to the United States, given his 
father’s inflexibility? Chapter Six examines how Alick Downer’s increasingly isolated 
perception of nation failed to evolve with these changing circumstances as a result of his 
interpretation of these events and the impact Menzies had on him when he visited 
Britain on six occasions. During Downer’s term as High Commissioner, Menzies stayed with 
Alick and Alexander Downer on three visits for extended stays and Britain’s entry to the EEC 
was at the centre of their discussions and private correspondence. 
Chapter Six also identifies Alick Downer’s increasing despondency over the 
changing nature of Commonwealth relations, as experienced through a core 
policy for him: immigration. Three successive British governments–the 
Macmillan government, the Wilson government and the Heath government–had 
variously introduced and reinforced a Commonwealth multi-racial approach to 
immigration entry. Heath, as a fellow conservative, viewed Alick Downer as 
being so involved in the events surrounding Britain’s immigration policy that he 
saw Downer as a personal contributor to the Commonwealth’s problem, which 
added to the perception that he was an implacable anglophile. Fundamental to 
Downer’s opposition to these ongoing British reforms to immigration was the 
policy towards Australians. Downer argued that, by not distinguishing between 
the Crown Commonwealth and the Republican Commonwealth, the policy 
penalised loyal supporters of the anglosphere. In other words, to avoid being 
seen as giving preference to white Commonwealth members for access to British 
citizenship, the Macmillan Government had initiated a policy which would have 
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fundamentally altered the attitudes of Australians towards Britain and, when 
compounded by the Wilson Labour Government’s broken promises regarding 
defence to the East of Suez and British membership of the EEC, would 
potentially irrevocably rupture Anglo-Australian relations. Downer came to be 
an increasingly controversial High Commissioner by attacking the bipartisan 
policies of the British for bringing about what he perceived as a wholesale 
change to Anglo-Australian relations and the future of the Commonwealth. 
This thesis is not, then, a biography of Alexander Downer. Rather, it is a study 
of the formative family policy influences on Alexander Downer, and how one 
Anglo-Australian family has impacted on Australian national political life. The 
methodology employed in this thesis was to draw upon a wide variety of 
primary sources, including interviews, letters and Parliamentary debates. Ethics 
permission was secured annually from the University of Wollongong.41 In 2011, 
Alexander Downer commenced a series of interviews with Robert Linn. 
Although only one interview with Linn had been completed at the time of this 
research, this researcher gained permission, facilitated by Downer, to access this 
interview with Robert Linn before the series was complete. A Letter of 
Introduction was also provided by Alexander Downer on 6 May 2012 prior to 
his appointment to the position of High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. 
This letter assisted in the interview that was conducted with the Hon. John 
Howard, former Prime Minister of Australia, on 7 July 2016 in Sydney. In 
addition to these interviews, the speeches of Alexander Downer as Foreign 
 
41 University of Wollongong. Ethics number 12346. 
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Minister in 1996-2007 were analysed, particularly the Earle Page Lecture in 
Armidale, NSW (2005), the Pioneers Association Address, Adelaide South 
Australia (1993) and the 25th Annual Menzies Lecture, ‘Liberalism and the 
Challenges of Building an Open Society’, Parliament House, Melbourne, 
Victoria (10 October 2002). 
Research for this thesis was also presented in a paper entitled ‘The Intellectual 
and Political Heritage of the Downers’ at The Australian Historical Association 
Conference at the University of Wollongong in July 2013.42  
This research also analysed the private correspondence of Alick Downer with 
prominent Australians in the 1960s, held by the National Archives of Australia. 
This included an examination of the correspondence between Alick Downer, 
Robert Menzies and Lord Casey as Governor-General in Australia in 1966-1969 
during Downer’s tenure as High Commissioner to the UK in 1964-1972. Both 
John Downer and Alick Downer featured prominently in the immigration 
debates of the First Parliament 1901-1903 and the Twenty Second Parliament 
1957-1958 respectively, and the Hansard debates on immigration and female 
suffrage and John Downer’s constitutional advocacy of the High Court in the 
1903 Judicial Bill are examined in this thesis. 
 
42 See also paper delivered at the National Conference of the Australian Historical 
Association, 6-10 July 2015, University of Sydney: Paul Brown, ‘The conservative 
paradox of Australia’s federation foundations’. This paper includes a discussion of the 
debates around the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and the opposition to the racism 
contained in this policy arising primarily from conservatives such as New South Wales 
Liberal Bruce Smith and South Australia’s John Downer. This paper traces the paradox of 
how conservatives contributed to the debate in the formative foundation years following 
Federation and the influence they had on progressive legislation. 
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Interviews were conducted regularly with Alexander Downer on his visits to Australia, 
returning from his role as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, and were held in 
Sydney and Woollahra, NSW. During these interviews Alexander Downer emphasised 
his connection to a family political tradition or credo and how he was directly 
influenced by it. Subsequently this thesis was shaped by the author’s experience initially 
of Downer’s conviction and impact of an evolving family narrative for him, particularly 
in areas such as nation building and progressive conservatism. It is a study of how he 




Chapter Two  
Leadership Credo and Downer Family Nation Building 
Throughout his career Alexander Downer has identified the influential role that his 
family have played in his political and policy development stating, ‘my family have 
been a fundamental influence on the way I see the world both politically and 
philosophically.’ He has gone on to argue that he stood within a family conservative 
tradition: ‘My family have always been in what I like to describe as the progressive 
conservative tradition.’43 This tradition, Downer argues, forms part of his family 
leadership credo. Downer has further elaborated how his conservatism was an evolving 
one, arguing, ‘I have been brought up to understand the world in that way; that is, 
looking at society in terms of an evolving organism with the political process assisting 
with that evolution.’44 How do political credos mobilise politicians and in particular 
Alexander Downer? 
David Kemp argues that behind the normal motivations for some political leaders and 
policy lies this larger stimulus of leadership credo.45 He sees limitations in the analysis 
of political leaders from the perspectives of interactions between leaders and followers 
and leadership and centralisation of power. Moving beyond these areas, Kemp identifies 
the importance of a defining set of values which have motivated leaders in Australian 
 
43 Manne, Robert, A conversation with Alexander Downer, Quadrant, Vol. 38, No. 12, 
Dec 1994, p. 37. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Kemp, David, “Leadership Practices: Reflections on Australian Political Leadership.” 
Public Leadership: Perspectives and Practices, edited by Paul ‘t Hart and John Uhr, 
ANU Press, 2008, pp. 203–216. 
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political life.  He argues that what has trademarked particular political representatives in 
Australia is their convictions, which emanate from this leadership credo. Often these 
values arise from a combination of family and cultural factors which drive policy. There 
are a number of restraints and challenges to the extent to which political leaders can let 
their credo influence policymaking, but nevertheless it is an enduring feature of many 
leaders and this could be argued for Alexander Downer. Kemp explains it this way: ‘It 
is a story that transcends political party, though each major party has played a 
distinctive role in the story, and leaders in each have had to deal with unique internal 
challenges arising from the distinctive character of their party.’46 
Kemp argues that, on a practical political level, leaders need to balance their deeper 
seated motivations for their political decisions with the contemporary political issues 
facing the electorate. There may not be the same immediate motivation in the electorate 
for these convictions and the tension always exists between policy implementation and 
pragmatism. Alexander Downer may well have understood this necessity of political 
decision-making within the context of electorate expectations and the constraints 
applied by the voting public to changes. Downer has asserted: 
I am not someone who believes in grand and simplistic models of how society 
works but somebody who believes in the evolution of society. Michael 
Oakeshott, Edmund Burke, you can articulate it in those terms today, but right 
from my childhood I have always thought of the world in those terms.47 
 
46 Kemp, David, op.cit., p. 204. 
47 Manne, Robert, A conversation with Alexander Downer, Quadrant, Vol. 38, No. 12, 
Dec 1994, p. 37. 
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The efficacy of political credos in influencing political leaders’ policies and actions has 
had found expression in very different ideological contexts. From Whitlam to Howard, 
policy credos have been evident which went beyond the normal day to day 
machinations of political parties. Whether it was Whitlam’s ‘big government 
egalitarianism’ or Fraser’s ‘critique of big government’, Keating’s republicanism or 
Howard’s ‘social conservatism and economic liberalism,’ they were all motivated by 
something deeper to achieve these policy gains. Kemp argues that in each of these cases 
parties’ policy directions were not driven by ‘inevitable agendas,’ but rather were ‘all 
expressions of the leadership credo of the Prime Minister of the day.’48 And the leaders 
often tried to take their colleagues with them with their policy priorities.  
Some leaders have had a strong credo which was evident and gained respect from the 
electorate and others, such as Peacock and Beasley, had weaker political credos. If one 
is to understand the success of the major political figures of the last fifty years, one 
needs to look at the ‘macro’ picture motivating these leaders. Kemp argues that it is not 
only about values and beliefs, but also has to do with what is important in limiting ‘what 
governments can and should do and how they can be most effective.’ Kemp further 
contends that the last four decades have been noteworthy for the considerable policy 
reform achieved by respective governments. The reason for this, he argues, is best 
understood by the power of these credos: 
The policy dynamism of Australian political leadership in recent decades is a 
consequence of leaders with developed political credos, committed to policy 
reform. One of the constraints to the unbridled expression of leaders allowing 
 
48 Kemp, David, op.cit., p. 207. 
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their political credo to be expressed is the restraining influence of culture.49  
Kemp asserts that within Australia there have been two dominant cultural values which 
permeate political parties and provide a rubric for political decision-making. Kemp 
describes it this way: 
Unlike Europe, the United States or Canada, Australia has a homogenous culture 
in which two ideas have a dominating role in our political life, and indeed our 
academic evaluations of politics: democracy and rationality.50 
Decision-making, therefore, is dependent upon the cultural qualification that everything 
needs to be within a framework of rationality and democratic values, so that any 
political initiatives that do not follow democratic values will be circumscribed within 
the paradigm created by the leader’s political credo. Kemp argues that this is 
fundamental to the Australian way of life and that two hundred years of democratic 
traditions, supplemented by an egalitarian-style democracy, have required political 
leaders to subordinate their political credos to this historical background. 
Kemp continues: ‘The political core of the democratic idea is “government with the 
consent of the governed”’. He goes on to argue that this is something fundamental to the 
Australian settlement experience over the past two hundred years. Whereas European 
countries have struggled with the path to democracy, Australia's development within an 
egalitarian tradition has been forged with an understanding of ‘equal entitlement’ 
 
49 Kemp. See also Kemp, D. A., 1973, ‘A leader and a philosophy,’ in H. Mayer, Labor to 
power: Australia’s 1972 election, Angus & Robertson, pp. 48-59. Kemp, D. A., 1988, 
Foundations for Australian Political Analysis: Politics and Authority, Oxford University 
Press. 
50 Kemp, David. op.cit, p208. 
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between citizens. Kemp further argues: ‘A foundation concept, since at least the 
eighteenth century, has been the idea of the equality of all people, including the equal 
entitlement of every person to be heard and to pursue their individual values in 
life.’51Alexander Downer, in his discussion of values, also identifies tolerance and 
stability as key drivers within the Australian electorate. He argues that the basic 
character of the Australian electorate is a preference for tolerance and allowing for 
equal opportunity for all citizens. Downer contends Australians are ‘the most tolerant 
people in the world and I think that sense of tolerance needs to be built upon, not 
challenged.’ 52 
Expression of the democratic idea has found its way into policy in post-World War 2 
Australia. Kemp asserts that this has meant most areas of policy reform reflect this basic 
premise where policy initiatives ‘as disparate as tax neutrality, free market entry, gender 
equality, educational opportunity, non-discriminatory immigration and accountability of 
our political leaders, all find justification in the democratic idea.’53 
David Kemp summarises his argument by explaining that leaders have restrictions and a 
paradigm to work in that is based on their historical, cultural context:  
Leaders, as we know, are not free (if they seek support) simply to advocate 
 
51 Kemp, David, op.cit., p209. 
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whatever public philosophy randomly takes their fancy. They are constrained by 
the cultural context in which they appeal for support, by the intellectual world of 
ideas, and by the institutional setting within which they will seek to lead.54 
The second cultural value that needs to be understood by political leaders attempting to 
give expression to their political credo is rationality. Kemp argues that the electorate 
needs to see that the process is based on rational justification in order for political goals 
to be achievable. He states: ‘Again, the idea of rationality means that action should be 
justifiable as a rational means of pursuing an objective.’  
Kemp’s exhortation to look at leaders through the lens of their leadership credos has not 
found full expression in the biographies of Australian political families. Many of the 
studies are historical accounts of the key events in their lives and their relationships with 
the body politic. The deeper levels of motivations inherited from generations of family 
influence have not been always uncovered. For example, a study of the Anthony family 
in northern NSW, the only family in Australian history to have had three generations of 
representation in the House of Representatives federally, is mainly a chronological 
account of the events of the life of each family member, starting with Hubert 
Anthony.55In this particular study we see the commitment to nation, God and King of 
the Anthony family by Hubert Anthony in World War One. It describes the policy areas 
that the Anthony generations had to deal with, including telecommunications, national 
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transport infrastructure, war and opposition. These are analysed, somewhat in isolation, 
as events as they occurred chronologically rather than as an integrated family political 
philosophy. This has the effect of recording a strong family association but not 
necessarily one that is influenced politically in externally identifiable ways. The chapter 
entitled ‘Political Leanings’ might be expected to provide deeper insights into the 
foundations of a political credo for the Anthony family. However, it is more a 
description of the events affecting the decision of the Anthonys to proceed in a 
conservative direction rather than demonstrating an early inclination towards the 
Australian Labor Party.  
The discussion of leadership credo is particularly relevant for our study of Alexander 
Downer and his family. In what ways was Alexander Downer formed by a family 
understanding of political values such as nation building? Alexander Downer has 
repeatedly stated the importance of his family as nation builders, commencing with 
John Downer’s commitment to Federation and the development of the High Court, two 
particular areas which originally helped establish this family credo. John Downer’s 
advocacy of the High Court as self-sufficient within the Australian system away from 
the Privy Council is further evidence which Alexander Downer recognises as a 
distinctive nation building exercise. Reflections between the Downer generations 
provide evidence of their self-understanding. Alick Downer observed that his father's 
emphasis upon developing an independence apart from the reserve powers of the Privy 
Council was driven by the need for an independent Australian legal system. Although 
John Downer was a regular visitor to Britain during the Imperial Conferences in the 
1880s and 1890s, he retained this belief in the Australian capacity to deliver its own 
legal system as a part of his understanding of nation building. Alick Downer has 
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identified these positions his father took on Federation through his contributions to 
Imperial Conferences and the creation of a High Court independent of the need to refer 
to the Privy Council as foundational in the family leadership credo. 
For a political credo to endure it needs to have practical expression in the form of 
political leadership through policy. The second generation of Downers in Australian 
political life is represented by the career of Alick Downer in his approach to a bigger 
Australia through immigration, which provided a consolidation of the Downer family’s 
approach to nation building. This in turn provided a precedent and motivation for 
Alexander Downer. 
What are these central formative family beliefs that Alexander Downer holds which 
have influenced public policy? It may not be possible to make a specific content link 
with his grandfather's reforms in areas such as nineteenth century marriage and property 
rights, for example, but the formative beliefs, underpinning both his grandfather’s and 
his father’s careers, have been around this idea of nation building. 
Alexander Downer’s grandfather John Downer had provided a blueprint for the family 
policies of nation development which are examined in Chapter Three. Alick Downer, in 
the final years of his life, went as far to make an appeal for a family tradition of 
progressive reform based on his father John’s principles. John Downer was a nation 
builder not only in his work around Australia’s Federation and the establishment of the 
Australian High Court but, Alick Downer argued, in his progressive mindset towards 
the social reforms of his time.  Alick Downer described his father in terms more in line 
with the credentials of Gough Whitlam than the views of conservatives. Writing in 
1979, Alick Downer laid claim to a heritage within his family that was consistent with a 
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progressive tradition. He argued that even though his father had been portrayed by many 
writers ‘as an arch conservative, if they had researched his record and his speeches, they 
would have discovered the advocacy of some measures dear to the heart of modern 
radical politicians such as Mr Whitlam’.56 
This study challenges the view of John Downer as a progressive, arguing the case is a 
matter of a mix of progressive inclinations complicated by tactical, electoral 
machinations. However, what is clear is that Alick Downer stresses these apparent 
progressive credentials as central in the family's background. This is the family self-
perception which becomes part of the credo which Alexander Downer argues for in his 
account of the family’s progressive conservatism and nation building. 
As mentioned previously, Alexander Downer also identifies, within this credo, the 
process of progressive conservatism. For Downer, the means of realising change within 
the community is the family’s commitment to seeking the authorisation of the 
community for social and economic policy initiatives. Downer identifies the way his 
family has approached policy in this fashion as a determining influence on his own 
political decision-making, citing the example of his father. Additionally, when the 
electorate has authorised change, as in the case of his father’s support of southern 
European migrants, politicians should not unwind what the community has accepted. 
Viewed in this light, progressive conservatism is more the process, the evolving vehicle 
for delivering change and policy, whereas nation building is seminal in the formative 
family credo. 
 




Alexander Downer has created space within the family credo for progressive 
conservatism. In 1993 at the Pioneer Day speech in Glenelg, a year before his election 
as leader of the Australian Liberal Party, Alexander Downer reflected on his preferred 
means of social change, arguing that it would best be described as progressive 
conservatism. He rejected radical notions of reform as well as conservative extremism. 
He described this philosophy of progressive conservatism as one in which reforms can 
be made where they are gradually endorsed by the community. This was articulated at 
the height of a ten-year period of government of the Progressive Conservatives in 
Canada led by Brian Mulroney, in contrast to a corresponding period of dominance by 
the Hawke/Keating Government in Australia. 
The Australian Liberal Party was looking for a way ahead after years in the wilderness 
and Downer was laying down a manifesto, but was it realistic and representative of the 
influences of his family life upon him? In doing so he laid claim to a form of 
progressivism which was evident in both his family background and their South 
Australian origins. This study examines the nature of this progressivism for Alexander 
Downer and its influence upon both his policy achievements and his wider political 
philosophy. In doing so, it seeks to assess the nature of this form of conservatism, for in 
the cases of both his father and his grandfather, the results were mixed. 
The idea of progressive conservatism was an attempt to recast conservatism in a 
more appealing light, in which its adherents were viewed not as reactionaries but 
as prudent custodians of change.57 Alexander Downer has referred to the 
 
57 See Robert Linn, Interview with Alexander Downer, 2011 National Library of 
Australia, Oral History and Folklore Branch Research, Oral TRC 6100/23. 
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progressive reforms made by his father around immigration protocols, in 
particular the abolition of the Dictation Test. However, this was not so much a 
wholesale change to the White Australia Policy as a streamlining of the 
administration of that policy. Most of Downer’s subsequent speeches were in 
support of a relatively uncompromising approach in maintaining non-European 
immigration restrictions. Although Downer strengthened and expanded the 
sources of southern European immigration, there was no substantial relaxation 
of Asian immigration exclusions. Alick Downer’s abolition of the Dictation 
Test, suggested by his predecessor Athol Townley, will be viewed as a process 
of bureaucratic and administrative reform rather than a root and branch review 
of the White Australia Policy. In his 1970s review of the policy, Alick Downer 
argued that he was quite consistent in not modifying the bipartisan commitment 
to the Policy. In the context of such complexities, this thesis aims to test 
propositions regarding the extent and nature of progressive changes in the 
context of their wider policy implications. 
Similarly, John Downer had a complex history when it came to progressive 
reforms. Whilst he was an early advocate of women’s suffrage, in the later 
stages of his service in the South Australian Parliament, he reversed his position 
by opposing the call for women to be permitted to stand for Parliament. John 
Downer implemented a number of progressive initiatives, but with major 
legislative qualifications. In the example of female suffrage in South Australia, 
he commenced many of the early reforms around property rights only to decline 
to endorse the proposal of women standing for parliament. In the final analysis, 
he was one of the few South Australian parliamentarians who actually opposed 
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female suffrage when the Bill was passed in 1894. 
Does progressive conservatism best describe John Downer or was he more a 
conservative with limited progressive interests ultimately confronted by 
persuasive political and tactical challenges? John Downer’s contribution to 
female suffrage may be understood in two phases. He initially supported female 
suffrage, primarily through his concerns with reframing legislation around 
women’s property rights in marriage. The second phase is characterised by his 
entrenched opposition battles with the Playford Government, the United Labour 
Party and finally the Kingston Government, in which he placed several caveats 
on these progressive reforms. The amendment to allow women to stand as 
representatives saw him mired in the political battle with his opponents to the 
extent that he was almost alone in speaking against the unrestricted conditions of 
the Bill. 
The Downer family’s reflections on John Downer do not contain a nuanced 
record of this but view him as an unconditional reformer. Alick Downer, for 
example, contends that John Downer was an unqualified progressive when in 
practice he held back the final stages of this Bill, mainly for political, pragmatic 
reasons. Alexander Downer perpetuates this family self-perception, which 
supports his assertion of progressive conservatism. 
Immigration is depicted as a clearer example of John Downer’s progressivism, 
yet this was also clouded as Downer held a complex position on race and 
immigration. Whilst he was an opponent of those who argued on narrow racial 
lines for the White Australia Policy, he was compromised by the arguments he 
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put forward later when he agreed with the opponents of immigration. John 
Downer expressed his reservations this way: 
Senator Higgs went to the root of the matter when he said these coloured 
aliens could starve us out, and it was a question whether we should allow 
them to come in and starve us out.58 
What, then, did Alexander Downer mean by his self-described ‘progressive 
conservatism’ and what were the family influences for ‘managing the 
inevitability of change’ in public office?59 Downer’s commitment to progressive 
conservatism was identified by him in terms of a family heritage of reform in 
immigration and female suffrage and the lesser-known rescinding of the 1910 
Emigration Act in 1958. Alick Downer, as Immigration Minister, had repealed 
the Emigration Act, enabling Indigenous Australians to leave the country for the 
first time without the requirement of special Government permits. Hitherto, 
Indigenous people were forbidden from travelling internationally to a country, 
such as England, without European permission. 
Throughout his career, the public statements and speeches of Alexander Downer 
consistently emphasised the imperative of sustainable change being legitimised 
by the wider community. This was most clearly exemplified in his 28 December 
1993 Proclamation Day Address in South Australia, where he argued the case 
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for progressive conservatism, stating: 
We progressive Conservatives do not oppose change. The opponents of 
change are reactionaries. Progressive Conservatives recognise the 
inevitability of change and the need to manage change in an appropriate 
way.60 
This statement was a direct reference to Edmund Burke, and to Downer's 
understanding of Burkean political philosophy. Downer was advocating that 
change needed to be introduced through what Burke called the ‘prejudices’, the 
enduring social and political ‘habits’, of any proposed context. For Downer, the 
heart of progressive conservatism was not simply in the content of reform but 
also in the timing, sustainability and pace of the proposed reforms. As Australian 
Foreign Minister, he regarded reform as less about global ambition than as a 
pragmatic geo-political approach: 
The second sort of regionalism is what I would call ‘practical 
regionalism’. This is where regionalism achieves practical goals which 
cannot be achieved through the more general and relatively popular 
process of globalisation or indeed at the national level.61 
In February 1998, Alexander Downer, as Australian Foreign Minister, delivered 
a paper to the Australian National University entitled ‘Reshaping Australia’s 
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diplomacy,’ Australian National University, Canberra, 18 February 1998. 
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Institutions of Diplomacy’, which would prove to be predictive in the East 
Timor crisis which lay ahead. Anticipating changes in the Australian-Indonesian 
relationship, Downer outlined a conservatism which he argued would produce 
‘enduring’ changes and create the ‘lasting institutions’ necessary for countries 
such as East Timor.62 This conviction reached back to his most fundamental 
instincts which evolved from both his family and his educational influences in 
South Australia and England. Downer’s paper, subtitled ‘Evolution versus 
Imposition–The Liberal Tradition’, stated that the rationale for Australia’s 
involvement in East Timor should ‘evolve pragmatically in response to social 
development and need.’63 When Downer asked the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade to conduct a survey of the East Timorese people in July 1998, 
he found that 82 per cent of the population wanted not limited autonomy, but 
complete independence from Indonesia. This contextual imperative reflected his 
Burkean values and the call for local communities to provide their ‘enduring 
authority’ to act. Moreover, it authorised support for the East Timorese in their 
quest for national self-determination. 
Alexander Downer’s self-description as a progressive conservative finds a 
political precedent in the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party. Progressive 
conservatism has enjoyed a much higher profile in Canada than in Australia. 
Following decades of successful Liberal Party administration in Canada under 






in 1942 as a response. Other than the first three decades following Confederation 
in 1862, when Prime Minister John Alexander McDonald, the ‘nation builder’, 
had dominated, the Liberal Party has generally been more successful in Canada 
and conservatism, particularly in the twentieth century, has struggled to 
compete.64 This stands in direct contrast to the centre-right parties within 
Australia and the success of conservative parties generally. 
Alexander Downer has noted an identification with the Progressive Conservative 
Party in Canada for two main reasons: 
My family has reason to identify with the Progressive Conservative party 
in Canada and its emphasis upon individualism around ethical decision-
making. However, in other areas such as appointing the first female 
cabinet minister and movements towards Indigenous voting rights, which 
my father recognised in the relaxation of the Emigration Act reforms in 
1958, we found a further similarity.65 
Here, Downer was referring to the decision of the Progressive Conservatives not 
to implement a policy of social conservatism, such as that of the religious right 
in the United States in the 1990s, but to place the emphasis on the individual 
when it came to social issues, such as abortion and the right to life. 
Progressive Conservatives had moved early to allow Indigenous Canadians to 
 
64 The Canadian Liberal Party was, for example, in power in the twentieth century for 69 
years. The reverse is correct in the Australian political context for Liberal conservative 
parties. See Paul Brown, ‘Review of George Megalogenis’, The Australian moment in 
Policy Magazine, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2012-13, p. 63. 
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vote and to recognise women in Cabinet. Part of the reason for this was the 
increasingly progressive agenda of liberals and the need to develop a responsive 
conservatism which recognised the need for progressive reforms where the 
individual accepted more personal responsibility for outcomes such as social and 
moral decision-making.66 
The decision to launch the Progressive Conservative Party in 1942 was an 
attempt to confront more forcefully the liberal concerns of the electorate. In 
1942, in the middle of World War II, the Progressive Conservatives emerged as 
a new force. This was also a reaction to the fact that conservatives had been 
performing very poorly in by-elections, particularly in areas such as York South. 
Conservative Party leader Arthur Meighen had run on a pro-conscription 
platform which raised the opposition of the New Democratic Party precursor, the 
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation candidate was then successful, as Liberal supporters voted against 
Meighen which, in turn, produced an outcry from conservatives and a demand 
for reformation in a new Party. 
There are parallels here with the collapse of the United Australia Party in 1943 
and the creation of the Australian Liberal Party in 1944. Conservatism in both 
countries had lost its direction and had lost power. Just as the Australian Liberal 
Party had restructured its platform around policies that were more appealing to 
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social development’, Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs ‘Reshaping 




the forgotten men and women of the middle class, the progressive conservatives 
in Canada were introducing similar family-based policies around affordable 
housing, retirement pensions, domestic allowances and a modified form of a 
national medical system. The conservatives met in Port Hope, Ontario, and 
drafted a new progressive platform which became the foundation of the 
Canadian Progressive Party in 1942, and the Liberals met in Albury, NSW, in 
1944 to launch their new Party. 
These progressive policies were designed to embrace the disenfranchised within 
conservatism and attract Canadians who were supportive of the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation and Liberals. However, the success of Canadian 
progressive conservatives has been limited. The struggle of Canadian 
conservatives is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that John Diefenbaker, the 
thirteenth Prime Minister of Canada, was the only conservative leader, either 
Progressive Conservative or Conservative Party, to lead the party to an election 
success between 1930 and 1979. Diefenbaker led the Progressive Conservatives 
as Prime Minister from 21 June 1957 to 22 April 1963. Diefenbaker promoted 
progressive conservative policies by being the first Party of any political 
persuasion in Canada to appoint women and members of ethnic minority groups 
to Cabinet. It was Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative Party that enabled 
Canada to achieve Indigenous suffrage, with the granting of the vote to the First 
Nations and Intuit Canadians in 1960. The Progressive Conservative Party’s 
Canadian Bill of Rights, legislated on 10 August 1960, remains on the federal 
statute books and provided a precedent for further changes in Canadian political 
culture, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
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Progressive Conservatives were the first to remove explicit racial discrimination 
from government policy criteria for admission to Canada under the Immigration 
Act of 1961. 
The emphasis upon the individual, recognised by Downer as part of the core 
appeal of the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party, has been most evident in 
their approach to social issues.67 Some of the most divisive debates in North 
America in the 1990s were around social issues, including abortion and the 
‘right to life’. During these debates in Canada, the position of the Canadian 
Progressive Conservatives was to distinguish between the role of the individual 
and the role of the State. Unlike in the United States, where the religious right 
was appealing for government intervention with legislation around issues such 
as abortion, the Canadian Progressive Conservatives were arguing for separation 
between the individual and the State. James Farney, in his analysis of the 
Canadian Progressive Conservatives, has captured the difference in the 
following statement: 
The reaction of the Progressive Conservatives to these issues clearly 
illustrates that an ideologically consistent conservative response is not 
necessarily one–like that of the religious right–that uses State power to 
enforce traditional social mores. Rather it is possible for conservatives to 
take a stance on social issues which denies that such matters are political 
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In other words, the importance of personal responsibility and individual 
freedoms in decision-making, which lay at the heart of Menzies’ liberalism and 
was adopted by the Downers, found an echo in the views of Canadian 
progressive conservatives. Unlike the United States’ religious conservative 
movement, which sought to intervene in government legislation around the 
‘right to life’ movement, Progressive Conservatives were arguing that the 
personal and the political needed to be separated. 
The Canadian Progressive Conservatives provide an insight into progressive 
conservatism in Canada as an example, like Australia, of connected British 
colonies of settlement. However, can both John Downer and Alick Downer, with 
their often ambiguous positions on women’s property rights in marriage and 
immigration administrative reforms respectively, be described as progressive 
conservatives? Were they consistent with the brand of conservatism expressed 
by Canadian progressive conservatism, or rather conservatives with liberal 
instincts who continually struggled to balance the two? 
Further evidence of Alexander Downer's conviction regarding progressive conservatism 
is found in his approach to the Republican argument to the 1990s. Predictably, 
Alexander Downer took a conservative position regarding the monarchy and was 
reluctant to concur with the Republican arguments which built during this decade to the 
point of a referendum in 1999. Downer described himself as part of ‘an intensely 
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political family who saw public service as public duty, they were certainly believers in 
King or Queen, empire and country. No Downer is recorded as being a passionate 
Republican.’69 However, in his approach to the question of whether a Republic was 
desirable or suitable, he referred to the place of progressive conservatism. He argued 
that the debate ‘about changing the constitution for example is an important component 
of a broader debate about social stability.’ 70Downer argued that the way to proceed 
with the discussion of whether a Republic was desirable or not was to start from this 
point:  
[I]f we are going to evolve one day into a Republic then that will happen as a 
result of a national consensus emerging. And no one knows whether this will 
happen or not. But to try to thrust major constitutional upheaval on a country 
which benefits so much from being stable I think is just an unwise thing to do.71  
Downer here was referring to the original argument that a society should evolve, rather 
than be subject to a rationalist imposition of a new idea thrust upon the electorate 
without being brought to fruition from their own thinking and desire. Downer argues 
that this is a family philosophy of respecting the electorate’s wishes and working 
closely with the community. He also argues that values need to be related constantly 
back to the community and advocates a rejection of unbridled capitalism, ‘crass, selfish 
individualism which is something I think has done western societies including ours a 
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great deal of damage through the 1980s’.72 
An important dimension of the Downer family leadership credo is their 
understanding of Britishness. The Downers have moved seamlessly between the 
old world and the new. Comfortable in London or Canberra, their sense of 
nation has always been understood within the context of Empire, until recently. 
What is this Britishness that seems to dominate the thinking of the Downer 
family and where has it emerged from in their credo? A further insight is to be 
found in the relative decline of Britishness and the varying importance of British 
world studies. The Downers and Britain are intertwined. And yet at a time when 
Alick Downer’s career, in particular, was peaking, Britishness was falling into 
disrepair with decolonisation and the end of Empire. 
Stuart Ward has identified the policy incongruence between Alick Downer and 
the Australian domestic political scene by juxtaposing their positions through a 
wide range of primary sources, but also in the observations of Downer’s close 
relationship with British conservatives. Ward argues that this relationship 
distorted the reality for Downer, in that he was hearing from those who were 
very much opposed to Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community 
but were not completely representative of the bipartisan changes begun by 
Macmillan, accelerated by Wilson and finally implemented by Heath. The 
conservative, almost reactionary, circles of London society with which Downer 





isolation from Australian domestic developments.73 
Alick Downer’s Six Prime Ministers provides a valuable primary source in 
understanding contrast between the power and persistence of Downer’s 
Britishness and the new demands and challenges for Australian-British relations 
in a post-colonial context. As a confidant of some of the most prominent 
government leaders of Britain and Australia in the 1960s and 1970s, Downer 
expounds on these challenges, examined through the lives of Sir Robert 
Menzies, Harold Holt, Sir John Gorton, Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and 
Viscount Brokenborough. Prior to his death, Alick Downer stated: ‘This book is 
not a series of biographies but an account of prime ministers and cabinet 
ministers as I knew them, in my relations with them.’74 The study gives an 
insight into Britishness at a pivotal time of change from the perspective of an 
intimately involved Conservative committed to the maintenance of a vigorous 
Commonwealth, all at a time when traditional values were under siege from a 
rising wave of social and political changes in a decolonising world. The study is 
also significant for the fact that Alexander Downer had written the preface to the 
book at Martinsell in 1982 as he was tasting his first political experience as a 
speechwriter to Andrew Peacock, and understood the Britishness his father felt: 
‘as High Commissioner in London he was deeply involved in events which 
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Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno and David Lee, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
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loosened the ties between Australia and Britain.’75 
Downer took the opportunity in the preface of the book to comment that one of 
the compelling motivations for his father to complete his study was that there 
was ‘far too little objective and well researched literature based on first-hand 
experiences about leading personalities in Australian politics since the last world 
war.’ He went on to argue that ‘the perspective of writers and academics would 
leave future generations with misleading impressions of the motives, characters 
and the work of our post-war prime ministers’. Of his father’s role as Minister 
for Immigration in the Menzies Government from 1958 to 1963, Downer 
maintained: 
He was a prominent advocate of the now fashionable view that migrants and 
their descendants should not lose touch with their own cultures and traditions, 
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and it rightly predicted that those cultures would enrich Australian life.76 
In his later life Alexander Downer would be openly critical of this under-
appreciation of his father’s ‘progressive conservative’ achievements. 
Post-Britishness struggled to see the significance of Anglo-Australian relations 
embodied in the credos of influential Australian political families, such as the 
Downers, the British colonies of settlement and the importance of the ‘greater 
 
76 Ibid., p. viii. Recent analysis of Australia’s rejection of the White Australia policy has 
attributed its demise primarily to the Whitlam government. The prevailing orthodoxy 
around the progressive reforms of Whitlam between 1972 and 1975 has gained such 
common currency as to lead former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating to endorse 
this view. When asked to summarise Whitlam’s greatest achievement, Keating stated: 
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discrimination and our salvation occurred through and with Gough Whitlam’ (George 
Megalogenis’ The Australian moment, Penguin, 2012, p.?). Receding recognition is given 
to the fact that it was Harold Holt, as Minister for Immigration in the Menzies 
government, who initiated the process in 1956. The biggest single change to the policy 
was made in 1958 with the Revised Migration Act, proposed by Sir Alexander Downer, 
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become citizens. This was continually opposed by the Labor Party for over a decade 
following the stands taken by John Curtin and Arthur Calwell in the 1940s. When Holt 
became Prime Minister in 1966, he terminated this policy, permitting the entry of non-
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the last step in this process with the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, but the 
contentious lead-up work had been done between 1949 and 1966. This was achieved 
against the background of John Curtin’s 1944 Empire Day speech: ‘It is of utmost 
significance to the British speaking race that such a vast continent should have as its 
population a people and a form of government corresponding in outlook and in purpose to 
Britain’, and later: ‘This country shall remain forever the home of the descendants of 
those people who came here in peace in order to establish in the South Seas an outpost of 
the British race’. Arthur Calwell, who returned Malayan and Indochinese war refugees at 
the conclusion of World War 2 against their will, confirmed his position in his 1972 
memoirs, Be just and fear not , arguing against non-Europeans settling in Australia. He 
wrote: ‘I am proud of my white skin, just as a Chinese is proud of his yellow skin, a 
Japanese of his brown skin, and the Indians of their various hues from black to coffee-
coloured. Anybody who is not proud of his race is not a man at all. And any man who 
tries to stigmatize the Australian community as racist because they want to preserve this 
country for the white race is doing our nation great harm. I reject, in conscience, the idea 
that Australia should or ever can become a multi- racial society and survive’. See also 




British family.’77 As Neville Meaney has noted: 
[F]rom the beginning of the national era, Australians came to define 
themselves as white British, and they did so without any demands or 
inducements from imperial authorities in London.78 
Britishness was increasingly defined as ‘keeping a “British soul”’ and what ‘was 
at the core of what it meant culturally to be Australian’.79 Independent 
Australian Britons, as Deakin described them, were, as contemporaries of John 
and Alick Downer, prepared to fight in two World Wars, as ‘from the beginning 
of the nationalist era Australians defined themselves as belonging to the British 
race’.80 As Britishness waned, but never completely lost its capacity to garner 
popular support, its links to conservatism found themselves compromised in the 
post-imperial landscape. Meaney argues that this pan-Britishness and Australian 
nationalism were not mutually exclusive, but sat alongside each other quite 
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comfortably.81 As Linda Colley has argued, multiple identities could be held 
within the British world82 and, for Australians at the turn of the century, 
nationalism did not demand ‘a separate myth of themselves as a unique 
people’.83  
However, it is not as if the Downers have always run contrary to Australian 
values with their Britishness. Their political credo was deeply influenced by 
their understanding of Britishness, but this was not their preserve alone and was 
embedded in diverse political forces they often opposed. Neville Meaney’s 
contribution to the debate about Britishness and Australia has been augmented 
by the work of Stuart Ward and James Curran.84 Both Curran and Meaney have 
identified John Curtin’s actions World War 2 as an example within Labor Party 
history of an arguably independent tradition existing simultaneously within 
Britishness. Meaney addresses David Day’s argument that the events of World 
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Politics & History, 51, 2005, p. 408). 
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84 James Curran, Curtin's empire. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011; Stuart 
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War II, in particular Churchill’s disinclination to support Australia right through 
to the Singapore crisis, did not result in a call for a separate Australian nation. 
Meaney notes that Day, as a Labor historian, was perplexed by the fact that 
independence was not the natural outcome of this disillusionment with British 
support. He asserts: 
The curious title, Reluctant Nation, expressed Day’s disappointment that 
the salutary lessons of wartime had not been translated into a crusade for 
independence which he seems to have believed was the natural 
culmination of this history.85 
Given the considerable pressure that Australia was under during World War II, 
and the absence of British support when it was required in South East Asia, an 
account is needed that explains why, in the light of these failures, Australia was 
so reluctant to move away from Britain. Meaney asks the question, ‘Why then 
were Australians so unwilling to claim their independence from Britain and its 
empire?’ His conclusion is that Australians were unable to move outside their 
pan-Britishness and ‘could not think of themselves as other than a British 
people. The idea of Britishness which Australians had embraced at the end of the 
nineteenth century was so deeply embedded in the society that no alternative 
was seriously contemplated.’86 
Meaney’s central argument is that, even when forced to the brink in World War 
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II, Australian leaders, such as Curtin, continued to speak within the conceptual 
framework of British race patriotism. For example, following the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Australia’s declaration of war on Japan, he 
continued to use the language of a wider British world. The cultural and 
linguistic structure of the following quotation has become emblematic of 
Curtin’s desire to maintain Britishness within the Australian Labor tradition. 
Curtin declared: ‘We Australians shall hold this territory and keep it as a citadel 
for the British speaking race.’ Britishness was never too far below the surface of 
Australian national awareness.87 
This British world in Australia outlined above has never been far from the 
Downers. In describing his family as ‘intensely South Australian’, Alexander 
Downer has insisted his family influence has been simultaneously ‘British in the 
broad cultural sense’.88 As Anglo-Australians, both John and Alick Downer have 
been what W.K. Hancock would have described as ‘in love with two soils’89, 
where ‘double loyalties’ have been prominent.90 In 1979, reflecting on his 
career, Alick Downer identified the major events and people which had 
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impacted on him throughout his life, and placed Britain centre stage. At the heart 
of this reflection were British institutions and, in particular, his education at 
Oxford. Downer stated that Oxford was his ‘spiritual home and always will 
be.’91 In 1928, he took the newly introduced course of Politics, Philosophy, 
Economics with Modern British History at Oxford at the behest of his mother, 
following the frequent visits of John Downer to the British Imperial Conferences 
from 1887. This interconnectedness with England led to a wider identification 
with British cultural values and traditions and helps to explain how the Downers 
interpreted their ‘Britishness’ as part of the broader British world, imagined or 
otherwise.92 Stuart Ward has described this interconnectedness in these words: 
‘[Alick] Downer was first and foremost an Australian but one whose conception 
of Australian nationalism was inseparable from his wider dedication to the 
“Greater British” family.’93 
Alick Downer moulded the political and educational experiences of his son Alexander 
when he accepted the position of High Commissioner in Great Britain. It meant that 
Alexander Downer would be exposed to a large number of conservative leaders in 
England and Ireland whom he befriended and invited into his home at Oates Wiltshire, 
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not all of whom were in complete agreement with Alick Downer on matters of entry 
into the European Economic Community. Nevertheless, Alick Downer is recognised 
and identified by Alexander as the reason why he entered politics, partly as a result of 
the maturing family years that he spent in Britain with his father until they returned to 
Australia in the mid-1970s. This thesis will examine the extent to which this dimension 
of being part of the broader British family was part of the Downer family credo and the 
ways in which Alexander Downer was influenced by it. 
Family leadership credos therefore provide a rich source of historical understanding for 
how political values have been shaped. Wayne Errington has summarised this as a need 
for something beyond immediate political goals and a respect for deeper rooted values 
and ideas. This may lead to an interaction between a leader’s values and their ability to 
motivate others around these ideas. Errington argues that ‘successful leaders tend to be 
those who can mobilise followers around a set of ideas, rather than simply a set of 
goals.’94 This study argues that the Downer family have such a political credo and that 
had it has influenced each member and been contributed to by each generation of the 
family to varying degrees. Alexander Downer himself has identified the importance of 
this around the theme of nation building and the influence this had on him in terms of 
his support of policies within the Howard government in areas such as larger 
immigration policy and international relations. The following chapter examines the 
evidence in the life of John Downer for his contribution to this political credo in what 
Alexander Downer describes as the way the family evolved to become ‘part of the 
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backbone of conservative South Australia.’  
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Chapter Three  
South Australian Background and John Downer’s Influence 
Are some of the best residents of Australia to be prevented from enjoying the 
rights of citizenship as a matter of course, simply that we may give the 
Government the power of exercising a veto in the case of one or two coloured 
persons whom they may choose to say have been unworthily admitted?... So far 
as the Commonwealth is concerned, it seems to me to be taking a low 
contemptible standard.95 
It may be a good argument, for it may be that, after all, it is a question whether 
Darwin is right in his view as to the survival of the fittest, and whether we have 
to kill all the rest, or keep them down somehow or other, if they will interfere 
with our means of earning our livelihood.96 
When Alexander Downer won the inaugural election for the seat of Mayo in 1984, it 
represented the third continuous generation of Downers to be elected to Australian 
Federal politics, matched by the Anthony family in northern New South Wales. Over 
the ensuing twenty-three years he would advocate a political credo of nation building 
which he identified as having commenced with his grandfather Sir John Downer. Both 
his father, Alick Downer (1910-1981), and his grandfather, Sir John Downer (1843-
1915), contributed to a social and cultural model, somewhat peculiar to South Australia, 
which was introduced through the systematic colonisation of Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield. 
To understand the Downer family influence on Alexander Downer’s policy evolution 
it is necessary to explore their origins in South Australia. To what extent did the 
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differentiated development of South Australia affect their conservative politics. How 
was their political credo influenced by the distinctive South Australian experience in 
contrast to some of the penal settlements on the Eastern seaboard? In this chapter we 
will examine John Downer and his contribution to the family leadership. Is it reasonable 
to accept that there were progressive elements leading to a philosophy of progressive 
conservatism or is this an overstatement? 
Alexander Downer views his grandfather as driven by nation-building ideals and that 
this is central to the family credo. In what ways did John Downer contribute to the 
building of Australia through areas such as gender reform? What were, for example, his 
contributions in the High Court and his approach to immigration. Did he wish to narrow 
Australia around the parameters of the White Australia policy or did he lay the 
foundations for a broader immigration approach which his son Alick followed in his 
immigration widening towards a bigger Australia? 
South Australia represented a new framework of opportunity successfully advocated 
for by John Stuart Mill in Britain between 1832 and 1836, laying the foundations for Sir 
John Downer (Australian Senator 1901-1903 and twice Premier of South Australia) to 
promote married female property rights and oppose the Immigration Restriction Act in 
1901. Emboldened by these origins, Alick Downer would introduce the revised 
Migration Act of 1958 as Minister for Immigration (1958-1963), abolishing the 
Dictation Test and ending discriminatory Indigenous emigration controls. 
If Alexander Downer was conscious of a family tradition in nation building how did this 
evolve in South Australia. Alexander Downer has observed the political inheritance 
begun by his grandfather John Downer: 
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My father and grandfather were both progressive conservatives. They were more 
aligned culturally to Britain but politically this was often a form of Burkean 
conservatism. Where changes to society were pursued they needed to be 
endorsed by the communities they served.97 
Sir John Downer was a leading figure in Australian Federation and constitutional 
development. These contributions led Alick Downer to describe him as the ‘high water 
mark’ in nation building.98 In the years immediately prior to his death, Alick Downer 
identified the influence of Sir John Downer as formative for his family in three main 
areas: his progressive immigration positions, the role he assumed in women’s voting 
rights and his constitutional advocacy of the High Court in the 1903 Judicial Bill.99 John 
Downer took dissenting positions on each of these questions, leading Alick Downer to 
conclude that ‘he had more in common with the Whitlam era than the more reactionary 
elements of Australia’s first Parliament.’100 
This claim within the family credo requires closer inquiry of the Parliamentary record 
and the context of the women’s suffrage movement to determine Downer’s overall 
record on female suffrage and the totality of his stance on immigration in the debate 
surrounding the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. Downer, as Premier in 1885, had 
originally supported female suffrage, but by 1894 had assumed a more complex 
position. Was the progressive narrative Alick Downer claims for his family consistent in 
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all respects in its contribution to nation building with gender equality? 
Family self-reflections provide valuable insights into the manner in which traditions 
may influence future family members such as Alexander Downer. However, the 
question remains as to their historical reliability. Is there consistent evidence to support 
Alick Downer’s assertion that his father was a women’s rights reformer? It is clear that 
he was perceived by the family as a legislative pioneer in South Australia largely 
through his work on the Married Women’s Property Act. Alick Downer went as far to 
describe his father’s achievement as embodying ‘all the zeal of a young reformer.’ 
The Parliamentary record of John Downer can best be viewed in two stages. 
Undoubtedly John Downer began his career as Attorney-General with the Bray 
Government with a number of reforming initiatives designed to redress the imbalance 
around women’s property rights in marriage. However, following his dual Premierships, 
these reforming ambitions had become subservient to political machinations. The early 
1890s were characterised by conflicts with the Kingston Government and the newly 
formed United Labour Party. These political intrigues often triumphed over the case for 
female suffrage. The outcome of all of this was that Downer actually voted against the 
Bill. How did John Downer begin as a reformer yet turn away from the critical vote in 
its last stages in 1894? 
Downer’s positioning within the South Australian Parliament in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century flowed from his successes as a Law graduate and his appointment as 
Attorney-General in the Bray Government in 1881-1884. From the commencement of 
his parliamentary career in 1878 as Member for Barossa, John Downer was concerned 
with the rights of women as it affected their property entitlements. Originally his 
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position was one of opposition to the changes to the Real Property Bill, which he argued 
would disadvantage women, but it was not until 1882 that, as Attorney-General, he 
exhibited his liberal values in giving back to married women control over their property 
rights. Influenced by what he saw as the inconsistencies inherited from the British legal 
system, Downer initiated a number of changes including protecting the prior existing 
property entitlements of women and children’s rights. 
The manner in which the first Bill failed would later be echoed in the battles around the 
franchise Bill of 1894. In both cases, Downer’s efforts were enveloped by the politics of 
the period, often of his own making. For when the legal preparation of the Bill was 
finished, Downer refused to agree to its passing unless the Parliament backdated the 
entitlements of women to prior to the implementation of the Bill. The South Australian 
House of Assembly would not agree to this and the Bill was left floundering for another 
eighteen months. Such was the conviction of Downer that these legal reforms should be 
universal that he took these proposals to the Imperial Conference of 1887 in England. 
Downer believed that the liberal legislation he had introduced in the South Australian 
Colony should be adopted by the English and, representing the English Marriage Law 
Reform Association, he attempted to convince the British Government of the merits of 
his arguments. Downer perceived the need for clearer appreciation of colonial 
legislation and its recognition by the British Government, which declined his offer. This 
championing of women’s property rights illustrates that Downer’s Britishness did not 
exclude his pursuit of liberal values. 
The final stages of the Bill demonstrated Downer’s view that the political 
manoeuverings of the United Labour Party took precedence over the passing of the Bill 
in its amended form. The party wanted a referendum which Downer saw as a means of 
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delaying the Bill and so he opposed the Second Reading. John Bannon takes the view 
that the underlying reason for Downer’s opposition lay in the fact that Playford had 
withdrawn from the debate, knowing that Labour would insist on a referendum which 
would probably lead to the Bill’s failure.101 It was not even as if Downer was 
contemptuous of Labour. Quite the contrary; he had a grudging regard for their political 
ability to engage either side of the House. Peter Bartlett has identified this Downer’s 
description of their skill, ‘They are very clever fellows. I have great respect for the way 
they use either side for their purposes with absolute impartiality’.102 
The political ambition of regaining power after losing office in 1892 after only eight 
months took precedence over principle in this debate. The urgent battle for Downer was 
to move out of the role of Opposition Leader which he occupied for the majority of the 
time in the 1890s. The effectiveness of United Labour to partner with Kingston to bring 
down the Downer Premiership had been all the more transforming as it was Kingston 
himself who had sided with Downer earlier to overcome Playford. These political 
manouevres had frustrated the proponents of female suffrage to such an extent that they 
called for the formation of the Women’s League and the Great Petition. Political 
enfranchisement was identified by the League as the seedbed for all future reforms. 
Mary Lee described its purpose as ‘to raise the moral status of women’; they had begun 
‘to realize that a propelling motor on the down grade of womanhood was that they had 
no recognition as citizens’. At a meeting held in June 1888, it was resolved that as 
woman’s political enfranchisement is deemed by this Society absolutely necessary to 
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the right fulfilment of her duties as a citizen.’103 Some have questioned the pioneering 
role of Downer more by way of his omission by the leading proponents within the 
women’s suffrage movement and scholars. Helen Jones, for example, identifies four 
significant males of the time but does not include Downer. The prime movers described 
in her study are Dr Edward Stirling, Mr Robert Caldwell MHA, the Hon. Dr Sylvanus 
Magarey and the Reverend J. C. Kirby.104 When one looks closely at the reflections by 
the Women’s League itself as to who was instrumental, one finds only occasional 
reference to John Downer. At the May 1892 Annual General Meeting of the Women’s 
Suffrage League, Mary Lee identified Stirling as the key Parliamentary figure and 
argued that the League itself was formed in 1888 precisely because other politicians had 
shown little definitive will in completing the task. John Downer was not mentioned in 
the historical overview proferred by Mary Lee at this pivotal Annual General Meeting. 
During the period 1885-1892, Downer was Premier twice and yet the matter was not 
resolved under his Premierships. 
It was not as if Downer was alone in his political manoeuvering. Kingston, who had 
opposed Stirling’s 1886 motion, saw an opportunity in having a predominant city 
electorate voting Labour who were his consistent supporters by this stage. 
It is difficult to underestimate the role of the Women’s League in breaking the 
Parliamentary deadlock around female suffrage. John Downer’s role in woman’s 
suffrage needs to be assessed within the context of this movement’s considerable impact 
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following its inception in 1888. In particular, there was the high profile community role 
of Mary Lee, who attended widespread community meetings and wrote Letters to 
Women in March, April and May 1990 to the Register outlining in clear persuasive 
terms the case for female suffrage. The Great Petition of 1894, where over 11 600 
signatures were gathered supporting the movement, represented a turning point in public 
opinion. 
Previously, in May 1990, Mary Lee had organised a series of public meetings where she 
addressed South Australians in Port Pirie, Quorn and Port Augusta, garnering support 
for women’s suffrage. She also used each of these meetings as an opportunity to collect 
signatures for the petition. The meeting at Port Pirie alone attracted over five hundred 
attendees. Catherine Spence, who had been overseas, now joined Mary and, together 
with Mary Coulton, they created a formidable advocacy of a cause which politicians 
could hardly ignore. 
The Great Petition was formally presented to the House of Assembly by the Hon. G.C. 
Hawker for both Houses of Parliament. As the ‘father of the House’  Hawker was 
asked to present the petition as he was also in favour of the Bill. The petition was over 
110 metres long, wrapped in a gold ribbon and the Women’s Suffrage colours and 
included the support of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union of South Australia. 
If Downer can be described a Conservative defending British institutions, and yet an 
advocate of liberal values in certain contexts, from where did these liberal instincts 
emanate? The Downers’ South Australian origins differed quite markedly from the 
eastern seaboard States and included contrasting social and cultural values. The source 
of Australia’s egalitarianism originated in the convict experience, primarily in New 
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South Wales. Irish-Australians represented over half of all new immigrants by 1851; in 
contrast they were a minimal presence in South Australia. The struggle between the 
largely Protestant English and the Irish Catholics imported to the penal colonies was not 
evident in South Australia, but was a prominent influence on the eastern seaboard in 
developing Australia’s egalitarian tradition. 
Conservative politics in the first Parliament often found Protectionists holding 
contradictory positions. George Reid, for example, as a Free Trader, had been criticised 
as the ‘yes and no’ Parliamentarian on Federation and States rights. John Downer, on 
the other hand, is viewed in Downer family reflections as an unqualified reformer in the 
Immigration Restriction Act, a position subsequently reinforced by his Federal stand on 
the rights of women. 
However, is this position of John Downer a consistent one or is it conflicted, as we saw 
in his somewhat contradictory stance on women’s suffrage in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century in the South Australian Parliament? Immigration is depicted by 
Alick Downer as a clearer example of John Downer’s progressivism and yet John 
Downer held a complex position on race and immigration. Whilst he was an opponent 
of those who argued on narrow racial lines for the White Australia Policy, he was 
compromised somewhat by the arguments he forwarded later in which he agreed with 
the opponents of immigration. The following statements by Downer reflect an 
ambivalent position. In the debate in the Senate, Downer questioned the merits of 
allowing non-white immigration: 
Senator Higgs went to the root of the matter when he said these coloured aliens 
could starve us out, and it was a question whether we should allow them to come 
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in and starve us out.105 
Downer’s conservatism centred around his commitment to the British liberal institutions 
that, he argued, needed to underpin the Australian constitution and Federalism. 
Downer’s studies in law, and his experience in taking articles with R.J. Ingleby in 
March 1867 in Adelaide, reinforced these beliefs. At the heart of this Britishness was 
the belief that individual freedoms and the rule of law would prevail against any 
perceived excesses or external threats. Freed from these constraints, John Downer’s 
conservatism enabled him to enter into the debates regarding female suffrage confident 
that the Anglo-Australian structures evolving would withstand radical change. The 
caveat to Downer’s position was the speed and extent of the changes. 
Central to understanding John Downer’s position was the paradox of holding both 
conservatism and liberalism in a creative tension. His conservatism was anchored in his 
confidence in ‘Britishness’ which enabled him to take more liberal stances on issues 
such as women’s voting rights and immigration. Even when discussing the newly 
formed Federation in 1903, he expressed his views through the identity of pan-
Britishness. Downer contended: ‘When we established the Commonwealth, our aim was 
to bring together an aggregation of persons who were British subjects in the States.’106 
This included Federation aspirations for an embryonic Australia and selective liberal 
elements. Any progressivism, however, was grounded in his wider confidence in 
Empire. Nation building had always to be seen with the restraints of Empire. 
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John Downer’s liberal views echoed the Benthamite origins of South Australia, which, 
in turn, reflected the influences of the Scottish Enlightenment and the later English 
philosophies of John Stuart Mill. John Downer was inextricably linked to this 
perception that South Australia provided a differentiated opportunity. 
Even amongst Protectionists, John Downer’s position was unusual. The political 
consensus was very supportive of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, with such 
contrasting figures as Protectionist Edmund Barton and Labor Leader Chris Watson in 
agreement over the need to rebuff non-European immigration.107 The other liberal group 
of the period was the Free Traders, and besides Bruce Smith and Donald Cameron, they 
were also in alignment. 
Much of the Labor opposition to non-British immigration stemmed from the 
movement’s ambition to terminate the system of Chinese and Melanesian labour and to 
quarantine the living standards of its largely Anglo-Celtic constituency. Overseas labour 
was contracted at very low costs, and, in being so cheap, competed directly with the 
higher wages of Anglo-Celtic labourers. 
T.B.W. Higman has identified the concerns from organised labour around immigration: 
The origins of the so-called White Australia policy lay in the racial ideology and 
labour movements of the late nineteenth century. Although British settlers had 
early expressed concern that the colonies might develop a subservient indentured 
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class of Asian workers, it was not until the 1880s and the debate over Federation 
that Social Darwinist notions of racial superiority came to drive politics and 
immigration policy.108 
The fact that he was opposing both his own Party and Labor made Downer’s stand even 
more conspicuous. The Labor Party, headed by Chris Watson, had moved an 
amendment to the Immigration Restriction Act which explicitly aimed to deny entry to 
‘any person who is an Aboriginal native of Asia, Africa or the islands thereof.’109 
Watson went even further in supporting this Amendment by contending ‘the Oriental as 
a rule, the more he is educated the worse man he is likely to be…the more cunning he 
becomes.’110 Watson became Australia’s third Prime Minister in 1904 and forged a 
tradition supporting restricted immigration that carried right through to Arthur Calwell, 
Labor Opposition leader in the 1960s. 
Some of the most robust support for the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901, therefore, 
came from the newly formed Labor Party. Chris Watson had become Vice-President of 
the Sydney Trades and Labour Council in January 1892. Additionally, he was a 
founding member of the New South Wales Labor Party in 1891. His support of the 
White Australia Policy was grounded in the economic concerns of the members of these 
organisations. 
Watson’s proposed amendment to the part of the law concerning base immigration 
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exclusion explicitly on race failed, not for want of ideological support from the first 
Parliament, but due to the political reality that Joseph Chamberlain as British Colonial 
Secretary would not sanction such overt race-based criteria within the Empire. The 
decision to introduce the Dictation Test, or the Education Test as it was originally 
known, was an indirect method of achieving this same race-based goal. It had been used 
successfully in Natal, South Africa, and the first Australian Parliament knew they would 
gain royal assent to such legislation with little resistance. 
This was also a time when Deakinite liberals, or the advocates of ‘positive liberalism’, 
as it was then known, shared many interchangeable positions with Labor, leading Henry 
Mayer to observe: 
In the Federal sphere, the period of Deakinite Liberalism, up to 1910, is usually 
seen as one of positive liberalism…it would be difficult and fairly futile to 
attempt to draw a sharp line between Deakinite and Labor policies.111 
At a time when Australia’s first parliamentarians were in sharp agreement on the 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, John Downer provided a more complex 
perspective. 
The original objective of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was to exclude 
‘prohibited immigrants’. The instrument used to achieve this was the Dictation Test, 
under which any individual, when requested, needed to write out a dictation extract of 
fifty words in a European language determined by the Department. Downer asserted: ‘I 
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strongly opposed legislation of this kind in the South Australian Parliament’.112 
Juxtaposed with this undesirability of the Dictation Test stood his views on the 
undesirability of ‘coloured labour’ which he argued was unwanted in South Australia, 
where he had been Premier twice in seven years, and was now a national concern. At 
one stage in the Federal Parliamentary debates, Downer asserted: 
We never wanted coloured labour in South Australia proper. You never wanted 
coloured labour in Victoria proper, nor did they ever want coloured labour in 
New South Wales proper.113 
The national drive towards Federation had swept with it grand notions of national vision 
and a burgeoning sense of national opportunities based on a unity of purpose around 
racial homogeneity. Britishness and finding a way as Australians to express pride in 
now being ‘independent Australian Britons’, as Deakin described it, contained a 
dimension of race. ‘Imperial patriotism had become an extension of Australian 
nationalism’, as Hancock later defined it, and with that came a sense of responsibility to 
maintain racial purity.114 
Alfred Deakin, as Leader of the House of Representatives, was supporting the Bill 
originally introduced by Edmund Barton, both as Prime Minister and in his capacity as 
Minister for External Affairs. Deakin at specific times was careful to couch his language 
in non-offensive terms, insisting this was not legislation designed to identify any 
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civilisation as being better than any other grouping. However, it was imperative for 
Australia’s new national purpose that races should under no circumstance be allowed to 
intermarry and blend with each other. 
If this were to occur it would weaken a new Australia: ‘Unity of race is an absolute 
essential to the unity of Australia. It is more, actually more, in the last resort, than any 
other unity’. Australia would now require a purity of race and the first act of a new 
Australian Parliament should be to legislate for this certainty through the Immigration 
Restriction Act.115 Thus, Downer’s statements on race were often contradictory; at one 
point he stated: ‘I do not anticipate or fear any intermixture of races from Asiatics who 
may come here.’116 He was appearing to maintain a moral position separate from that of 
his Federal contemporaries and yet this was not a consistent position. On another 
occasion, for example, he argued: 
It may be a good argument, for it may be that, after all, it is a question whether 
Darwin is right in his view as to the survival of the fittest, and whether we have 
to kill all the rest, or keep them down somehow or other, if they will interfere 
with our means of earning our livelihood.117 
In this sense, the varying positions of John Downer on race and migration present a 
conundrum. Similar to the changing approaches he assumed on women’s suffrage, it is 
not always possible to discern a consistent policy position. Nation building was 
 
115 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Australia, House of Representatives, 
September 12, 1901, p. 4804. 
116 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Australia, Senate, 14 November 1901, p. 
7239. 
117 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Australia, Senate, 23 May 1901, p. 6248. 
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therefore a complex pursuit where Downer held often conflicting positions in his overall 
quest for change. 
There is also a sense in which Alick Downer, as John Downer’s son, developed his own 
philosophy regarding immigration policy from an awareness of this stance taken by his 
father in the debate over the Immigration Restriction Act. In his discussion of how John 
Downer formed his progressive conservatism, Alick Downer referred to his father’s 
account of his position: 
I thought it was unnecessary; and I entertained a general notion–something like 
that held by Mr Chamberlain about the English Traditions–that Britishers 
generally consider themselves strong enough to hold their own. It was a wrong 
opinion, no doubt, but the feeling I had was that if a better man could meet me 
on my own ground I did not care much what his colour was, I thought he was 
entitled to win.118 
John Downer developed his career within a differentiated South Australian settlement 
model where the family credo was commenced. The Downer family evolved within a 
society somewhat separate in Australia in the nineteenth century. As John Bannon has 
observed: ‘From the outset South Australia was planned as a place of enlightenment and 
opportunity’.119 However this was primarily a cultural development rather than a 
separate political model. South Australia, like the Eastern States, had a bi-cameral 
system of government and its upper house was elected on a restrictive franchise. The 
 
118 Quoted by Alick Downer in The Downers of South Australia, p. 59. 
119 Bannon, op. cit., p. 6. 
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question here is how South Australians perceived themselves culturally and how this 
may have emboldened political leaders such as the Downers in their nation building. 
South Australians conceived themselves differently. One of the central arguments of 
Douglas Pike’s Paradise of Dissent was in outlining a different mindset driving the 
early South Australian settlers. He argued that it was not just a higher purpose to 
establish an ideal society, but almost a sense of resentment that they had not been given 
the opportunities they deserved in Britain. The 1832 Reform Act, the ‘bloodless 
revolution’, as Pike describes it, opened the door for the middle classes to have more 
political representation. They had tasted the partial fruits of success but were not 
experiencing any real change to their lifestyle. The economic and social benefits were 
still passing them by.120Pike’s thesis was that what differentiated South Australia was a 
quest to establish a society based on freedom of opportunity rather than conservative 
privilege. He described this as a ‘stubborn determination’ to plan and argued that the 
foundation plans were carried out ‘by men bred in opposition and inspired by the 
moralistic convictions of a frustrated English minority’.121 
Later in this study Pike identified that the key event which motivated a number of 
disillusioned Englishmen to plan for the foundation of South Australia was the Reform 
Act in Britain in 1832. Pike contends that, even though the middle classes were the 
winners out of the 1832 elections, the Act created more problems than it solved. The 
middle classes had achieved greater than expected success and representation but this 
 
120 Pike, op. cit., p. 8. 
121 Douglas Pike, Paradise of dissent: South Australia 1829-1857, second edition, 
Halstead Press, Kingsgrove, 1967, p. v.  
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did not resolve their desires; it only fuelled their aspirations. Pike argues that ‘to many 
of the middling classes in other words the Act of 1832 was not a triumph but a new 
weapon; a means not an end’.122 The election results of 1832 had seen a number of 
parliamentary candidates known as the philosophical radicals succeed and raise 
expectations that, within the British Parliament, they would be able to implement the 
aspirations of a middle class who felt disenfranchised. However, when little was 
achieved which satisfied their ambitions, because of the difficulties of the parliamentary 
process and the skills of the Tories, many turned their eyes towards the colonies. 
Pike argues that ‘the philosophical radicals were young Londoners, men of fortune and 
intelligence who had become disciples of Jeremy Bentham.’123 Their expectations were 
high as they had become intellectually empowered by the ideas of Bentham and then 
encouraged by the political results of the 1832 election and the Reform Act. They were 
not content to settle for just this, however. Pike argues that, for middling class reformers 
outside parliament, the failure of their representatives was a source of frustration. Some 
were determined to take a different course of action. Pike asserts that ‘most were 
prepared to wait and hope. But a few professional men whose only capital was their 
knowledge and skill and a few parents whose sons were forced into hopeless 
competition with the protegés of the great were tortured by the disappointment of their 
hopes for colonial adventures.’124 Pike’s argument was not that the early founders of 
South Australia were positioning themselves as somehow morally superior to others. 
 
122 Ibid., p. 8. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Rather, ‘the leaders of the South Australian pilgrims were ambitious middle-class 
townsmen with few claims to ‘good society.’125 Their motives were not just some sort 
of noble aspiration for the freedom of its institutions. South Australia was not viewed as 
a project whose purpose was purely to overcome the inequalities of the British system; 
it had to achieve the personal aspirations of the settlers. Established privilege had to be 
overcome. Pike goes on to argue: ‘If in the new province they were to better their 
positions, South Australia had to be free and had to be respectable. But free institutions, 
free press, free trade and free churches were nothing if an aristocratic oligarchy with it’s 
exclusive social circle was transmitted to the colony.’126 
In New South Wales these values quickly incubated in contrast to the undiluted 
Britishness evolving in South Australia. Through the systematic colonisation of the 
Wakefield Plan, the English liberalism of key founders, such as John Stuart Mill as a 
member of the 1834 South Australian Association, contrasted with sections of anti-
English sentiment in the eastern convict experience. 
Russel Ward has argued for the distinctiveness of South Australia: ‘The fact that no 
convicts and relatively few Irishman immigrated directly to South Australia explains 
 
125 Ibid., p. 145. 
126 Ibid. Pike expresses this another way when he states: ‘For some the great advantage of 
South Australia was its freedom from political, social and religious frustrations. But by 
far the most important attraction was that land buyers were entitled to free passages for 
their labourers’ (Ibid., p. 150). 
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some real differences in outlook which are still discernible’.127 Moreover, the 
geographical isolation of South Australia from the experiences of the penal settlements 
on the eastern seaboard militated against the egalitarian flavour of Australian culture. It 
was as if there was almost an internal tyranny of distance between the mainstream 
socialising forces and the remoteness of Adelaide with its experiment in colonisation. 
Very little of the mainstream values of eastern societies and the Australian legend 
permeated Adelaide in its formative development. It was not until the Imperial 
Conferences of the 1880s regarding the possibility of Federation that South Australia 
engaged in a systematic dialogue with the Eastern States and, by that time, leading 
South Australian contributors, such as John Downer, had formed their views. 
However, the question needs to be asked: do all foundation events warrant the 
significance placed upon them by later generations, including the Downers. Douglas 
Pike, for example, argues that, whilst there is no doubt that South Australia enjoyed ‘for 
six years a unique position in the Empire’, everything had changed after this period. 
Pike argues: 
By 1842 South Australia had lost its most distinctive marks. It no longer had a 
special board of commissioners. It was brought under a general land and 
Emigration Law applying to all the Australian colonies. This position was 
 
127 Russel Ward, The Australian legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1958, p. 7. 
Carl Bridge has also observed the somewhat ambiguous attitude Ward held towards 
Britishness in South Australia and towards Australia more generally. He quotes Ward 
from the preface of Australia, published some seven years after The Australian Legend: 
‘Few Australians now feel any sense of contradiction between their nationality and their 
close association with Great Britain’. See Carl Bridge, ‘Anglo-Australian attitudes: 
remembering and re-reading Russel Ward’, Journal of Australian Colonial History, Vol. 
10, 2008, p. 196. 
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relegated to that of an ordinary Crown colony.128 
So one needs to distinguish between the substantive failure of the original principles of 
the Wakefield Plan and the enduring myths regarding South Australia’s origins. A 
parallel may be found in Russel Ward’s argument concerning the Australian legend, 
where he distinguishes between how Australians imagined themselves through the 
legend and the reality that most people lived in the cities and did not always manifest 
the qualities of self-reliance, independence and improvisation required by the bush 
ethos. South Australians have continued to argue for a difference which may not be 
historically based but forms a strong self-perception. 
Pike summarises this proposition in the following way: ‘Later argument has traced to 
the same source qualities permanently distinct from those of neighbouring colonies but 
the later conviction rests like many other articles of faith on assumptions more 
questionable than the conclusion.’129 In other words the assumptions of the ‘dazzling 
success’ of the Wakefield Plan need to be tested against the reality. Although it has been 
argued that South Australia ‘had one of the most auspicious starts ever enjoyed by a 
modern colony’, this obscures the fact that some years later this had changed and the 
state was experiencing ‘an ignominious retreat from its founding principles’.130 
However, what remains for this study is the question of the way in which South 
Australians, including the Downer family, perceived or imagined themselves as being 
free, liberal and set apart from the Eastern seaboard. This exceptionalism may be 
 





more a matter of a cultural mindset. 
A sense of personal responsibility and commitment to public affairs may have been 
prominent for some South Australians and in particular the Downers for their credo of 
nation building. Families such as the Downers developed a confidence based on a mix 
of this cultural mindset and their interpretation of its British liberal institutions. 
Furthermore, the principles they were pursuing found reinforcement in the education 
received by both Alick Downer and Alexander Downer at British educational 
institutions: Oxford and Newcastle Universities respectively. As free settlers of largely 
British Protestant ancestry, South Australians sometimes attempted to reproduce a 
British way of life in Adelaide. They were committed to the British institutions in which 
they had been raised; however, they were disillusioned with the English social 
structures that prevented them from fully experiencing their benefits. To them, South 
Australia was an opportunity to succeed individually. The path to success in the new 
colony was, however, often very uneven. 
By the time transportation was on the wane on the eastern seaboard, more than half of 
the assisted immigration was Irish. Furthermore, the first sixty years of New South 
Wales’ development represented a wide-ranging implementation of the penal system. A 
number of these convicts were Irish people who had deeply-held grievances towards the 
English. These resentments towards authority flourished in the numerically larger 
groups of emancipists and ‘currency lads’. It needs to be noted, however, that this Irish 
presence was in the minority. 
In contrast, there were no convicts in Adelaide and, as such, there was comparatively 
less resentment against the English. The phrase ‘currency lads’ was rarely used in 
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relation to South Australians, as it was a term indicating a certain pride in defining the 
essential differences of the new homeland against what some viewed as an English 
dominance. Whereas the currency lads had a deeply ingrained suspicion of authority, 
the South Australians held few of these Irish-Australian working class resentments. It is 
within this South Australian experience that John Downer developed an emphasis on 
English liberal values and the consolidating perception of the State’s foundational 
differences. Although the political structure of South Australia developed along similar 
lines to that of many of the Eastern States, the cultural self-perception of being a free 
settlement influenced its leaders. Russel Ward has further asserted this difference: 
South Australia and Western Australia were most completely insulated, by 
distance as well as by their lack of convict origins, from the social attitudes 
emanating from ‘Botany Bay’.131 
These influences were captured by Edward Wakefield in his unique Australian blueprint 
for the new Crown and chartered Colony. This was not limited to South Australia, as 
colonists in Canada and New Zealand reinterpreted their British origins and institutions 
for each different context. 
These reforming traditions from the Downers in South Australia had Benthamite 
origins, which Alexander Downer expressed in this way: 
Behind my Grandfather’s achievement in female suffrage and position on 
immigration was a deeply held South Australian view of the responsibilities 
within the Benthamite tradition. We were part of a new opportunity under the 
 
131 Russel Ward, op. cit., p. 8. 
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Wakefield Scheme and the new ideas being promoted at the time of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill.132 
Unlike the penal settlements of Sydney and Hobart, South Australia was conceived of as 
a fresh start for settlement away from the economic restrictions of England with no 
‘convicted felons’ allowed to be transported from Britain as part of its founding Charter. 
Wakefield had spent three years in Newgate prison, and he was not convinced that 
another settlement based upon penal servitude would be successful. Influenced by 
dialogue with Jeremy Bentham and his views on Britain’s Poor Law Reforms, colonial 
expansion provided the opportunity for enlightened social and political innovation.133 
Jeremy Bentham was a late convert to supporting Wakefield’s colonisation plans. 
However, before he died in 1832, he had become an advocate for the South Australian 
program. Edward Kittrell has observed: 
Though Jeremy Bentham was in his eighties and at the very close of his life 
when Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his plan of Systematic Colonization 
appeared, Bentham was one of the first eminent names to advance the 
program…Wakefield, quite early, set out to convince Bentham that this view 
 
132 Paul Brown, Interview with Alexander Downer, Sydney, 30 January 2015. 
133 Britain’s Poor Law Amendment Act was introduced in 1834. Based upon his 
‘avoidance of pain’ theory, Bentham was critical of the Act as he believed it would create 
government dependencies. Its main provision was to enforce workhouses as a pre-
condition for any government support: ‘Except as to medical attendance, and subject to 
the exception respecting apprenticeship herein after stated, all relief whatever to able-
bodied persons or to their families, otherwise than in well-regulated workhouses (i.e. 
places where they may be set to work according to the spirit and intention of the 43d of 
Elizabeth) shall be declared unlawful, and shall cease, in manner and at periods hereafter 
specified; and that all relief afforded in respect of children under the age of 16 shall be 
considered as afforded to their parents.’  
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was erroneous sending his early anonymous writings to the old man while still in 
Newgate prison–and he succeeded, at last, in overcoming Bentham’s economic 
objections.134 
Supported by contemporaries, such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill, Wakefield formed 
the South Australian Association, composed of twenty-one founding members, which 
conceived of a different land distribution model from that of Sydney and Hobart. 
Having analysed the Sydney penal experience in A Letter from Sydney, Wakefield 
quickly formed the opinion that the challenges and limitations of the Sydney colony 
were a direct result of land monopolisation. This was a control of land and labour 
through the influence of dominating individuals, such as John Macarthur. London had 
witnessed the return of two Colonial Governors from Sydney, Governor Bligh in 1810 
and Governor Macquarie in 1821, following the persuasive ability of Macarthur in the 
latter instance to influence the Bigge Report. Macarthur had argued that more free 
convict labour would be necessary for the wool industry to prosper in Sydney, despite 
the accompanying restrictions surrounding both convicts and emancipists. The arbitrary 
nature of land distribution was becoming an increasing concern for the Colonial Office. 
A.W.P. Whimpress has argued that Wakefield was convinced a different colonisation 
model was required for South Australia, as: ‘The British Government considered that 
the haphazard and inequitable land distribution in New South Wales, including 
squatting practices had become apparent.’135 In London, Wakefield was able to 
 
134 E.R. Kittrell, ‘Bentham and Wakefield’, Economic Inquiry, 4: 28–40, 1965, 
doi:10.1111/j, p. 28.  
135 A. W. P. Whimpress, ‘The Wakefield model of systematic colonisation in South 
Australia: An examination with particular reference to its economic aspects’, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of South Australia, 2008, p. 40. 
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convince Sir James Stephen, British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, that a 
sufficient price for land would be necessary to attract the preferred profile of antipodean 
settler and then that these funds should be used to pay for qualified labour to be brought 
back into South Australia.136 This virtuous circle of emigration, capital and labour 
ultimately won the acceptance of the British Government. 
Given the social and economic problems being faced in England, the proposed 
settlement represented a new paradigm of opportunities for British and European 
settlers to find a fresh start in South Australia. Wakefield expressed the need to replicate 
British institutions and sensed this solidarity in the first settlers gathered at the South 
Australian Association in London in 1834: ‘They feel too the great expediency of 
rendering the Colony as like as possible to England from the very beginning of its 
career.’137 Jeremy Bentham had supported Wakefield and his ‘new technique of 
colonisation’, leading Edward Kittrell to note: 
The evidence indicates that substantive changes of theory were not involved in 
his later support of Wakefield’s plan of Systematic Colonisation. His 
[Bentham’s] reasons for the adoption of the latter’s program were due to the new 
technique of colonisation espoused by Wakefield; and, had he lived, his 
probable differences with other economists would have revolved around 
Wakefield’s doctrine of the sufficient price and not on analytical differences 
 
136 R.C. Mills, The colonization of Australia, p. 257. 
137 E.G. Wakefield, New British province of South Australia, second edition, 1835, p. 141.  
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pertaining to the effects of capital accumulation on the rate of profits.138 
Following the success of a number of his publications, Wakefield gained an audience of 
a new league of political thinkers, in addition to Bentham, who were prepared to support 
his proposals. One of these political philosophers who proved paramount in legitimising 
his blueprint, was the emerging patron of South Australian liberalism, John Stuart Mill. 
The rapidly changing nature of English society, resulting from the industrialisation and 
urbanisation forces of the nineteenth century, were demanding different responses from 
society’s leaders. Political philosophers were challenged to provide new solutions, as 
England was being overwhelmed with social and political problems. The timing of and 
resistance to Britain’s new Poor Law Reforms had proved decisive in Wakefield’s 
proposals garnering new interest from a diverse range of stakeholders, including the 
British Government. 
Britain’s liberal institutions and parliamentary system were not being brought into 
question; they were just being overwhelmed. John Stuart Mill had commended South 
Australia as an alternative to Britain in an article entitled ‘The New British Province in 
South Australia’: 
We conclude by most strongly recommending this little tract to all who are 
interested, either as citizens, in the means of relieving the industry of their 
country from the evils of an over-crowded society, or as individuals, in 
withdrawing themselves personally from those evils.139 
 
138 E.R. Kittrell, op. cit., p. 31. 
139 J. S. Mill, ‘The new British province in South Australia’, Examiner, 20 July 1834. 
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Wakefield was influential through his publications, in particular a A Letter to Sydney, 
and quickly gained the interest of those committed to changing the eastern Australian 
colonial experience. His second major publication, ‘A New British Province; or a 
Description of the Country, illustrated by Charts and Views: With an Account of the 
Principles, Objects, Plans, and Prospects of the Colony, 1834’, would expand this theme 
of replicating British institutions in their entirety, not partially, whilst maintaining 
British parliamentary and economic institutions, as the ideal configuration. Mill was 
centrally concerned with the British Poor Laws Amendment Bill of 1834 and the fact 
that Britain’s lower classes, in the movement from rural to city living, were incapable of 
supporting themselves, owing to their unemployment and minimal wages. Settler 
colonisation in foreign fields, such as South Australia, represented the ‘most feasible’ 
opportunity, Mill wrote in 1830, to remove the ‘immediate pressure of pauperism.’140 
John Stuart Mill himself even contemplated emigrating to South Australia, contending 
that ‘the “colonial reformers,” as they came to be known, were the protagonists of the 
liberal canon ‘battling against tradition and the political establishment.’141 What is less 
appreciated are the considerable number of correspondents Mill had created amongst 
influential South Australian families during these formative years. These were 
influential foundational South Australian families, with whom the Downers were 
indirectly connected, creating family and political forces of enduring significance. More 
specifically, the liberalising views of race emanating from this tradition influenced 
 
140 J.S. Mill, ‘The labouring agriculturalists’, Examiner, 19 December 1830, CW, 22, p. 
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Alick Downer’s attitudes in areas such as immigration policy. 
John Stuart Mill saw in the South Australian proposal an opportunity for families, such 
as the Downers, to begin England again, not by selecting parts, but by giving its liberal 
institutions a new canvas to fully express itself. Mill envisaged it in this way: 
Like the Grecian colonies, which flourished so rapidly and so wonderfully as 
soon to eclipse the mother cities, this settlement will be transformed by 
transplanting an entire society, and not a mere fragment of one. English colonies 
have almost always remained in a half-savage state for many years from their 
establishment. This colony will be a civilized country from the very 
commencement.142 
Mill was arguing here that the British model, given a new context, would ‘flourish’ like 
ancient Greece, providing the potential for its colonies to outperform themselves. 
Surveying Britain’s colonial expansion, Mill could see a piecemeal attempt to 
implement the British social and political structures. His reference to ‘a half savage state 
from their establishment’ is an oblique reference to the penal servitude model of prior 
English settlements.143 He was seeking to adopt the full liberal model ‘from the very 
commencement’, in order to provide security and stability to enable socially progressive 
reforms. With such rich beginnings, it was believed that future citizens, such as the 
Downers, would be empowered to implement social reforms anchored in the success of 
the ‘transplanted’ British liberal institutions. In his later years, when he adopted a 
 
142 J.S. Mill, ‘Wakefield’s The new British province of South Australia’, Examiner, 20 July 




socialist position, Mill would be critical of his support for British imperialism, but in 
these influential statements in 1834 he was providing the policy fuel for the systematic 
colonisation model that Wakefield was advancing. Moreover, this was occurring at a 
time when Wakefield lacked the same personal credibility and standing with the British 
Government, having earlier spent three years in prison. 
Australian political historians have rarely failed to note Mill’s influence on conservative 
Australian political philosophy. However, his personal involvement in the foundations 
of and political influence on liberals such as the Downers in South Australia requires 
further elucidation. To fully appreciate Mill’s proposals, one needs to appreciate the 
extent of his desire to maintain the complete suite of British parliamentary, legal and 
educational institutions by ‘transplanting an entire society’ to South Australia.144 In 
1834, Mill wrote four articles in the Examiner and The Morning Chronicle defending 
Wakefield against many critics including the influential newspaper, the Times of 
London.145 In his review of Wakefield’s new publication entitled ‘The New British 
 
144 New British province of South Australia, 1835, second edition, p. 205; Wakefield’s 
letter to the South Australian Commissioners, 2 June 1835; Appendix to Report of Select 
Committee on South Australia, 1841. 
145 John Stuart Mill also advanced these arguments in his debate with The Times over the 
proposed South Australian Colony: ‘The grand recommendation of this scheme of 
Colonization is, that it is a plan of making emigration pay its own expenses. Every one 
admits, and every one must admit, that if a portion of our labourers could be removed 
from the country, where they are now earning a scanty and precarious subsistence, and 
placed in a new and fertile country, under the best arrangements which could be desired 
for giving the greatest possible productiveness to their labour, the surplus of what they 
would there produce, above what they can produce in their present situation, would form 
a fund sufficient, in a year or two at farthest, to repay with interest the whole expense of 
their emigration. Now, this fund, by the present scheme, is to be taken hold of by the 
State, by a very simple mode of taxation, the sale of public lands. And thus the expenses 
of emigration will be paid for out of the increase to the general wealth of the world, 
produced by emigration itself; the increased produce of the emigrant’s own labour will be 
made available to pay the expenses of his emigration’, ‘The new colony’, Examiner, 6 
July, p. 419.  
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Province of South Australia’, Mill put forward his most complete discussion of the 
conservative argument for the proposed colony of South Australia. 
Central to Mill’s thesis were his persistent criticisms of the partial and inconsistent 
nature of previous attempts at English settlement. The belief that settler colonisation 
would be sufficient just because it was done by the British was heavily criticised by 
both Mill and Wakefield. Mill was less concerned with a preference for Englishmen to 
be the implementers of change than he was with ensuring that English liberal 
institutions be relocated in South Australia. Just as Edmund Burke, who had supported 
the American Revolution, was critical of the way Englishman had failed to appreciate 
the American demand for ‘no taxation without representation’, Mill was arguing that the 
British system needed to be transplanted to the south as an integrated model for the new 
settlers to interpret. 
One may attempt to limit the impact of John Stuart Mill’s influence to his considerable 
writings on the matter of settler colonisation. However, Mill’s involvement with early 
South Australian families, which included that of Henry Downer, is difficult to 
minimise. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, women’s suffrage leaders such as 
Mary Lee were referring to the works of John Stuart Mill to add credibility to their 
progressive views.146 
As mentioned previously, Alexander Downer is a descendent of three of the foundation 
families, including the Gosses and the Russells. Mill was in correspondence with a 
number of leading South Australians at the same time that John Downer was being 
 
146 Mary Lee, ‘Letters to women’, South Australian Register, 21 March 1890, p. 7. 
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admitted to the Bar as one of South Australia’s brightest lawyers in March 1867. Mill 
was in ongoing communication with barristers and ng citizens, such as Henry Chapman, 
who advocated for the secret ballot, as to the Colony’s progress and prospects. Within a 
small community, originally 546 in 1836 and rising to only 17 933 by 1860, this 
formative interaction between Mill and its citizens reinforced the utilitarian influences 
in South Australia. 
The struggle between the South Australian Association formed by Wakefield and the 
British government was not a philosophical one. Both could see the merit of a new 
society based upon the British model and the vision of John Stuart Mill. The challenge 
for Wakefield and the newly formed Association was convincing the British 
government of how to fund the new colony.147 Britain had been hamstrung by 
Government expenditure in the Napoleonic wars, which had concluded in 1815, and 
was particularly concerned about further government funds heading overseas when so 
many pressing domestic matters were proving restrictive. 
 
147 Following the failure of the Swan River colony in Western Australia in 1829, there 
was little appetite to start new colonial adventures that were not underpinned by proven 
funding models. Wakefield’s systematic colonisation would provide further opportunities 
for settlements like Western Australia to revisit their models. Wakefield had such 
influence as to have the Perth Gazette provide the following editorial: ‘It was to the 
author of the Wakefield system that we are indebted for the discovery that “cheap land 
was the root of all evil in a colony.” Given a certain number of emigrants, however 
inexhaustible may be the supply of fertile land, it is better that only a certain proportion 
should become owners of the soil. The remainder ought to undertake those co-operative 
duties which can only be performed by hired service. And repugnant as may be the idea 
of remaining in the same condition of farm-labourer which the emigrant possibly 
conceived he had left behind him on the other side of the globe, there is the consolation 
for him that his supposed degradation is only temporary; while, as it is, he has chosen the 
least of two evils; for “the life of a servant, where servants are plentiful and well paid, is 
more eligible than the life of a master where servants are not to be had.” The 
arrangement, therefore, is best for himself, and certainly better for the community’ (Perth 
Gazette, 7 December 1849), p. 3.  
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What ultimately proved attractive to the British government was the innovative 
Wakefield funding solution. By creating a virtuous circle of funding, Wakefield was 
suggesting that the monies used to purchase the land by British individuals would be 
recycled to attract skilled labourers to emigrate to South Australia and support these 
ventures. This private enterprise model of funds being reinvested secured the interest of 
the government, ultimately enabling Wakefield’s proposal to be implemented. 
Jenny Booth has described this achievement in the following words: 
Faced with high rates of rural unemployment and stagnant domestic markets, it 
became essential to find a solution overseas. Yet cost remained a major 
nullifying factor in migration to Australia. As previously mentioned, until 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield suggested a nexus between payment for land and the 
provision of assisted passages, the British government had no formula to bring 
about a sizable increase in the Australian population. The availability of a labour 
pool would counteract a worsening shortage of convict labour and underpin a 
larger colonial society, with a consequent increased capital inflow.148 
South Australia was the only colony not to embrace convict transportation, which 
provided Jeremy Bentham, Edward Wakefield and the South Australian Association 
with the opening to convince the British Government that here was the opportunity to 
reverse the shortcomings of the eastern seaboard colonies with a more efficient model 
that would cost significantly less. Wakefield had previously written enthusiastically, at 
the age of twenty-four, of the undesirability of Sydney as a colony in A Letter to Sydney, 
 
148 Jenny Booth, ‘Emigration, economics or strategy? The British government and the 
South Australia Act 1834,’ Journal of Australian Studies, 27:80, 2003, p. 162. 
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which was published anonymously because of his earlier prison sentence. 
As we have observed, the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, with the hopes it inspired, 
and the wide currency of Bentham’s ideas on utilitarianism had given Wakefield a 
much-needed credibility. They had also directly impacted upon all those interviewed by 
the South Australian Association as potential settlers. Bentham had rejected the writings 
of Locke on natural rights and his influence on South Australia’s electoral 
administration from the 1850s onwards became increasingly evident. Although the 
Australian secret ballot was first implemented in Victoria in 1856, it was quickly 
followed in the same year in South Australia and not replicated in Britain until later in 
the century. 
In 1819 Jeremy Bentham had published his argument for connecting utilitarianism with 
electoral expansion in his paper, Radical Reform Bill. In addition to expanding the 
franchise, he originally proposed the secret ballot, which was implemented in the 
Australian ballot and proportionate electoral districts. There is a discernible thread here, 
beginning with Jeremy Bentham’s progressive aspirations through South Australia’s 
establishment to John Downer’s Federal constitutional contributions; this will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Jeremy Bentham’s influence was also manifest in his advocacy for women to obtain the 
franchise as early as 1818 in his tract, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation. The original influence of Jeremy Bentham helped ferment a more tolerant 
South Australian reception to progressive electoralism.149 Women’s rights, like the 
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debate over race in the Immigration Restriction Act, were not so much areas for 
adversarial opposition by John Downer as moderate appeals to human dignity. 
Following Bentham’s death in 1832, John Stuart Mill continued Bentham’s association 
with South Australia as a proponent of women’s rights, culminating in the publication 
On the Subjection of Women in 1869. 
One determinative area which provided a continual challenge to John Downer was 
balancing his dual career ambitions as Premier of the Colony of South Australia and the 
establishment of a Federal structure for Australia.150 Downer’s achievement in being 
elected Premier of South Australia on two separate occasions–first from 16 June 1885 to 
11 June 1887 and second from 15 October 1892 to 16 June 1893–was qualified by the 
manner in which he lost office in 1887. The second term of his Premiership in particular 
would prove to be short-lived, following the success of his long-time rival, Charles 
Cameron Kingston,151 who was able to win the election of 1893 and sustain himself in 
power until the end of the decade.152 
Probably one of the most important contributions of John Downer to nation building 
 
150 For a discussion of the role of South Australian political leaders in the Federal 
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even less public notice’ because ‘it lacked the true democratic inspiration.’ Conservatives, 
he suggested, were seeking to use the process for their own interests. He asked, ‘are there 
none supporting it [federation] in the hope that it may prove a check to democratic 
advance?’ What was needed, he argued, was that ‘public thought must be aroused, reason 
appealed to, and sentiment awakened’ (Graeme Osborne, ‘“We have enemies to oppose”: 
communication, class and the federation of Australia,’ Media History 8, No. 1, 2002.  
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was his contribution to the federation debates and then the creation and structuring of 
the High Court. Downer had been a delegate at one of the important early Federal 
meetings at the Australian Inter Colonial Conference, held in Sydney in 1883, and 
would ultimately become one of the six South Australian senators who were sworn in 
by the Governor-General on March 30, 1901. Downer was a substantial contributor to 
the federal movement. He had been invited to attend the first Imperial conference 
organised in London in 1887 whilst he was simultaneously the Premier of South 
Australia. He was one of only two Premiers invited to attend. However, in a 
circumstance somewhat reminiscent of the experience of another Liberal leader, Robert 
Menzies, when he was also absent in England for a sustained period of time and lost the 
Prime Ministership in 1941, John Downer, on his return to South Australia, found he 
had been removed as Premier. 
Playford argued that ‘he left the ministers and us. Things were bad enough when he 
went away. No question of policy was to arise in his absence?’ and further ‘Here we 
have the Colony in a great state of depression with people looking for the Government 
to propound some policy to give confidence to the country and yet we find the head of 
the Government leaving the Colony’. Playford ridiculed Downer for the contributing to 
the opening of the Conference, but not being there in attendance at the opening of a 
crisis in South Australia. This lack of judgment by Downer was critical to the survival 
of his government. The Advertiser reported: ‘The ministerial benches presented a too 
painful blank. Goliath was away and sent David in its place and David looked 
uncomfortable’.153 Comparisons were made with the Victorian Premier who had not 
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chosen to leave his duties at home to travel to England. 
In attempting to provide a national public service in the vision of a united federal 
Australia, Downer had not only lost his Premiership upon return, but he had also lost his 
favoured youngest brother, Harold. His sense of disappointment was compounded by 
the death of Harold, of which he was informed when he arrived home on 12 June 1887. 
Harold had passed in the early hours of Monday, 23 May from tuberculosis at age 39. 
As there were no communication technologies on board the Parramatta when he 
disembarked at Glenelg on June 12, Downer arrived to find his world irrevocably 
changed. He had received a knighthood on the recommendation of Robert Gascoyne-
Cecil, the third Marquess of Salisbury, to the Queen and contributed to laying the 
foundations for Federation. However, his controversial attendance at this inaugural 
meeting, necessitating his absence, had cost his party power, causing widespread 
resentment. 
As Premier, Downer had been able to introduce protectionist measures which had 
supported local industries and hence his political position whilst he was in South 
Australia. With Downer away, the Ministry he had left behind was unable to raise these 
same protectionist arguments effectively in the election campaign and, together with the 
South Australian depression, this contributed to the Party’s loss. Downer’s party 
welcomed him home with a somewhat lukewarm response, questioning his judgement. 
The implication was that he could have done more for them by being in Australia at the 
time than by promoting Federation about which some South Australians were still 
ambiguous. Ironically, whilst absent in 1887, ignoring his constituency, he had been 
nevertheless cultivating successful long-term relationships with Barton and Deakin on 
the long ship voyage to England, relationships which would yield considerable success 
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for him in these Federal Conventions. Subsequently, he was elected as a delegate to the 
Federal Convention on 4 March 1897 and invited to attend the Federal Convention in 
Adelaide from 2 March until 23 April 1897. Following these achievements, he attended 
the next Federal Convention in Sydney between 2 September 2 and 24 September 
1897.There continued a series of federal meetings which would ultimately result in 
Federation and his election to the Senate of Australia in 1901. John Downer’s keen 
sense of public service had led him to make decisions which could not sustain both 
federal and colonial service simultaneously. His party clearly viewed his decision to 
leave South Australia when a State election was due as evidence of poor judgement. 
How could an election be won when the Premier was away fighting for federal issues 
which many in South Australia, were not supportive of in any case? This was further 
evidenced by the fact that, when the first referendum was held in 1899, only 53 120 
people voted out of a population of 150 000. Previously, Downer had spoken to a well-
advertised Federation function in the town of Gawler in his beloved Barossa Valley to 
find only one hundred people in attendance. Clearly national Federation issues were not 
always South Australian concerns and this failure to identify the difference may have 
contributed to his untimely demise as Premier in 1887. 
As one of six Senators elected from South Australia in the first Parliament, John 
Downer found a wider forum for his progressive conservatism. Contrary to his persona 
as a reactionary anglophile, John Downer provided an alternative voice in areas such as 
women’s suffrage, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and the Judicial Bill of 
1903. It is in this last area that, surprisingly, John Downer seems to contradict his image 
as following Britain at whatever cost and this requires further analysis. Britishness had 
its limits for John Downer and this was somewhat predictive of Alexander Downer who 
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would later abandon his father’s unqualified acceptance of everything British. 
The central debate was around the structure of the judiciary in Australia within the 
Constitution and the establishment of the High Court, when a Privy Council already 
existed in Britain. 
It may have been assumed that Downer would naturally argue for the retention of the 
Privy Council as the main instrument for referral and revision of legal recourse. It was, 
after all, British. For the first half of 1903, the new Federal Parliament was consumed 
by this question and debate raged over the role of the Privy Council and whether the 
High Court should be assigned the major powers of referral within the judiciary. 
John Downer vigorously debated the case for the establishment of a High Court and its 
pre-eminence in the Australian judicial system. This was most clearly articulated in his 
speech to the Senate on Wednesday 5 August 1903, in which he laid out a systematic 
argument as to why the High Court needed to be established within the Constitution. 
Downer argued: 
At the time of the Convention an appeal to the Privy Council lay as a right in 
certain cases and is a favour in other cases, and an endeavour was made to alter 
that state of things. We thought that the time had come when Australia in these 
matters be self-contained.154 
Downer was referring to the two Federation conferences of 1891 and 1897. At the 1897 
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convention, delegates were looking at previously established examples of the role of the 
judiciary within the Constitution and conducted a comparison between the American 
Constitution and the Canadian Constitution. The first model was of Federalism and the 
second of Unification. 
In his defence of the Judicial Bill, Downer took a broader approach by contrasting the 
two fundamentally different examples. Downer was critical of the Canadian model, 
arguing that it was ‘altogether an impure Federation,…which is more in the nature of 
unification’.155 Whereas in the United States judges were appointed by the states, the 
Canadian judges were appointed by the central government. Downer argued that this 
left the Canadian states ‘subject to the Dominion government and liable to have [their] 
acts of Parliament vetoed by the Central executive.’156 He was opposed to the idea of 
the executive within the centralised system having disproportionate power. 
From the South Australian perspective, he was looking at the opportunity for the 
sovereignty of the states to be promoted at every opportunity, with a federated model in 
which ‘the sovereignty of the people as a whole’ was not compromised. The central 
flaw in the Canadian system, as Downer saw it, was that we ‘have the power of the 
states defined by the Constitution and all the power given to the Dominion’.157 The 








The American model which had emerged successful in both the conventions of 1891 
and 1897 would be the federated system that Australia would follow. Downer had 
formed a close relationship with Edmund Barton and they were now both leading the 
debates conducted in the 1903 Parliament. Downer contended that the American model 
which they had agreed upon was preferred because of this state-based sovereignty in 
which the states reserved to themselves the residuum of power. The Parliament or 
Congress within this Federation model had ‘the power which the states have conferred 
upon it preserving their own sovereignty throughout158. This was the converse, Downer 
argued, of the Canadian model with the executive or centralised government controlling 
the judiciary and determining the sovereignty limits of the states. 
Within this 1897 Federation model, ‘the judiciary are the very basement of the 
Constitution’.159 Flowing from the American model of Federation being argued for by 
Downer was the necessity of the role of the High Court as a ‘power of vindication’. 
Downer’s opponents, such as Victorian Senator Styles, objected to the need for the High 
Court, contending ‘there is such dignity in Parliament that the courts cannot interfere 
with it and why not’.160 This proposition asserted that the Parliament should be supreme 
and did not require any more checks, particularly when the British back stop was the 
Privy. To support this argument Downer outlined the ‘law of imperfect obligation’ 
where his opponents were arguing that Parliament should not be mandamused by a High 
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Court. Downer was cynical about the tendency of the executive and parliamentarians 
leaning towards unaccountability. Downer was maintaining that parliamentarians had a 
tendency to believe ‘our honour is so high that we are superior to the necessity of 
interference by courts of justice’. The sovereignty of the people with a judiciary was to 
be ‘the very basement of the people’. 
Downer contended that the Canadian system had failed precisely because it relied too 
much upon the executive without sufficient derivation of authority from the people 
within its constituent states. Without the sovereign power of the states and a strong 
‘vindicatory power’ being passed, the High Court would represent a failure of the 
Parliament in its obligations to implement the best available system for Federation and 
‘would be to associate Federation with a bad system of morality and a poor recognition 
of our obligations’. Moreover, Downer argued that ‘the Americans had done their best 
to preserve the power of the people’ and to recognise the necessity of preserving the 
sovereign power of the states, and requested that a vindicatory power through the High 
Court be established. In other words, this tribunal would be established as a ‘defender 
and protector of the smaller states against the aggression of the more populous states’.161 
At the centre of Downer’s concern for a tribunal such as the High Court was the 
unpopular parliamentary proposal that parliamentarians be submitted to continual 
scrutiny despite the belief of others that there is such a ‘dignity in Parliament’ that this 
was not required. Downer argued that the American Constitution was to be preferred 
with its two Houses, an Executive and a High Court. The High Court was to be the 





faction’ to discharge justice for the minority. When threatened by the majority, an 
appeal to the independent findings of the High Court would sit above factions in 
parliamentary groupings. 
Moreover, Downer was arguing that there was no need to reach out to a British sense of 
superiority to solve Australia’s problems: 
We were of the opinion that there was no necessity for appeal to a foreign 
tribunal which knew not our wants, which knew not the reasons for our 
legislation, which was absolutely unacquainted with our surroundings.162 
Having so geographically distant a Court that was not visible to the Australian public, 
the press and other agencies of revision, meant that decisions were being made which 
were ‘ignorant of its proceedings’ and that it ‘conducted its deliberations in the dark’. 
Only a High Court in Australia could provide the necessary transparency for the 
Australian electorate: ‘With the High Court in Australia we should have justice 
administered in the cold light of day instead of practically in a back room 13,000 miles 
away’.163 
Downer was contending that there were few checks and balances on the Privy Council, 
as ‘nothing is known of the proceedings until judgment is delivered’. He referred to the 
example of a recent Privy Council judgment in New Zealand where ‘the grounds on 
which they decide it might have been right, but the material was certainly all wrong’. 
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He was contending that the New Zealand public had been alienated from the democratic 
process and had no transparency around proceedings in the implementation of justice. 
Downer was an alternative voice at a time when other parliamentarians were arguing for 
the status quo and the pre-eminence of the Privy Council with arguments against the 
High Court on the grounds of its cost. In Downer’s estimation, this was short-sighted 
and the Australian nation demanded more. 
Much of the opposition Downer encountered to the establishment of the High Court 
came not only from the Labor Party, but from his own side of politics. Patrick Glynn, a 
fellow South Australian but a Free Trader, was as opposed to creating a High Court as 
Downer was favourable to the initiative. Downer had to meet head-on the objection 
forwarded by Glynn that State Courts were sufficient and, if necessary, appeals to 
Federal Courts would be implemented. He argued that the Privy Council was, in the 
opinion of parliamentarians, such as Glynn and William Wilks, more than capable of 
meeting Australia’s needs. 
Wilks also cast a shadow over the motivations of new Federal parliamentarians: 
We have been told that we require a High Court, the members of which have had 
parliamentary experiences, and we may reason to believe in further from this that the 
first appointments to the court will be purely political. This will not specially 
recommend the proposal to the public, because those who have had a hand in the 
framing of the Constitution.164 
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In other words, the creation of the court was self-serving and gave an opportunity for 
constitutional lawyers (and here he was referring to parliamentarians such as John 
Downer) to secure office as High Court judges. This was a financial burden for a new 
emerging Federation which was not justified by its benefits. He went on to argue that 
the High Court was not necessary, as ‘the citizens of the Commonwealth will still avail 
themselves of their right to an appeal to the Privy Council.’ Wilks was correct in this 
point regarding the Privy Council, as the legislation proposed by Edmund Barton was 
for the establishment of the High Court, but not at the expense of the Privy Council. The 
Privy Council would continue to exist and, in the eyes of Wilks and Glynn, was 
therefore duplicating the work of the High Court. 
Wilks resented the arguments presented against the conservative point of view of 
maintaining the primacy of state Courts when he stated: ‘The Prime Minister has no 
right to suggest that those of us who have opposed the Bill do so because we are 
governed by exterior influences’.165 Wilks was expressing his sensitivity to the 
argument that the opponents of the new Judicial Bill were tugging their forelocks before 
their British overseers. Wilks countered Downer’s arguments in his address to the 
House on 11 June 1903 by outlining the various local press and intellectual opposition 
to the proposed legislation of Barton and Downer. He asserted: 
In Victoria the Argus and the Age are both opposed to the measure and the press 





people on public questions.166 
He went on to oppose Downer’s position by asking whether the press, ‘because they are 
of the opinion that the immediate establishment of a High Court is not one of the 
requirements of the people fairly are to be called violent enemies of the Constitution’.167 
Downer and Glynn were in direct opposition over the role of the Privy Council. It was 
the lightning rod within the Judicial Bill and the issue which revealed Downer’s 
progressive conservatism most clearly. 
G.B. Edwards, Free Trade Member for South Sydney, expressed his view that the 
debate, whilst being discussed within the boundaries of Britishness, nevertheless boldly 
advocated a certain confidence for Australians to design their own judiciary: 
The Privy Council, like many other institutions, is a time-honoured body, but it 
no longer meets the exigencies of the Empire, and much less the needs and 
necessities of Australia.168 
Downer disagreed with Glynn in particular over the structure of the Privy Council and 
the relevant expertise of its members. He observed that, as there were fifteen members 
of the Council, only four were required to form a quorum. He was concerned that if a 
quorum contained four members who may have been expert in commercial and ordinary 
law disputes drawn from a British jurisdiction, they may not have the necessary 
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expertise to address constitutional cases for the Australian context. 
Downer was also concerned that the Privy Council, in forming its decisions, would 
draw on precedents from other dominions, such as Canada, which were substantially 
different in design to Australia. There also existed the problem of particular decisions in 
Canadian cases being read into the Australian Constitution. Downer was asserting the 
progressive belief that Australian judges were uniquely positioned, by comparison with 
the British, to interpret their own Constitution as they would be ‘permeated with 
Australian ideas’. Both Patrick Glynn and John Downer were South Australians. Both 
were concerned with the intrusive role of Federal governments over the rights of South 
Australians. Glynn in particular was reluctant to concede that there was a justification 
for establishing yet another judicial body. Glynn stated: ‘[W]e shall soon be about the 
most judicially overmanned race on the face of the globe’.169 
As early as the second session of the 1897 Convention, Glynn had proposed an 
amendment which would have abolished direct appeals to the Privy Council. Originally, 
he was supportive of the High Court, but only to the extent that its role was not reduced 
by the retention of the right to appeal to the Privy Council. The fact that the Privy 
Council was continuing made the new Judiciary Bill and the arguments contained 
therein problematic. Glynn asserted: ‘Until we have abolished appeals to the Privy 
Council we shall not have the final word as to the interpretation of the Constitution’.170 
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Glynn outlined his case by arguing for the supremacy of State Courts, as they alone 
understood local state issues, further empowered by a State Supreme Court. Moreover, 
there was a direct line of appeal from the State Supreme Courts, such as in South 
Australia, to the Privy Council. Glynn contended: ‘[I]f it is correct that a litigant can 
appeal from a decision of a State Supreme Court direct to the Privy Council upon 
federal matters that appeal will lie upon every other matter that arises’.171 Glynn was 
arguing that, until this anomaly could be resolved, the Judicial Bill, supported by 
Downer, was duplicating legal avenues of appeal and creating a plethora of courts. He 
contended that the Supreme Court of the States, an appellate court in a Commonwealth 
industrial arbitration Court, in addition to similar state tribunals, were creating not only 
legal and bureaucratic entanglements, but extra costs for the Commonwealth which 
could not be sustained. 
Both Downer and Glynn appealed to their South Australian origins as justification for 
their respective positions, but for polarised reasons. Whereas Glynn was arguing that the 
smallest states, such as South Australia, needed to have strong localised legal 
infrastructures, Downer was arguing that the High Court was the safeguard in the 
original agreement by South Australia to Federation. Downer contended that South 
Australia would never have agreed to being part of the Federation movement without 
the protection of the High Court. Downer argued: ‘I say unhesitatingly that without the 





have been accepted in South Australia.’172 
Throughout his own campaign, Downer repeatedly pressed the argument for the 
inextricable connection between Federation and the necessity of the High Court. His 
argument was that the overwhelming numbers held against South Australia would 
militate against its best interests, unless there was an independent arbiter ‘above 
politics’. Downer argued: ‘In our campaigns I pointed to the High Court as being the 
protection we should have against your greater numbers.’ In this sense ‘the High Court 
was to be above Parliament’ and had a unique role to play in South Australia’s future. 
The Constitutional inclusion of the High Court, together with the achievement of 
Federation ,demanded that the High Court ‘defend the rights of the small states.’173 
South Australia would never have supported Federation without this assurance: ‘The 
result of Federation would be that they would be merged in New South Wales and 
Victoria’. He further observed that, while New South Wales had taken a ‘broader view’, 
Victorian members ‘have a strong disposition against the principle of equality of 
representation in the Senate’.174 Downer was asserting that the Victorian members were 
looking to oppose this Constitutional reform. However, as the Constitution had been 
passed by the referendum, it was now necessary to understand that ‘the High Court was 
created by the Constitution’ and was inseparable. Downer was insistent that the two 
could not be separated. Attempts to diminish the importance of the High Court with 
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arguments that the Privy Council was still in operation and had not been superseded did 
not give full recognition to the people’s vote in the referendum for the changes in 
acceptance of the Constitution. 
In this sense, arguments put forward by Glynn revolved around the States being self-
sufficient and not needing protection at a federal level. While the smallest states needed 
protection, it was not to come, in Glynn’s view, from the High Court as the ‘defender of 
the rights of the smallest states’, but in the self-contained jurisdiction already existing in 
the relationship between the courts and the South Australian Supreme Court.175 
Whilst Glynn had pursued an almost reactionary position based upon the ultimate veto 
of the mother country’s Privy Council, Downer maintained the broadest national view 
of the role of the Constitution and the importance of the High Court. He eschewed the 
fall-back position represented by the British Privy Council and rejected the argument for 
states’ rights over national concerns as a federalist. Downer was to make his mark in the 
Senate largely through the strength of these arguments. He would ultimately be 
unsuccessful in his quest to be appointed a High Court judge, but not because the 
Judicial Bill and the High Court were successful. 
Arising from this issue was Downer’s role in expanding the number of High Court 
judges from three to five. This was a contentious element of the debate with the 
conservatives in the case of Wilks, Styles and Glynn arguing for small numbers on the 
grounds that having more High Court judges could not be justified on the basis of cost 
and utility. Downer, as a constitutional lawyer, may at this point have had a personal 
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self-interest in the expansion of the number of High Court judges. He was arguing that 
the High Court judges needed to be sourced from all the States and constitutional 
lawyers, such as himself, may have been in a privileged position. Downer may have 
been attempting to maximise his own qualifications for the role, particularly given his 
involvement in the Constitutional Conferences of 1891 and 1897. The extent to which 
Downer may have been ‘feathering his nest’ is open to interpretation. He argued that the 
cost of increasing the number of judges was not a valid ground for objection. He 
contended: ‘I wish only once more to express my regret that a pecuniary consideration 
of some 10 000 pounds should have led another place to agree that this High Court 
should be reduced in numbers and therefore reduced in dignity’.176 
Although Downer argued that new constitutional lawyers would be needed as a 
minimum qualification to be High Court Judges. In doing so he raised the criteria, 
stating: ‘The judges to administer this Constitution ought to be much more than lawyers. 
They ought to be great constitutional lawyers from the Federal point of view.’ Given his 
considerable experience and achievements in the federal sphere this may have been self-
serving in the final analysis. 
Glynn drew on the example of the Supreme Court of America. He argued that, eleven 
years after its establishment the number of heard cases was five, ‘while during all those 
years only six were down for hearing’. Despite this, he argued, ‘the Attorney-General 
asks us to agree to a heavy expenditure for the creation of the new tribunal’. Glynn 
asserted that because the Privy Council would be the final court of appeal there would 
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be very few cases to be heard by the High Court. 
Glynn, as a member of the Free Traders, was also concerned about the rights of the 
individual which were independent of the decisions of the courts. In an argument 
reminiscent of John Stuart Mill and the South Australian Association, he argued that 
‘our liberties rest upon such charges as the Magna Carta and upon the declaration of 
rights’. Glynn was aware of the importance of the courts, but believed that the rights of 
the individual were beyond judicial frameworks, asserting that: ‘Although matters of 
great importance had without doubt been decided by the courts the instances in which 
the liberties of the people have been defined by the courts are very few indeed’.177 
He was somewhat cynical about the efficacy of courts to maintain the freedoms of the 
individual, ‘it sounds very nice to say that the Courts are the protectors of the liberties 
of the people but as a matter of fact they are very seldom required to act that part’.178 He 
also claimed that Deakin’s argument that there is a mandate in the Constitution for the 
creation of the court was tenuous, as Section 73 of the Constitution provided for the fact 
that ‘this court can be immediately taken away’. 
John Downer retired from the Australian Senate on December 31, 1903 and was 
subsequently elected as Member for the Southern District of the South Australian 
Legislative Council on 27 May 1905. 
The political heritage of John Downer defies neat categorisation. His liberal ambitions 
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were often qualified by practical political restraints. In the final analysis his family’s 
characterisation of him ‘as having more in common with the Whitlam era’ needs to be 
approached with caution. His early fervent involvement in favour of woman’s suffrage 
and concerns over the Immigration Restriction Act were later moderated by challenges 
and revisions necessitated by his personal political experiences. 
Nevertheless, his family influence has been enduring. Alexander Downer has observed: 
Behind my Grandfather’s achievement in female suffrage and position on 
immigration was a deeply held South Australian view of the responsibilities 
within the liberal tradition and noblesse oblige. Like Disraeli and the later 
policies of Joseph Chamberlain he took the view that all classes were organically 
connected, not superior, and had responsibilities to each other.179 
Reconciling the conservative disposition of John Downer with his liberal values can be 
understood in the same way the majority of Australians viewed their lives through a 
prism of pan-Britishness. Downer’s cultural Britishness could lead him to advocate 
social liberal reforms whilst defending the British Empire and remaining loyal 
throughout this period of national formation and Federation. As John Bannon has 
observed that this ‘combination of conservative values with a liberal approach….might 
seem at odds, but at the time they were viewed as progressive and compatible’.180 
John Downer was an alternative voice on female suffrage and immigration policy at 
various times, but not consistently. He was a robust defender of tribunals, such as the 
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High Court, to check excessive executive overreach. For many Australians ‘nourished 
by a glorious literature and haunted by old memories’, the question nevertheless 
remained as to what form an emerging national identity, understood through this 
Britishness, would take in a newly federated Australia.181 For John Downer, his South 
Australian cultural background as a source of ‘opportunity and enlightenment’ enabled 
his conservatism to express itself in many seemingly contradictory forms to the extent 
that he could state on 9 April 1902 in the federal debate on women: ‘I vote for this 
measure practically because I think it a highly conservative measure. I think that women 
are better than men, and have purer and higher notions.’182 
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Chapter Four  
Formative Influence of Menzian Liberalism 
Menzies and my father were very close and this meant I was the witness to many 
conversations regarding the nature of liberalism and conservatism whilst we 
lived in both Australia and in England. They both shared the same beliefs in 
personal freedom and responsibility and when they referred to conservatism, 
which was a word they seldom used, it was how to progress change in the 
Burkean sense of conservatism.183 
The second of my conclusions is that, in envisaging the future world after the 
war, we should not seek to destroy this driving progressive element which really 
represents one of the deep-seated instincts of man, but should seek to control 
and direct it in the interests of the people as a whole. In other words, the choice 
is not between an unrestricted capitalism and a universal socialism. We shall do 
much better if we keep the good elements of the capitalist system, while at the 
same time imposing upon capital the most stringent obligations to discharge its 
social and industrial duty.184 
The Downer family are inextricably linked with Robert Menzies. Alick Downer was a 
close friend of Robert Menzies throughout his life. Menzies visited him wherever he 
lived whether it was South Australia at Arbury Park or Wiltshire in England when he 
was High Commissioner. Alexander Downer was directly influenced by his father's 
close relationship with Menzies and the development of a new type of liberalism which 
led to seven electoral victories following World War Two. Menzies was a mentor and a 
confident to the Downer family and needs to be examined as part of the formative 
influence of Alexander Downer through his family associations. 
Downer drew from Menzies important formative influences on policy. Firstly the 
 
183 Interview with Alexander Downer, 1 February 2015. 
184 R.G. Menzies, ‘Forgotten speeches’, Has capitalism failed?, No. 21, 7 August 1942.  
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relationship of the state and the individual in its influence upon policy formation around 
human rights and the encroachment of the state upon individual freedoms. Secondly 
nation-building needed to be secured by national security. In his maiden speech 
Alexander Downer noted the importance for him in his career lay with a commitment to 
a strong world order clearly influenced by Menzian liberalism. Many of the arguments 
that Downer provides in his opening speech are found in the writings of Menzies. 
Menzies talks about the forgotten people and the four freedoms just as Downer refers to 
the three freedoms in his major speeches. Downer contended that nation building at its 
heart required commitment to national security as a priority policy and set this in his 
speech as his benchmark for his nation-building: 
As a former member of the Australian diplomatic service I would feel negligent 
in this, my maiden speech, if I said nothing about the security of our nation. I do 
so not because it is currently an issue of public controversy, and of very serious 
public controversy, but because it stands as the grandest illustration of what I 
and my electorate believe to be the national interest.185 
Downer argued that there was evidence that even his own Party had lost track of the 
importance of maintaining this minimum requirement for the nation to grow 
successfully. He was constantly, throughout his career, echoing this appeal for national 
building through international security. In this chapter we will analyse the speeches and 
writings of both Menzies and where they both appeal to the same arguments. 
Importantly for this chapter Downer identifies the priority he puts around international 
 
185 Hon. Alexander Downer, Inaugural Speech as Leader of the Opposition, House of 
Representatives, Australian Parliament, Hansard, May 1994. 
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security for nation building with Menzies achievement in establishing this in post war 
Liberal Party policy. It is Menzies who sets the tone and the standards for developing, 
particularly within the Cold War, the approach that Downer is advocating. In his maiden 
speech he refers to the complacency in the 1930's with regards to appeasement and the 
role that Britain took and sets this as the first principle in his policy priorities for nation 
building. He argued that national security had become a complacent assumption in 
Australian national life stating: 
The debate is between those who are prepared to guarantee peace through 
strength and deterrence and those who just hope war and conflict will go away. 
The generation of the 1930s in Britain and France which demanded peace 
through unilateral disarmament ended that decade fighting the world's bloodiest 
and most destructive war.186 
He argued that the battle within the Western world over the importance of international 
security and military armament was about values over the ‘way of life’ for Australians. 
Downer asserted in his opening speech that his own Party had failed to stand up to the 
pressures on national security, had let ANZUS be weakened and that ’the political, 
moral and intellectual basis of the alliance is being challenged’.187  A ‘big Australia’ 
was being diminished as the importance of international security and military armament 
through ANZUS was being underminded: 






life-a way of life which is, and always has been, under threat. The Government's 
failure to address the fundamental political and moral bases of ANZUS has led 
to an intellectual vacuum which has been filled by naive cries for unilateral 
disarmament.188 
Upon his election to the leadership of the Liberal Party of Australia in May 
1994, Alexander Downer declared: ‘I am born of the Liberal Party, a creature of 
the Liberal Party and am imbued with the culture of the Liberal Party and its 
values’.189 His father had been a backbencher of the first Menzies Liberal 
Government in 1949, and being born two years later, Alexander Downer would 
be immersed in its new Liberal philosophy. Throughout his career, Alexander 
Downer has been inextricably linked through his close personal and family 
relationship to Menzies. Menzies was everywhere in his formative development. 
From his many personal visits to the Downer property at Arbury in South 
Australia, to Alick Downer’s time as High Commissioner to Great Britain from 
1963-1972 at Wiltshire in England, Menzies was a pervasive influence.190 Even 
in his final years, before his death in 1978, Menzies was asking after the 
 
188 Ibid. 
189 Hon. Alexander Downer, Inaugural Speech as Leader of the Opposition, House of 
Representatives, Australian Parliament, Hansard, May 1994.  
190 Robert Linn, Interview with Alexander Downer, National Library of Australia, Oral 
History and Folklore Branch Research, 2011, Oral TRC 6100/23. 
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progress of Alexander Downer.191 
Both Menzies and the Downers spent considerable time in each nation and could 
well be defined by Hancock’s dictum of ‘being in love with two soils.’192 It is 
tempting to view Menzies’ Britishness as somehow separate from mainstream 
Australia, as a type of high-Anglo cultural abstraction, but as the studies of 
Meaney and Curran have shown this was not the case. British race patriotism 
was, up until 1950, a widely held source of national identity in what Phillip 
Buckner has described as ‘the existence of little Britains overseas playing a role 
in shaping British attitudes in the construction of their own national identity.’193 
Linda Colley has argued that, as members of the Commonwealth, ‘in practice 
men and women often had double, triple or even quadruple loyalties’ and the 
Downers and Menzies often felt no identity pressure to choose.194 
Indeed, Australians of both political persuasions had an identification with 
British race patriotism. Menzies, for example, shared a bipartisan proclivity with 
Labor Prime Ministers John Curtin and Ben Chifley in viewing national identity 
 
191 Alick Downer, Six prime ministers, Melbourne, 1982, p. 58. Menzies mentored 
Downer right up to the last years of his life. Alick, in the last year of his own life, before 
he died of cancer in 1981, observed Menzies’ key influence in providing his final political 
advice: ‘In 1975, with Menzies crippled by two strokes and scarcely able to walk, he 
received Alexander at Haverbrack Avenue, Melbourne.’ Prior to this, Menzies visited the 
Downers repeatedly during their time at Oates, Wiltshire, England. ‘Whenever he came to 
Oates, if Alexander was home from school or university, he counselled him on his 
future...and gave him valued and considered advice which my son followed.’ 
192 W.K. Hancock, op. cit., p. 68. 
193 Phillip Buckner, ‘Whatever happened to the British Empire?’, Journal of the Canadian 
Historical Association, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, p. 32.  
194 Linda Colley, ‘Britishness and otherness: an argument,’ Journal of British of British 
Studies, 31, 1992, p. 319. 
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through Britishness. On 15 February 1944 speaking in Canberra on the two year 
anniversary of the fall of Singapore, Prime Minister Curtin stated: ‘After two 
years it may be said that Australia has survived her Dunkirk in a manner not 
unworthy of people who are members of the British race.’195 Reflecting on Ben 
Chifley’s criticisms of Britain and British policy in World War Two, Neville 
Meaney has observed that these were objections ‘about the Empire from inside 
the Empire.’196 He further argues that for Chifley, as well as for Menzies, 
‘Britishness meant more to the Australian prime minister than to the British 
themselves’.197 This Britishness, as an influence for Alexander Downer, 
therefore needs to be qualified by a recognition of its wider national acceptance 
as a means of understanding the range of responses to Menzian liberalism. 
Alexander Downer’s assessment of Menzies’ liberalism and social conservatism 
was one of open acceptance. Downer expressed the ongoing influence of 
Menzies’ political philosophy in the 25th Anniversary speech of his passing, 
quoting Menzies: 
We took the name ‘Liberal’ because we were determined to be a 
progressive party, willing to make experiments, in no sense reactionary 
but believing in the individual, his rights, and his enterprise, and 
rejecting the social panacea. 
 
195 Canberra Times, ACT, 15 February 1944.  
196 Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity: the problem of nationalism in 




As I [Downer] said at the outset, these principles are still as valid today 
as they were over a half-century ago.198 
Whilst the primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse the influence of Menzies 
upon Downer, as reflected in speeches and interviews, it is necessary to consider 
the consistency of Menzies’ liberalism and his claim for the Liberal Party ‘to be 
determined to be a progressive party’. Menzies’ biographer A.W. Martin argued 
that the task for the new Liberal Party following the collapse of the UAP was to 
‘stand for genuine liberalism’.199 John Latham, leader of the United Australia 
Party, also declared that Menzies was the man most likely, embodying a ‘robust 
liberalism’.200 The fact that Menzies, through the establishment of the Liberal 
Party, laid claim to a liberal tradition does not necessarily mean that at all points 
this was a consistent expression. Although Menzies permitted changes, albeit 
minor ones, to the White Australia Policy, such as the Dictation Test and the 
Emigration Act reforms, which we will examine in the next chapter, overall he 
was committed to maintaining the integrity of the policy throughout his sixteen-
year prime ministership. Why did Menzies concept of individual liberalism not 
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extend to wider racial inclusions in domestic policies, foreign policy towards 
Asia and the changing relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth to be 
examined in this chapter? 
Part of the answer lies in Menzies’ interpretation of Britishness. Together with 
his particular interpretation of international liberalism, he was squarely focused 
on the countries at the heart of the Old Commonwealth and struggled to come to 
terms with the New Commonwealth and the inclusion of more African nations. 
The private correspondence between British Prime Minister Macmillan and 
Menzies in 1962 provides an interesting insight into how Menzies viewed this 
change to world affairs following World War Two and the complex nature of his 
liberalism. Macmillan argued that World War Two had provided an explanation 
for the collapse of white pre-eminence in world affairs with the two periods of 
Europeans fighting each other culminating in the rejection of ‘the predominance 
of the whites.’201 
How could Europeans believe themselves to be superior to Asians and Africans 
when they had revealed themselves to be so ‘barbaric’ in their treatment of each 
other?202 This was Macmillan’s reluctant conclusion, which was not contradicted 
by Menzies. Macmillan felt that England’s position in the light of this was one 
of relative powerlessness. England simply did not enjoy the moral authority it 
once had in comparison to the previous spread of its Empire. 
 





The correspondence also reveals the inflexibility of Menzies’ liberalism. The 
two men approached the issue of the European Economic Community from 
different perspectives. Clearly, Menzies was regretful about England’s moves 
towards Europe from his Imperial lens in the antipodes. Macmillan’s position 
was that, given England’s decline in international authority, she now needed to 
engage more with Europe to prevent further problems as the Old 
Commonwealth was being subsumed by the New and had diminishing power to 
maintain the status quo. 
In contrast, Menzies’ response did not involve a reforming worldview where 
racial equality needed to be respected following the failure of white Europeans. 
Rather, it was a continuation of his condemnation of the African countries in 
particular, within the New Commonwealth. His correspondence shows an 
uncompromising rejection of African leadership, particularly in Ghana and 
Nigeria. In this sense, Menzian liberalism did not extend to a tolerance of a new 
Commonwealth order. Menzies attacked Ghana as the antithesis of democracy 
‘with five years of arbitrary “preventive detention” for political opponents’ and 
then, as part of a general criticism of the new Commonwealth ‘coloured’ 
nations, he commented: 
Why do we take such pains to keep countries like Ghana in the Commonwealth? 
They appear to have less affinity with our own conception of freedom than they 
have with Moscow and Peking. They will cheerfully use the threat (and follow 
the practice) of going to Moscow in order to extort aid from other 
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Commonwealth countries, particularly Great Britain.203 
Moreover he was insistent that people movements between nations in the 
Commonwealth not be discussed as he did not want migration flows with 
‘coloured nations’ in the New Commonwealth. The White Australia Policy 
needed to be protected from close examination in the light of the New 
Commonwealth’s rise. Speaking of the racial tensions in the New 
Commonwealth countries he reflected on the wisdom of opening up the question 
of people movements: 
If we were at liberty to discuss the internal racial policies of one member, it 
would be quite legitimate that at some subsequent meeting to discuss, for 
example, the Australian immigration policy which is aimed at avoiding internal 
racial problems by the expedient of keeping coloured immigrants out.204 
Thus, in analysing his claim to the liberal tradition, to what extent is a colour 
binary at work in Menzian liberalism which turned away from the call of Africa? 
Chris Waters has suggested that colour lay at the heart of Menzies’ interpretation 
of ‘world affairs’: 
What were the bases for this world hierarchy? Clearly race was an essential 
ingredient. Macmillan’s and Menzies’ writings are a history of the ‘whites’ 
against the ‘blacks, browns and yellows’. Race lay at the core of Macmillan’s 






of the imperial statesmen of their generation.205 
Frank Bongiorno has further suggested that Menzies had a ‘particular version of 
the liberal tradition he championed’.206 This version did not include a consistent, 
direct interest in Asian-Australian relations and this may have been different, 
Bongiorno argues, had Menzies followed the example of Alfred Deakin who, he 
suggests, forged a contrasting liberal tradition at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Bongiorno contends, for example, that Deakin conceived of Australia 
and India as having a ‘shared identity’ and had Deakin’s ‘intense fascination 
with Asia’ persisted in the Liberal Party, they may well have taken different 
policy directions in the twentieth century. He contrasts Deakin’s openness to 
Asia, particularly India, with Menzies’ imaginative disinterest. At the very 
minimum, the romance of Menzies’ imaginative constructions of England is 
noticeably absent in any reflections on Asia. 
This ‘narrowing’ of liberalism will also be analysed later against the competing 
claims for a more international liberalism in foreign policy from the ALP 
Menzies’ approach to Asia had significant implications for both immigration and 
foreign policy which will be reviewed in this chapter. 
Closely influenced by his father’s intimate relationship with Sir Robert Menzies, 
Downer, in the Annual Menzies Lecture speech recognising twenty-five years 
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since the passing of Menzies, identified ‘individualised’ liberalism as the new 
emphasis of Australian liberal conservatism. Following the failure of the United 
Australia Party to unite liberal conservatism around a common cause and its 
reduction in 1943, as Ulrich Ellis had formerly described it, to ‘the party of spare 
parts’, a new direction was required.207 
Alexander Downer was attracted to the ‘genuine liberalism’ of Menzies 
conceived as a counterweight to the muddled conservatism of the United 
Australia Party. Downer expressed it as a ‘struggle for the very existence of 
liberalism’.208 The totalitarian challenges of World War Two with its cold war 
remnant and the failure of the UAP had been co-joined to galvanise a challenge 
to the future of liberalism. 
Menzies perceived the need for a new direction based upon this disillusionment, 
his own personal failure in his first Prime Ministership (1939-1941), and his 
wartime experiences around the role of the individual, both in England and 
Australia. What was it, then, that Alexander Downer, through his reflections on 
Menzies, took away as principles of individualised liberalism for his own 
political philosophy? Part of the answer can be found in the direct influence 
upon Downer in his family life and the impact that Menzies made: 
I can remember Sir Robert Menzies visiting us in the Adelaide Hills and in 
 
207 Ulrich Ellis to Earle Page, 26 December 1931, Earle Page Papers, NLA MS 1633-
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England when my father was the High Commissioner. He used to talk in 
England a lot about the German bombings in World War II. I remember him 
relaying the fact that one morning when he awoke and walked out of his hotel he 
went outside to find 2000 Londoners had been killed the previous night. He 
stressed with me the importance of individual freedom and the need to 
appreciate that every day was a fight for the very existence of liberalism.209 
The themes of individual freedom and liberalism as a continuous fight would 
also be prominent in Downer’s speeches. One of the clearest expressions by 
Downer of Menzies’ influence was given at the 25th Annual Robert Menzies 
Anniversary Lecture, marking twenty-five years since Menzies’ death.210 This is 
his most comprehensive statement of the rationale behind liberalism. Given that 
it was a quarter-century milestone since Menzies’ passing, it may well have been 
expected that he would have chosen a topic centred on Anglo-Australian 
relations, such as the importance of the monarchy in Australia or the cultural 
links to England. Both men shared a love for the mother country, its history and 
traditions, so perhaps a discussion of the strength of the Anglo-Australian 
relationship would have been revisited. However, this was not the case. 
Rather, Downer chose to concentrate in this speech and in others, such as his 
controversial 2005 Earle Page Lecture, upon the nature and sources of 
Australian liberalism, and in particular, Menzies’ emphasis upon individual 
 
209 Paul Brown, Interview with Alexander Downer, Sydney, 1 February 2015. 
210 The Hon. Alexander Downer, Speech at the 25th Annual Menzies Lecture 




liberty and national security.211 Downer framed his discussion of the influence of 
Menzian Liberalism around three central areas, the ‘three great pillars of 
liberalism’ as he described them: ‘economic freedom, political freedom and 
security that makes possible the expression of those freedoms’. 
In the introduction to his address on Menzian Liberalism, Alexander Downer 
articulated the essence of the battle Menzies was facing to advance 
individualised liberalism: ‘There is a natural battle within liberal societies 
between those who would seek greater state control, and those who seek greater 
individual and intellectual freedom’.212 Downer argued that the struggle Menzies 
was fighting was also within the forces of conservatism. After the debacle of the 
United Australia Party’s decline, moving to a new era of liberalism was never 
assured. Conservatism in Australia had moved away from the W.K. 
Hancock/Edward Shann view of lower government involvement and more 
towards the David Syme/Alfred Deakin preference for social democracy.213 
Australian conservatism also carried the scars, within the United Australia Party, 
of internecine warfare characterised by the seemingly endless struggle between 
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Billy Hughes as Protectionist and Earle Page as Country Party opponent.214 
Menzies perceived the need for a new direction for Australian liberalism. 
Following his visit to England in 1942, as recorded in his diary Dark and 
Hurrying Days,215 Menzies described witnessing the bombing of London and the 
threat to English national security. This experience was balanced by a renewed 
belief in the capacity of the individual to defend British parliamentary 
institutions. Downer was arguing in his Menzian address that the same ‘fight for 
the very existence of liberalism’ was still an enduring battle within Australian 
political life. 
Downer and Menzies were united in their understanding that the source of this 
freedom was Australia’s British heritage. Rather than being a reason for 
conservative regression to larger government control, the British heritage 
represented a liberal democratic highpoint witnessed in the seventeenth century 
achievement of parliamentary government through the 1642 English Civil War 
and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Menzies contrasted the ‘struggle for 
freedom that led an English Parliament to make war on its King’ with the 
failures of continental Europe.216 Both Downer and Menzies contrasted the 
European experiences of the 1920s and 1930s, when countries including Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and Germany had been unable to separate institutional power and 
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the rule of law had been subjugated to the rule of individual despots. All of 
this occurred despite the fact that the ideas of Locke and Smith had established 
in England the ‘sovereignty of Parliament’ where ‘democracy brings it to the 
poor man’s door’.217 Menzies had argued this in his essay ‘The Achievements of 
Democracy’218, which Downer refers to in his speech ‘Liberalism and the 
Challenges of Building an Open Society’.219 Menzies appealed to the English 
‘village tree’ as the ‘foundation stones’ for Australian liberal democracy: ‘The 
truth is that ever since the wise men gathered about the village tree in the Anglo-
Saxon village of early England, the notion of free self-government has run like a 
thread through our history’. Menzies continued to argue that England alone had 
established the basis for Australia’s success as one of the world’s longest 
uninterrupted democracies: 
The struggle for freedom led an English Parliament to make war on its 
King and execute him at the seat of government, confined the kingship 
itself to a parliamentary domain, established the cabinet system and 
responsibility, set in place the twin foundation stones of the sovereignty 
of Parliament and the rule of law on which our whole civil edifice is 
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Downer argued this in his address to the Young Liberals in 2007, emphasising 
that the role of government is not a conservative maintenance of the British 
cultural status quo, but the necessary minimisation of government 
interference in the rights and freedoms of the individual.221 Whereas the left 
view was that the role of government was to ‘shape a society, we conservatives 
believe government needs primarily to allow a fair and prosperous society to 
flourish’. The shared belief of Menzies and Downer was that the creative ability 
of the individual should be preferred at all times to encroaching government, 
‘because we believe that people of any race or creed will better themselves if 
they are given the security and the freedom to do so’.222 
Where Alexander Downer drew inspiration from Menzies was the insight that 
the British liberal political heritage had given Australia the means to have a 
successful independence around the critical pieces of liberal democracy. In his 
address to the Earle Page College Annual Politics Dinner in 2005, Alexander 
Downer expanded on this liberal heritage: 
Those commitments all of a piece like liberty itself. [A] Free Press, 
freedom of association and political liberty are interdependent, along 
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with all the other liberties that are part of the British heritage.223 
Downer’s identification with Menzian individual liberalism and restrained 
government intervention was further complicated by Menzies’ social welfare 
initiatives. Menzies had formally announced his reforming credentials in 1938 
when he had been successful in having legislation passed for the first National 
Insurance Act around unemployment. He had been so committed to the program 
that when it was not supported by the Earle Page Country Party, he resigned as 
Deputy Leader of the United Australia Party. In the 1949 election, he took an 
uncompromising stance in the face of opposition from the Chifley Government 
to the introduction of Child Endowment for the first family child. 
Menzies’ sense of conservatism emerged from his legal background.224 He 
believed that the community needed to authorise changes through a gradual 
progression of social improvements endorsed by relevant electorates. Changes 
by governments should reflect the habits and ‘prejudices’ of the communities 
they represented. As a Burkean conservative, Menzies argued that accumulated 
historical wisdom needed to be recognised ‘over a period of centuries’, like the 
way in which Common Law had evolved. Menzies contended that these changes 
had been successfully embraced by societies where ‘case piled on case, 
precedent on precedent, until at long last all the basic elements in the laws of 
contract and civil wrongs and the like were hammered out and took form and 
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obtained an accepted authority’.225 Downer had embraced this commitment to 
change though the Menzian liberalism of his father and Menzies’ respect for 
electorally mandated change. Moreover, if the electorate has not sanctioned 
these initiatives there may be a repulse ‘and the people with a knowledge and 
commitment to making those institutions work, will simply let founder’.226 Both 
Downer and Menzies insisted that the vehicle for change was the individual. 
Downer cited Menzies in this regard: ‘As Menzies said in 1944: “I see the 
individual as the prime motive force for the building of a better world”.’227 
For Menzies, one of the means of supporting the individual was through the 
expansion of the universities. Menzies’ ambition was to widen the opportunities 
for individuals and to counter criticisms of them being ‘the bear garden of the 
idle rich’. In an address to Parliament on 28 November 1957, when endorsing 
acceptance of the Murray Report recommendations, he singled out the hitherto 
narrow offerings for university places: ‘Old conceptions die hard. It is not yet 
adequately understood that a university education is not, and certainly should not 
be, the perquisite of a privileged few’.228 
Menzies’ establishment of the higher education reviews resulting in the Murray 
Report of 3 September 1957 and the Martin Commission of 27 August 1961 
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resulted in an increase of one hundred and fifty per cent in university student 
places and over one hundred per cent in university academic posts between 1958 
and 1966. Expenditure increased tenfold between 1955 and January 1966, when 
he retired. The enrolment of Australian University students was 12 126 in 1938 
but by 1966 it had exceeded 95 000.229 Furthermore, he widened the scope of 
tertiary education through the introduction of Colleges of Advanced Education 
in 1966, which would provide the infrastructure for higher education expansion 
over ensuing decades. 
The Martin Commission further advanced the expansion of the Murray Report 
of 1957. The export expansion of the 1950s was underwriting the growth in 
universities and hence the development of the individual. 
Not everyone agreed with Menzies in all of these reforms. Arthur Calwell, who 
within eleven months of making the following statement would become Leader 
of the Opposition in March 1960, warned: 
I think that in some respects some phases of our educational life will 
collapse. I can see those residential colleges, particularly the secondary 
school residential colleges, closing down because they cannot carry on. I 
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can also visualise other systems of education getting into desperate 
straits. It would be well if the Minister had another look at all aspects of 
education in this country.230 
Menzies had previously returned to the electorate on two occasions to garner 
support and build on the reforms of 1957. This conservatism was producing 
support from the electorate, empowering Menzies to make reforms over and 
above the Murray Report and authorise further expansion. 
The reinvention of Robert Menzies and the relaunching of liberalism in the new 
Liberal Party of Australia had a mixed rationale. In addition to the longer-term 
repositioning of the Liberal Party towards the middle class, the primary 
motivation for Menzies, after witnessing 3000 Londoners killed in two days 
during his May 1941 visit, was the question of whether Western liberal 
democracies would survive. This is what Downer reflects upon in some detail 
and what produced the renaissance of liberalism through a discussion of the first 
principles of liberalism. 
Menzies had taken Roosevelt’s four freedoms and used them as a basis for his 
seminal radio addresses. This formed a platform for the relaunch of both his 
career and Australian liberalism. Menzies explained it this way: 
Speaking last year, President Roosevelt, in discussing the things at stake 
in this war, made use of an expression–‘The Four Freedoms’–which has 
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now found currency in most of our mouths. The four freedoms to which 
he referred were: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, 
freedom from want, freedom from fear. I propose therefore, in this and 
my next few broadcasts, to take each of these four freedoms and in turn, 
endeavour to get at its meaning and significance, and work out what it 
involves in our own living and thinking.231 
Menzies had spent time with Roosevelt on his return from England in May 
1942. In his diary, Menzies recalls one of the earliest affirmations of United 
States support after the Darwin attack by the Japanese. This identification of 
Australian and American interests led to Menzies including in his radio 
addresses the leading arguments for liberalism based upon the four freedoms 
that Roosevelt had previously launched in March 1942. These radio addresses 
formed a platform for the relaunch of both his career and Australian liberalism. 
The references to the middle class and Menzies’ opening speech from ‘Forgotten 
People’ were not so much an electoral appeal to the aspirations of the middle 
class as a case for why the middle class is necessary to the survival of countries 
where, unlike England, liberalism had been slower to gain momentum. Menzies 
contended that both France and Russia had experienced revolutions because of 
the polarised nature of their societies and the lack of an effective middle class. 
Russia, he argued, chose to polarise society by suppressing the peasantry 
without an effective middle-class voice to build liberal institutions with an 
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effective separation of powers. 
In the forty-seven speeches of ‘Forgotten Peoples’, eighty per cent of the 
arguments are offered as a rationale for the survival of liberal democracies and 
the challenge to national security. The four freedoms are primarily an 
examination of the first principles of democracy and deserve closer examination. 
The wartime threat for Menzies arose by April 1941 and the future of liberalism 
was uncertain. In the early months of 1941, Australian and other Imperial forces 
had been overwhelmed in Greece and Crete. Simultaneously, German forces had 
arrived in North Africa and secured early victories, repelling the Allies at Bardia 
and other strategic military points taken from the Italians. In April, persistent 
and successful German air raids were carried out against London and other 
leading British cities. Britain stood alone, without United States support at this 
juncture, and German invasion seemed inevitable. 
This international backdrop was given more immediacy by the bombing of 
Darwin in February of 1942 and the Japanese submarines’ entry into Sydney 
Harbour in the same year. Singapore had fallen to the Japanese in February 
1942, creating a confluence of events which led Menzies to broadcast from 2UE 
with a rising sense of urgency and national uncertainty. When Robert Menzies 
entered Savoy House, 29 Bligh Street, on 12 June 1942 to broadcast his thirty-
second and thirty-seventh speeches, it was four days after the shelling of the 
Eastern Suburbs of Sydney by Japanese submarines. Such was the perceived 
imminence of invasion, necessitating seventy-five per cent of his speeches to be 
centred on national security. The sheer survival of Western liberal democracy 
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was at stake, with the stark reminder of its urgent task being etched only streets 
away into the hearts and minds of Australian citizens. 
For liberalism to be successful, faced with these national security challenges, a 
heightened sense of awareness was required, whether it related to the wartime 
experience of Menzies in 1942 or, for Downer, the September 2001 New York 
attacks. Downer referred to the first principles of liberalism that Menzies and the 
Howard government were experiencing as a protracted quest for an open society. 
Downer described it in these terms: 
The essence of liberalism is to argue for the open Society, both as an end 
in itself, and as a means to providing individuals with the opportunity to 
maximise their fulfilment.232 
The emphasis on the word ‘means’ indicates the active nature of the struggle 
within society rather than the open society being regarded as an achievement in 
itself. This is a direct reference to Menzies’ description of the existential contest 
for liberalism within World War Two Australia. As Menzies built his narrative 
for the first national election contested by the Liberals in 1946, he identified two 
wars that had focused liberalism: World War Two and the emerging Cold War. 
The overarching theme of Menzies’ ‘Forgotten People’ essays was not simply 
the economic aspirations of Australia’s expanding middle class but also the 
appeal to the national security instincts of the Australian constituency around the 
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ongoing fight for liberalism. Menzies framed the appeal in this way: 
The reason for this wrong-headedness, so damaging to ourselves, is that we have 
treated democracy as an end and not as a means. It is almost as if we had said, 
when legislatures freely elected by the votes of all adult citizens came into 
being, ‘Well, thank heaven we have achieved democracy. Let us now devote our 
attention to something new’.233 
Where Menzies had structured his dissertation around Four Freedoms, Downer 
had conceived ‘three pillars of liberalism’. Each pillar needed to be interpreted 
generationally for its ‘domestic and international’ challenges. 
Downer’s three pillars of liberalism were economic freedom, political freedom 
and national security. Similar to Menzies’ argument regarding economic 
freedom, Downer argued for a basic freedom from want, including ‘food, 
clothing and shelter’ This freedom from the need to subsist was designed with 
‘the goal to empower individuals to lead their own lives by removing 
impediments and providing opportunities’.234 To support the argument for the 
success of economic liberalism, Downer made some comparisons between 
Australia and the less open Asian states, including North Korea and similar 
closed economies. Looking at the life expectancy of Australians in this period, 
he argued that the thirty-nine per cent increase from the age of 57 years to 79 
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years over the 100 years since Federation, was evidence of the success of 
economic liberalism given the right opportunity to flourish. Rather than adopting 
the view that Western history was deteriorating, Downer argued for an 
ascending narrative based upon the documented life expectancy of Australian 
constituents. He expressed it this way: 
In that context, human society has not descended from an ideal state. It 
has emerged, slowly and painfully, from a state in which the vast bulk of 
people throughout the vast bulk of human history have eked out a 
living.235 
What do you do when your very existence is being threatened through war? You 
revert to first principles and instinctive political beliefs. Menzies, like Roosevelt, 
was forced to this position, but in the process found a new purpose after a failed 
conservatism of the 1930s, which proved sufficient to reinvigorate and rebirth 
the non-Labor parties. 
Downer drew on five Menzian liberal principles in his justification of political 
freedoms culminating in his appeal for religious freedom. Downer argued that 
the areas that needed to be achieved for political freedom included the rule of 
law, accountability through the ballot box, transparency in government decision- 
making, freedom of expression and association and religious beliefs. 
In contrast to other conservative governments which had attempted to close 





for the maintenance of religious freedoms for all groups within society. In 
particular, he was arguing that following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the 
Twin Trade Towers in New York, Muslim demonstrators should be guaranteed 
religious freedom. Downer argued: ‘[T]here has never been a greater need for all 
liberals to articulate this principle’.236 At the height of religious intolerance 
within Australia towards non-Christian groups, such as Islamic entities, Downer 
was in fact insisting that ‘Australian Muslims are not diminished by false 
associations with extremism or terrorism’. This was the very heart of Menzian 
liberalism: the principle that religious tolerance in fact builds societal harmony. 
Downer quoted Menzies from his 1942 address: ‘freedom of worship is the 
victorious enemy of persecution’.237 Political liberalism therefore required 
religious freedoms for diverse groups, and in arguing his case, Downer put at its 
centrepiece the principle of religious freedom articulated by Menzian liberalism. 
Menzies’ influence was of indispensable importance. 
Downer drew inspiration from Robert Menzies’ foreign policy preference for 
bilateralism. Downer’s approach in crises such as East Timor was essentially 
bilateral, building on the same bilateral principles outlined in Menzies’ 
arguments in the ‘Forgotten People’ speeches and his radio addresses of 1942. 
They were united in the belief that large government interference by way of 
multilateral organisations, such as the League of Nations, prior to the United 
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Nations, would ultimately prove unsuccessful. 
Downer identified the Menzies Government’s expansion of overseas embassies. 
Menzies had established eleven new embassies or High Commissions between 
1949 and 1966, eight of which were in Southeast Asia. 
The challenge for Australia since 1945 has been to open itself to the world and 
to embrace its neighbours and immediate region. There has been no more 
important step in that process than the signing by the Menzies Government of 
the Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement in 1957. This was a far-sighted 
decision taken despite the opposition of some, including, amazingly, the Labor 
Party. It was a decision which recognised that Australia’s future lay with Asia 
and which rejected the backward-looking narrow views of some.238 
For Downer, Menzies was building on small steps acceptable to the Australian 
community following conflict with the Japanese in World War Two. The fact 
that this economic and political rapprochement with Japan was vehemently 
opposed by the ALP only impeded further foreign policy initiatives in Asia and 
gave little credit to Menzies. 
Eddie Ward, as Shadow Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, 
commented on the Australia-Japan Trade Treaty in November 1957: ‘It will do 
immeasurable harm to the Australian community and economy generally. I am 
perfectly satisfied that time will prove beyond doubt the attitude of the 
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Opposition to this agreement to be fully justified.’239 
Conversely, Downer was critical of the foreign policy of Curtin’s Australia, 
describing it as the Labor ‘small picture’ approach to international relations. 
Invited to give his second Sir Thomas Playford Memorial Lecture, Downer 
stated: 
Curtin declared that Labor would not support sanctions, and that ‘the 
control of Abyssinia by any country is not worth the loss of a single 
Australian life’. He said: ‘Australia is but a minor power; it is a small 
nation, remote from the great centres of international civilisation…we 
must have regard to our position, to our circumstances, to the place we 
hold in the geography of the world and to what we are capable of doing 
towards the maintenance of the peace of the world.240 
Downer contended that, by retreating from Australia’s international obligations 
to advance world liberty by confronting the Italians during the Abyssinian crisis 
of 1936, Labor had continued an isolationist policy evident throughout the 
twentieth century. Downer expanded this theme in his Earle Page Lecture, 
identifying Curtin’s opposition to the sending of forces overseas following the 
outbreak of World War II in 1939 and Jim Cairns’ trenchant reinforcement of 
the communist victories in Indochina in 1975 as evidence. Moreover, Whitlam’s 
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recognition of the Soviet Union’s incorporation of the Baltic states (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), which post-dated the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939-41, 
underlined the withdrawal of support for their national liberties. 
Downer’s objection to large government institutions, such as the League of 
Nations in the 1930s, was that, because of their internal divisions, they were 
inadequate to counter countries increasingly opposed to liberal democracies such 
as fascist Italy and Germany. Downer’s disinclination to have the East Timor 
crisis ratified by the United Nations echoed Menzies’ approach of seeking out 
bilateral relationships with England and the United States rather than waiting for 
international bodies to ratify any decisions. Menzies referred to Britain at a time 
when England was a major participant in World War II, as the United States had 
not entered the war prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor and England’s total 
isolation following Germany’s occupation of Paris and France in 1940. This was 
not a cultural deference to Britain, but realpolitik. 
If it was Menzies’ internationalism, then, which attracted Downer, how can this 
be best described? The record of Liberal Party foreign policy, as witnessed in 
Menzies and Downer, sits quite clearly within the realist tradition, but does it sit 
as comfortably within the liberal tradition? Smith and Lowe has defined the 
realist tradition in the following way: 
The Liberal Party tradition of foreign policy realism was based on a 
number of premises. At the centre was the perception of the international 
system as a world of power politics, where power was located in states, 
and in alliances of states, and based on economic and military strength. 
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The tradition was nationalist in the sense that it was oriented to the 
question of Australian national security.241 
Downer consistently argued in the speeches we have examined that Australia 
was not ‘a little country’ but a middle power, which would seem to be appealing 
to this tradition with the focus more around Smith and Lowe’s ‘economic and 
military strength’. His arguments against the ALP in the lead-up to World War 
Two through to the Abyssinian crisis and John Curtin’s reluctance towards 
committing troops outside of Australia would appear to be consistent with this 
tradition. 
However, the Australian Labor Party also embraced the realist tradition but with 
a different emphasis to the Liberal Party. Smith and Lowe has defined it this 
way: 
What differentiated the Liberal position from that of the Australian Labor 
Party, whose dominant faction also sought and supported the US alliance 
from realist premises, was the Liberals’ heightened perception of threats 
posed after the Second World War by communism, their greater 
scepticism over the value of any global or regional multilateralism that 
was not centred around its alliance relationships, and their enthusiasm for 
great power alliances even in the face of disappointment over what they 
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had delivered (e.g. over West New Guinea).242 
The essential difference is the attention given to regional concerns, particularly 
in Southeast Asia. Smith and Lowe describe the Liberal Party approach to Asian 
foreign policy as ambivalent: ‘ambivalence towards Asia was so persistent, that 
it may be called a “tradition”. There were indeed many nuances, many bursts of 
economic and defence cooperation.’ Smith and Lowe concludes that the lack of 
consistency remains as a question regarding Liberal Party foreign policy in 
Asia.243 
Whilst Downer can lay claim to being consistent with Menzies in pursuing the 
realist tradition, the practical evidence that the Liberal Party is the real custodian 
of the liberal tradition in the area of foreign policy is contestable. Downer argues 
that Spender and Casey developed substantial relationships with Asia which 
have not been sufficiently recognised. The Colombo Plan, the Australian-Japan 
1957 Treaty and the expansion of the Embassies are the often-repeated examples 
of Menzies’ Asian embrace. Downer was consistent in his defence of Menzies 
when he argued in 2005 that Menzies’ foreign policies had improved Australia’s 
relations with Asia as witnessed in the case of Malaysia. He contended: 
[T]he simple point is that we are in an incredibly strong position in our 
economic and strategic relations with Asia as a result of developments 
over the last three years. Australia is seen as a constructive and valuable 
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partner. Take Malaysia as an example. It’s no secret that we’ve had a 
difficult relationship with Malaysia for many years. But I think now 
relations are as strong as ever, as good as they were at the time of 
Menzies, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak. The visit by Abdullah 
Badawi earlier this year was the first by a Malaysian Prime Minister in 
more than 20 years.244 
However, it may not be that easy to discern Menzies’ direct influence in these 
specific areas. Frank Bongiorno has argued that, whilst it may be correct that 
Spender and Casey opened up significant Asian relationships through the 
embassies and the Colombo Plan, their achievements were not organically 
connected to the leadership of Menzies. In contrast to Downer’s interpretation, 
Bongiorno argues that Menzies was marginal to these foreign policy initiatives 
made by his Ministers to expand the number of embassies in Southeast Asia and 
to extend diplomatic contact through initiatives such as the Colombo Plan. 
Bongiorno argues: ‘[T]he identification of Menzies’ contribution to a “Liberal” 
tradition in Australian foreign policy is no easy matter because he was 
personally marginal to many of the major innovations of his government in the 
field’.245 
On the one hand, he was not personally engaged but, on the other, he allowed 
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these policies to pass through. The same argument could be applied to the minor 
reforms to the White Australia Policy. Although Alick Downer and Harold Holt 
initiated minor reforms, Menzies was not always directly involved. However, 
again, he sat above the decisions and did not prevent them from being 
implemented, even if they were often minor. 
Bongiorno’s survey of the secondary literature surrounding the liberal tradition 
argues that the Australian Labor Party in the 1940s was perhaps more active in 
pursuing a liberal internationalism than the Menzies government was from 1949 
to 1966. Under this analysis, Evatt pursued a more multilateral foreign policy, 
particularly considering his involvement in the United Nations. This pioneering 
attempt to liberalise foreign policy away from a realist tradition between United 
Kingdom in Australia was continued by the Hawke/Keating governments, 
particularly in the 1990s when Gareth Evans was Foreign Minister prior to 
Alexander Downer’s appointment as Foreign Minister in 1996. This argument is 
persuasive because, whilst the Australian Labor Party did not oppose the big 
power treaties, particularly with the United Kingdom and the United States, its 
support of the United Nations through Evatt was differentiating and, for future 
leaders, was ‘seen to epitomise a Labor approach to foreign policy.’ 
Bongiorno concludes with a reference to David Lee and Christopher Waters: 
Labor governments have allegedly been more willing to act 
independently of alliance partners and to work through multilateral 
organisations. Their relationship to the “realist” or “power politics” 




Throughout his career Downer was interested in the role of Australia in world 
affairs as an emerging middle power. Speaking to an Australia-Asia group in 
2005, he laid claim to the success of the Liberal Party in raising Australia’s 
presence in Asia and contrasted this with what he saw as Labor’s ‘little 
Australia’ complex: 
[T]o understand where we stand with Asia, we should first understand 
where we stand internationally. Ten years ago we thought of ourselves as 
a middle power. Before that, and even recently, some commentators have 
described Australia as a ‘little country’. This is a description that I 
strongly reject.247 
And yet the Australian Labor Party tradition is more to adopt a balance between 
the realist tradition and local Asian foreign policy geopolitical concerns. The 
Labor Party had a similar stance to the Liberal Party in respecting international 
alliances, but was able to simultaneously pursue multilateralism, often more 
effectively and consistently. This international liberalism can be observed from 
1947 through Evatt and Chifley through to Hawke and Keating in the 1990s. 
Beyond the realist and liberal traditions is the part played by race. Chris Waters 
argues that post war Liberal Party foreign policy was restrained by 
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considerations of race. Waters elaborates: 
Australian liberalism also took shape against a general fear of Asia 
within Australian society: a fear underlined by an understanding of world 
affairs at least partially based on the category of race. These historical 
roots are crucial to any full understanding of liberals such as Casey and 
their role in shaping Australian foreign policy.248 
In examining Liberal perspectives on Southeast Asia through Menzies’ 
Ministers such as Casey, Waters contends that ‘Casey saw race as one of the 
great organizing principles of world affairs.’ 
This stands in direct contrast to the view held by Downer of Casey. Waters 
begins his analysis of the importance of race in the Liberal tradition by quoting 
Downer’s appreciation of Casey: ‘[I]t was Casey “who perhaps more than 
anyone pioneered Australia’s modern relationship with our Asian neighbours”.’ 
In subsequent speeches Downer developed a history of Australia’s engagement 
with Asia with Casey placed firmly at its centre.249 
If the extent of Menzies’ involvement in direct decision-making is open to 
interpretation, what is not is that he presided over a foreign policy in relationship 
 
248 Chris Waters, ‘Casey: four decades in the making of Australian foreign policy’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History,Vol. 51, No. 3, 2005, p. 388.  
249 Downer expressed his view of Casey’s role in this way: ‘It was Richard Casey, 
Australia’s Foreign Minister from 1951-60, who perhaps more than anyone, pioneered 
Australia’s modern relationship with our Asian neighbours. As he put it, “Our own 
special role lies in South East Asia and consequently our foreign policy is largely, but not 
exclusively, concerned with that region”’ (Address by Alexander Downer, MP, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association, Sydney, 11 April 1996). 
161 
 
to Asia which was often ambiguous and tested his understanding of liberalism. 
Bongiorno has described it in this way: 
Menzies’s career epitomises a narrowing of Australian liberalism’s Asian 
horizons. If there was an imaginative and emotional deficiency in 
Menzies’ engagement with Asia, it might have reflected a flaw in the 
clay of the political culture he came to dominate, as well as in the man 
himself and the particular version of the liberal tradition he 
championed.250 
In what sense, then, could it be concluded from this section of the study that the 
influence on Downer of Menzies’ foreign policy was one of progressive 
conservatism? Given the fragmented nature of the approaches to Southeast 
Asian foreign policy, it would be difficult to conclude there is a consistent 
progressivism at work. Whilst there are various policy initiatives, these are 
indicative of an uncoordinated program of activities often unrelated to any 
particular philosophy, whether progressive conservatism or liberalism. 
If the influence of Menzies and liberalism upon Alexander Downer’s 
development of his ideas regarding individual liberty and national security is 
relatively clear, the connection to economic policy is more opaque. Part of the 
historical challenge in unravelling the Menzies legacy is separating the various 
components through which he has been understood. Downer viewed Menzies as 
a Deakinite when he stated: ‘What is not commonly observed is that both my 
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father and Robert Menzies were Deakinites. Contrary to the revisionist critique 
of them as imperial elitists is their actual policy practice which was sceptical of 
free markets’.251 
Deakin is barely mentioned in the writings and speeches of Menzies and Downer 
which in turn reflects an intellectual and philosophical division around the role 
of the individual in Australian history. One argument concerning Menzies 
concerns his expansion of the city of Canberra with both his infrastructure plans 
and the bureaucracy. This argument would have the Menzies government 
adopting more of a Deakinite liberalism in practice. Menzies is depicted here as 
operating in the tradition of the Deakinite Liberal Party of 1909 rather than in 
that of the uncompromising Free Traders of George Reid and Bruce Smith in 
1905. 
However, David Kemp argues against this thesis and provides the following 
Gross Domestic Product statistics in support of his view: 
Menzies’ government imposed tight restraints on government spending 
and taxation. Public debt levels, which in 1949 had been 136.3 per cent 
of GDP, declined to 51.9 per cent by 1966 (Menzies’ retirement) and to 
38.4 per cent by 1972. Taxation as a percentage of GDP declined from 
25.4 per cent to 21.8 per cent by 1960.252 
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And while Menzian liberalism railed against the increasing Chifley/Labor 
preference for nationalising banks and health services in the 1940s, Menzies was 
by no means a free marketer. In fact, Menzies summarised his position in the 
following way: 
The choice is not between an unrestricted capitalism and a universal 
socialism. We shall do much better if we keep the good elements of the 
capitalist system, while at the same time imposing upon capital the most 
stringent obligations to discharge its social and industrial duty.253 
It is in this sense that Menzies and Alick Downer are more in the mould of 
Deakinite liberals, determined to use the proceeds of capitalism for the 
promotion of individual families rather than being advocates of unbridled 
capitalism. Menzies rarely referred to the opportunities for larger business 
investment, but rather addressed his attentions to middle-class aspirations of 
employment and family life. And yet he remained staunchly supportive of the 
benefits of ‘progressive enterprise’. Reflecting in 1964, Menzies contended: 
It is frequently charged against those of us who are not Socialists that we 
are reactionaries; that we want to turn the clock back; that we yearn for a 
restoration of laissez-faire...We have learned that the same rising 
standards of living are the product of progressive enterprise, the 
acceptance of risks, the encouragement of adventure, the prospect of 
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rewards, these are all individual matters. There is no Government 
department which can create these things.254 
His trademark stereotype of family life in his retelling of Robbie Burns’ ‘A 
Cotter’s Saturday Night’ captured the ideal of family life in the Sottish 
Highlands being transported to regional and urban Victoria. The aspiration of 
government policy was selective intervention to assist employment. 
However, critics such as Greg Melleuish have recommended caution, viewing 
Menzies’ position as a compromise from the preferred Free Trade initiatives of 
George Reid: 
The Protectionists rode the populist tiger, somehow convincing 
themselves that these policies were not narrow and selfish but the 
expression of higher moral ideals. For the rest of the century the Liberal 
Party in its various guises remained leashed to its protectionist 
foundations.255 
Whilst acknowledging the futility of openly confronting the Australian 
settlement with the cross-party agreement around tariff protection, the White 
Australia Policy and compulsory arbitration, Menzies introduced a fresh 
emphasis upon responsible individualism. Menzies identified that, in the class 
division within Australian society around capital and labour, the role of the 
 
254 Ibid. 
255 Greg Melleuish, ‘The paradox of Australian liberalism’, The Australian Financial 
Review, January 22, 2001.  
165 
 
middle- class individual had been forgotten. Menzies was just as critical of the 
role of big business as he was of the role of compulsory unionism. 
This new focus upon the middle class as the forgotten people would provide the 
vehicle for social progress. Downer, in his analysis of Menzies, quoted him as 
saying: ‘[A]t this point there will be no social progress without the role of the 
individual’. Menzies was responding not only to the rising nationalisation plans 
of Chifley but also to the debt problems incurred by the Bruce/Page Nationalist 
Government of 1923-1929. 
Judith Brett has identified the weakness of the Bruce/Page Nationalist 
Government: 
Signs of trouble with Bruce’s vision of Australian prosperity were 
apparent by 1925 as the economy began to stall. Australia headed into 
the second half of the 1920s with rising levels of foreign debt and 
stagnating export income from primary industries hobbled with high 
costs by protection. By 1926 the accumulated foreign debt had risen from 
£419 million to £562 million, and the annual interest bill from £7 million 
to £26 million. It was not a happy situation, and London financiers were 
starting to ask ‘Is Australian finance sound?’256 
Menzies’ influence was not merely political rhetoric or the opportunistic 
manipulation of changing circumstances following World War II, but was also 
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felt in the construction of a new political narrative around the efficacy of the 
individual member of the middle class to create prosperity for Australia. The 
central platform of this new approach would be higher education. For Menzies, 
the achievements of the Murray Committee in 1957 and the Martin Commission 
in 1961 would expand higher education to levels never before achieved on a per 
capita basis. This in turn, Menzies argued, would provide an educated middle 
class to raise leadership capabilities in Australian institutions and business 
enterprise. The role of government should be to provide the educational 
infrastructure and to encourage self-reliance and personal responsibility. 
Responsible individualism was the handmaiden of individual freedom in this 
Menzian Liberalism. Whereas Deakin had perceived a danger in colonial 
liberalism that would need to be checked by government controls, Menzies 
was calling for a reinvigorated trust in the capacity of the individual to further 
develop Australia. 
In October 1941, Robert Menzies, as Prime Minister, lost power as leader of the 
United Australia Party and saw the non-Labor parties fall into opposition after 
ten years of government. The traditional view is that this forced Menzies to 
rethink his position and within twelve months, at the end of 1942, he had 
reinvented himself. This was based around the emerging needs of the ‘moral 
middle class’ whom Menzies would champion through the 1950s and 1960s, 
laying the foundations for Australian liberalism for the next generation. 
However, as we have seen, this is a revisionist reading of Menzies. For Menzies, 




The ‘Forgotten People’ addresses are therefore less the apotheosis of the middle 
class as a defence of the first principles of liberalism: why have liberalism at all? 
Menzies saw the middle class as a bulwark against the fall of the West in a 
struggle for sheer survival. The bombings of London and his visit to the Sixth 
Division at Tobruk had underlined the urgency of his mission and the threat to 
liberal principles. 
For Alick Downer, Sir Robert Menzies had been a lifelong friend since he first 
met him in 1949, with the restructuring of Australian conservatism following the 
disintegration of the United Australia Party. Initially perplexed by Menzies’ 
aloofness he grew, through many years of reciprocated loyalty, to defend him.257 
Whilst the role that Menzies played in Commonwealth relations has been well 
documented, Alick Downer argues that his Pacific achievements have not 
received the recognition they deserve. It was Menzies and his cabinet who ‘laid 
the foundations of Australian policy in those regions [Asia and Pacific] for the 
rest of this century’. Downer contends that, from the time of Menzies’ first prime 
ministership in 1939, he championed the role Australia would be destined to 
play in the Pacific. In a statement to the nation in 1939, Menzies said: 
In the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a principal, providing 
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herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic 
contacts with foreign powers. I look forward to the day when we will 
have a concert of Pacific powers.258 
Downer argued that the Colombo Plan was principally designed to build nations 
in Southeast Asian ‘to improve their economies and increase their productive 
capacities’ and by allowing their students to study in Australian universities it 
had been justified.259 However, the area of the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951 
has been diminished in comparison. For Downer, this was a raw issue as he had 
been imprisoned in Changi for three years during World War II. 
Whilst commending Menzies’ expansive vision in the Pacific, Downer noted his 
own opposition: ‘one of my own earlier parliamentary efforts was to disagree 
with the government on this issue, criticise it in the House and refuse to vote for 
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its adoption’260. For Downer, Australians were coming to realise ‘that what for 
Britain was the Far East for Australia was the near North’.261 Downer also 
argued for the consistency of Menzies’ belief in the Japanese Peace Treaty 
which continued to gain momentum, concluding with a trade agreement with 
Japan in 1957. The Menzies discourse and overriding concern was to develop a 
transforming economic partnership between the two countries in spite of 
opposition from the Labor Party and manufacturing groups throughout the 
1950s. This fostering of the Australian Japanese alliance with both its diplomatic 
and its economic dimensions was in addition to Menzies’ interest in new 
embassies in the Pacific region. 
Moreover, although important, the Colombo Plan was only one aspect of an 
Australian soft power strategy to build relations with Asian states. Between 
1949 and 1966, the Menzies government expanded Australian diplomatic 
representation in Asia, establishing 11 new embassies or high commissions. 
Eight of these were in South-East Asia. Cultural diplomacy played an important 
role in these efforts to establish good relations within the region. It was under 
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Menzies that educational, media and other society-to-society contacts began to 
gain momentum.262 
Alick Downer refers to the influence Menzies had on his family, particularly in 
the time spent at Downer’s two country residences, Arbury in South Australia 
and Wiltshire in England. Upon his return from Oxford in 1935, he purchased 
the land necessary to build Arbury in the Adelaide Hills and, upon his 
appointment as High Commissioner in 1963, he replicated this country retreat 
ambition with the purchase of Oare House in Wiltshire. Visitors to both country 
residences included such a diverse range of figures as Sir Robert Menzies, Clyde 
Cameron, Sir John Gorton, Gough Whitlam, Sir Edward Heath and Eddie Ward. 
Menzies is presented in his professional and personal reflections as a 
considerable force in the life of the Downer family, in particular through his 
close friendship with Alick Downer and the inevitable influence upon his son. 
Downer comments that ‘to my own children he manifested continuous 
kindness.’ The particular interest Menzies took in Alexander is highlighted in the 
conspicuous manner in which he publicly endorsed the maturing Alexander 
before the Australian Cabinet. He expressed his positive impressions of 
Alexander to his inner circle of Australian political Ministers: ‘The prime 
minister embarrassed me, at the beginning of a cabinet meeting one morning, 
whilst we awaited the arrival of some documents, by discoursing to our 
surprised colleagues on the good manners of young Alexander Downer.’263 At 
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another point Downer identified the particular interest Menzies took in 
Alexander ‘and whenever we called on the old man, as the curtain of his life was 
starting to fall, he would question us about Alexander in the most kindly way, 
accompanied by assessments of his personality which would gladden any 
father’s heart.’264 Alexander Downer was twenty five at this stage and conscious 
of the public approval he was receiving from the fading leader. 
The influence of Robert Menzies upon the Downer family had been prominent 
in the life of Alick Downer in England. Alexander Downer’s precedent for 
drawing upon the guidance of Menzies had been observed during his formative 
educational years in the late 1960s in England. The same role of mentor and 
inspiration which Alexander Downer drew upon had previously been utilised by 
his father. When Alick Downer faced the European Economic Community crisis 
in the Anglo-Australian relationship during his time as High Commissioner to 
the United Kingdom 1964-1972, he turned to Menzies just as he had when 
seeking guidance as a new member of Menzies Government in 1949. 
The bipartisan agreement in England around Britain’s joining of the European 
economic left Alick Downer increasingly isolated. His views failed to gain 
traction with the conservatives in Britain. From Harold Macmillan through to 
Edward Heath, he received diminishing support. A similar situation had 
occurred domestically with Australia’s Liberal Prime Ministers, except for 





the European Economic Community. 
Gorton, for example, had taken the view that Britain had moved so far from the 
Australian embrace as to be regarded as a foreign country. Downer described a 
meeting with Gorton on 6 January 1968 in London at which, he noted: ‘Britain 
he said had become for Australians a foreign country: one must treat it as 
such.’265 After listening to Gorton expound at length on the history of the Anglo-
Australian relationship, including Australia’s support in two World Wars, 
Downer was left with the impression that John Gorton had lost faith in the 
relationship. However, for Downer the opposite was the case: ‘[T]hough the 
light was grey, the trees bare, Kensington Road and Hyde Park did not look like 
a foreign country to me.’266 
As a result, Downer drew increasingly closer to Menzies who, following his 
retirement on 20 January 1966, visited Britain annually and on each occasion 
would visit the Downers either in London or at Wiltshire. In contrast, Gorton 
only visited Britain once during his prime ministership. It was on this matter 
of the changing Anglo-Australian relationship around the European Economic 
Community that the influence of Menzies’ position galvanised Downer’s views. 
Menzies, in spite of Downer’s attempts to shield him, was increasingly horrified 
at the direction of British foreign policy. Menzies lamented: 
I share your anxieties about our conservative friends in England: that 
 




they should line up with the Wilson government in seeking what will 
obviously be an unconditional accession to the Treaty of Rome horrifies 
me.267 
Menzies was just as critical of the conservatives as he was of the Wilson 
government and, in this extract from correspondence between Alick Downer and 
Menzies, Menzies reveals that they both shared the same ‘anxieties’ about the 
conservative Opposition prior to the election of the Heath government in 1970. 
Menzies was perplexed about Britain’s assertion that she would be able to 
manage responsibilities to the Commonwealth whilst turning her face towards 
Europe. 
Both Menzies and Downer were in lockstep as to the undesirability of 
Australia’s leadership by John Gorton as Prime Minister at the time. Their view 
of Gorton exemplified the closeness and trust of their relationship in that they 
were prepared to speak with such candour about a sitting Australian Prime 
Minister. In a letter to Menzies in 1967, Downer made the following comments 
regarding John Gorton: 
His defect as a Prime Minister as I see it is that he is too moody, too 
tensed up, not sufficiently wide in his gaze over the broad canvas of 
national and international policy…I have a hunch he is not a Prime 
Minister for a long time. If I am right I hope the Party is looking at the 
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horizon of training a successor.268 
In this correspondence, Downer demonstrated the strength drawn from Menzies’ 
influence. The position had become so extreme for Downer as High 
Commissioner that he made the following statement to Menzies: ‘If I get the 
sack then I shall have to devise other ways of exercising whatever capacities I 
possess’.269 In particular, Menzies supported Downer’s views on the 
Commonwealth: ‘As you say I have felt it necessary to speak up for Australian 
and indeed Old Commonwealth interests perhaps at times going beyond the 
bounds of conventional diplomacy.’270 Downer’s position had almost become 
untenable ,leading him to believe that he would shortly have his office 
terminated. 
Downer felt so emboldened by his relationship with Menzies as to attack the 
sitting British Prime Minister for betraying his electorate. Downer argued that 
Harold Wilson had abandoned the people by reversing his position on the 
European Economic Community and considered that this new policy had not 
been legitimised by the British public: 
I do so only because I am convinced that the present British government 
does not represent British public opinion on these issues as it goes. 
Harold Wilson and several of his ministers have completely 
 





somersaulted on undertakings given to me personally and to our 
colleagues in Canberra.271 
Downer also expressed his concern regarding John Gorton’s failure to support 
him stating: ‘[S]o far I have no indication from John Gorton as to whether he is 
pleased or disapproves of why I try to do this.’272 
Both Menzies and Downer shared a concern about Gorton’s position. Downer 
even describes this concern about the new direction in Anglo-Australian 
relations upon Gorton’s arrival in Britain in January 1968 as being that of 
someone who did not share Downer’s ‘Anglophile predilections’. The private 
correspondence with Menzies reveals considerable reservations, with Menzies’s 
view of Gorton being that, as Prime Minister, he was not going to be a desirable 
future custodian of Anglo-Australian relationships. 
Three areas where Downer’s loyalty to Menzies were most clearly illustrated 
included Downer’s account of the internal political machinations of Menzies’ 
Cabinet administration, his foreign policy record in the Pacific and his personal 
reflections on Menzies’ and Downer’s family relationships, particularly with his 
son. 
The first area in his defence of Menzies centred on Menzies’ management skills 
and Cabinet organisation. Downer was defensive of Menzies’ handling of 






with contempt, he would conduct lengthy cabinet sessions, often four in a week. 
They usually began at 3:30 pm and ran until ten o’clock each night. Menzies 
would then work well into the evening reviewing the results of Cabinet, 
reformulating policy accordingly and presenting it back to the various 
stakeholders the following day. Consensus in this manner for Menzies was more 
a constructed art than a science. 
Alick Downer asserted and, from the time of Menzies first prime ministership in 
1939, he championed the role Australia would be destined to play in the Pacific. 
He quoted Menzies’ statement to the nation in 1939: 
In the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a principal, providing 
herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic 
contacts with foreign powers...I look forward to the day when we will 
have a concert of Pacific powers.273 
Downer argued that the focus on the Colombo Plan, principally designed to 
build nations in Southeast Asia ‘to improve their economies and increase their 
productive capacities’ and allow their students to study in Australian 
universities, had been justified.274 However, the Japanese Peace Treaty 
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implemented in 1951 by the Menzies Government had been questioned by 
Downer at the time and strained his relationship with Menzies. For Downer, this 
was a raw issue as he had been imprisoned in Changi, Singapore for three years 
during World War II. He stated his firm opposition to Menzies’ pro-Japanese 
rapprochement and the Japanese Peace Treaty. 
Alick Downer expressed his opposition in the following way: ‘[O]ne of my own 
earlier parliamentary efforts was to disagree with the government on this issue, 
criticize it in the House and refuse to vote for its adoption’.275 For Alick 
Downer, Australians were coming to realise ‘that what for Britain was the Far 
East for Australia was the near North’. Alick Downer also argued for the 
consistency of Menzies’ belief in the Japanese Peace Treaty which continued to 
gain momentum, concluding with a trade agreement with Japan in 1957. 
The third area of reflection on Menzies’ influence is the family dimension. Upon 
his return from Oxford in 1935, Downer purchased the land necessary to build 
Arbury in the Adelaide Hills and upon his appointment to High Commissioner 
in 1964 he replicated this country retreat ambition with the purchase of Oare in 
Wiltshire. Visitors to both country residences included such a diverse range of 
figures as Sir Robert Menzies, Clyde Cameron, Sir John Gorton, Gough 
Whitlam, Sir Edward Heath and Eddie Ward. 
In particular through his close friendship with Alick Downer, Menzies had an 
inevitable influence upon Alick’s son. The particular interest he took in 
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Alexander is highlighted in the conspicuous manner in which he publicly 
endorsed the maturing Alexander in front of the Australian Cabinet. He 
expressed his positive impressions of Alexander to his inner circle of Australian 
political leaders: ‘The prime minister embarrassed me, at the beginning of a 
Cabinet meeting one morning by discoursing to our surprised colleagues on the 
good manners of young Alexander Downer.’276 Towards the end of Menzies’ life 
he took a particular interest ‘and whenever we call on the old man, as the curtain 
of his life was starting to fall, he would question us about Alexander in the most 
kindly way, accompanied by assessments of his personality which would 
gladden any father’s heart.’277 Alexander Downer was twenty-five at this stage 
and very conscious of the public approval he was receiving from the aging, 
esteemed Liberal Party leader. 
Life for Alexander Downer as High Commissioner in London from 1964 to 
1972 was divided between his city residence and Oare, Wiltshire. Menzies, as 
noted in this study, spent considerable at Wiltshire after he was appointed Lord 
Warden of the Cinque Ports by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1966, and 
made annual visits to England. This often coincided with the Ashes cricket tours 
by Australia and meant that the young Alexander Downer was constantly 
surrounded by leading Australian political figures such as David Fairbairn and 
John Gorton, but most especially Sir Robert Menzies. Their views on subjects 
such as Britain’s proposed entry to the European Economic Community and 
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military realignments were constantly under discussion. 
Menzian liberalism is more complex than may initially appear to be the case. 
Amongst the formative political and philosophical influences on Alexander 
Downer, the role of Robert Menzies therefore looms large, but the picture is 
mixed. The emphasis upon the individual is consistent and sustained in the 
sources examined in this chapter. Downer drew inspiration from Menzies as the 
Liberal Party leader who attempted to resurrect the first principles of liberalism 
from the ashes of the United Australia Party. Downer identified these principles 
in the question: ‘Should we try to mould and regulate social behaviour or should 
we encourage the full flourishing of ideas and a fearless tolerance of diversity 
with its potential for both genius and uncertainty’?278 Menzies’ higher education 
reforms were designed to give individuals the resources to develop this ‘full 
flourishing of ideas’. This focus on individualised liberalism, which had given 
conservatism a renaissance in the 1940s, was launched against the totalitarian 
experiences of World War Two and in the shadow of a rising Cold War with its 
accompanying collectivism. It provided the political philosophy around the 
individual needed for Menzies to succeed at a time when perceived international 
concerns around collectivism were present in some sections of Australian 
society. Menzian liberalism was able to use this anxiety regarding threats to 
Australia from the Cold War in more controversial attempts at legislative 
reform, such as the banning of the Communist Party in 1951. 
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However, what is more opaque is the approach of Menzies towards Australian 
foreign policy. This chapter has examined the general consistency around the 
realist tradition but observed apparent contradictions regarding the liberal 
tradition in foreign policy. The anomalies surrounding any consistent policy 
towards Asia may be explained, in one interpretation, by the overarching 
international imperative of the Cold War, but this ambivalence challenges the 
very heart of the assertion that there was a coherent political philosophy of 
progressive conservatism at play. 
However, it is more likely that it was the liberalism of Menzies, rather 
than his conservatism, which had maximum influence, particularly 
around individual freedoms. In Menzies’ Four Freedoms, Downer found 
the influence for his Three Pillars: economic freedom, political freedom 
and national security. Downer also drew inspiration from the pace and 
nature of Menzies’ reforms. 
On balance, whilst there were progressive periods in the Menzies era, particularly in foreign 
policy, there would not appear have been enough to confirm a consistent political philosophy of 
progressive conservatism. If Robert Menzies was a leading contributor to Downer being 
‘imbued with the culture of the Liberal Party and its values’, this chapter has revealed a 
complex, often ambiguous influence.279 However, it was his father who was an even greater 
influence on him in his experience as Minister for Immigration in the Menzies Government and 
in his dealings with foreign countries in relation to immigration and it is to this formative impact 
that we now turn.  
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Alick Downer’s Immigration Program: Building a Bigger Australia 
I was not previously aware of this fact regarding my father’s reform of the 1910 
Emigration Act. I was fully appraised of his abolition of the Dictation Act in 
1958 but not his revocation of the restriction on Indigenous Australians leaving 
Australia without Federal Government permission.280 
Even though he was in a way a great Anglophile, he was never quite so simple. 
He was passionate about the Italians, the Greeks and even the Germans as 
migrants. He had romantic notions of Southern Europeans based on their long 
histories...a bit like Lloyd George! He was passionate about several European 
countries and had a particular love of Italy. He was never of the school that we 
should just focus on British migrants. This is what he meant by progressive 
conservatism.281 
In 1982, Alick Downer’s Anglo-Australian diplomatic study Six Prime Ministers was 
published one year after his death. A young Alexander Downer wrote the Preface and 
highlighted, amongst a number of achievements in public life, the influence of his 
father’s immigration policy. 
As Minister for Immigration he was a prominent advocate of the now fashionable view 
that migrants and their descendants should not lose touch with their own cultures and 
traditions, and he rightly predicted that those cultures would enrich Australian life.282 
Both Alick and Alexander Downer shared a common belief in two central policy 
positions. At the heart of their belief in nation building were their approaches to 
immigration and international relations. Two policy areas needed to be promoted:  
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immigration with a stronger, bigger Australia and Australia’s international presence 
advanced at every opportunity through both foreign ministry and family British High 
Commissioner roles. 
Downer argues that his father’s immigration policies were directly influential for him as 
he was driven by the perceived need to ‘Bring more people in build up the population as 
we are never going to be a great nation we only have 8 million people living here.’ A 
‘great nation’ for Downer was a result of expansionary immigration policies. Downer 
further argued ‘When I was in the Howard Government I was much in favour of 
rebuilding immigration, building the country and building the nation through 
immigration. John Howard was not always a supportive of my approach to 
immigration.  It's not only about immigration it's about building a strong economy and 
strengthening foreign policy in particular international relations.’283 
Downer’s long tenure as Foreign Minister in the Howard Government 1996-2007 
provided him with the platform to express this family political credo of nation building 
by expanding Australia’s international presence. However, whereas his father pursued 
this through the Anglo-Australian relationship, Alexander Downer’s pathway was more 
with the United States. Downer has suggested, ‘throughout the history of my family in 
Australia we've always had this idea of nation building of building a bigger 
Australia. That we should build a nation of great liberal democratic values and build a 
nation of great prosperity, a nation which is fair. And if Australia is to have 
international influence with these values it needs to build a large nation with 
 




The influence of Alick Downer for nation building through a larger immigration 
program was reinforced by his approach to international relations. Alick Downer had 
shaped his son’s future by accepting the role of Australian High Commissioner to the 
United Kingdom in 1963 which would see Alexander follow him in several ways. They 
both attended Geelong Grammar before their tertiary education in the United Kingdom 
at Oxford and Newcastle University respectively. Uniquely, as father and son, both 
would become Australian High Commissioners to the United Kingdom. However, it 
was the area of immigration policy reforms in Australia which Alexander has nominated 
as one of the most influential manifestations of his father’s influence. Reflecting on this 
issue, Alexander Downer contended: 
His approach to immigration reform was that of a progressive conservative. He 
realised that with the compact in the polity around the White Australia Policy he 
would have to make changes incrementally both publicly and more nuanced. All 
the time his opponents and the reactionaries in both Parties wanted to reduce 
migration and narrow its target migrant profile even further.285 
There are two distinct stages in Alick Downer’s career: the first as Minister for 
Immigration 1958-1963 and the second as Australian High Commissioner in London 
1963-1972, to be examined in Chapter Six. Immigration is central to the nation building 
credo of the Downers. How did this transpire in the life of Alick Downer? How did he 
 
284 Ibid. 
285 Paul Brown, Interview with Alexander Downer, Sydney, 30 January 2015. 
184 
 
pursue broadening sources of Australian immigration given his commitment to the 
White Australia Policy and its Britishness? What is the connection between a bigger 
Australia through immigration policy and Alexander Downers statements concerning 
the need for a big Australia in his political career? 
Alick Downer’s immigration changes were motivated by this belief in population 
growth as will be observed in this chapter. Alick Downer was a progressive 
conservative in this respect not a reactionary refusing to bend to moderate reforms to the 
White Australia Policy. Ian Hancock has captured the essence of the challenge in 
understanding Downer: 
He believed that a privileged background imposed obligations. It was easy 
enough–if unfair–to typecast him as an unreconstructed Tory, and as a member 
of the Adelaide Establishment who spoke in the accents of southern England and 
who steadfastly maintained positions even as they were becoming 
anachronistic.286 
The assertion that Alick Downer made changes to the White Australia Policy needs to 
be evaluated against the backdrop that the Migration Act was first and foremost a 
revision of the ‘archaic mechanism’, not a root and branch review of policy. This 
chapter will caution against viewing Downer as a wholesale reformer. He was in 
agreement with the general continuity of the White Australia Policy. For Downer a 
bigger Australia was conceived at the beginning of his Ministry in 1957 through more 
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British migrants. It was only when this was seen to have increasingly obvious 
constraints that he turned to alternative sources and methods such as wider Ministerial 
discretion powers. And although he reformed certain crude means of denying entry such 
as the Dictation Test, his contribution to incrementalism lies in a more obscure, 
subordinate and yet significant area. It was his tendency to bring into the open the small 
changes in practice regarding Asian exceptions which had hitherto been covered up. 
Both Ministerial discretion and increased Asian exceptions had the effect of weakening 
the policy and paving the way for Harold Holt to allow non -Europeans into Australia 
for the first time in 1966. 
Each of these important reforms needs to be examined in greater detail in the passage to 
slowly building a larger nation. Firstly, the public discussion of changes was rare prior 
to Downer, as both Parties were concerned that the electorate would view what the 
Head of the Department of Immigration in 1958 Tasman Heyes described as 
‘modification by degrees’ as a betrayal of British race patriotism. Downer’s close 
identification with Menzies and all things British saw the two committed to maintaining 
the policy. It is therefore more likely that Downer, in his attempts to humanise the 
clumsy and internationally embarrassing administrative structures, may have considered 
that minor changes were the means for ensuring its overall continuity. Downer could see 
that by removing the excesses of the Policy he would bolster it. By countering criticisms 
which were starting to appear, such as not allowing any high-achieving Asian 
immigrants, and removing the Dictation Test he was actually bolstering the conservative 
macro objective of securing the success of the policy. Similar to John Downer in his 




This argument is reinforced by the fact that, well into his term as Immigration Minister, 
Downer had solidified his resistance to Asian immigration. Reflecting on his position at 
the time of his Roy Milne Lecture in 1960, Downer stated: 
[A] section of the Press fanned a campaign for an annual quota of Asians. 
Newspapers such as the Melbourne Herald and those controlled by Rupert 
Murdoch constantly criticised my refusal-with strong Cabinet concurrence- to 
countenance such a doubtful expedient.287 
In other words, well after his reforms to the Migration Act and the exceptions being 
made for distinguished Asians, he was still advocating strongly for the White Australia 
Policy. 
Gwenda Tavan has identified that the relative silence on the part of both politicians and 
bureaucrats around the acceptance of the relaxation of Asian exceptions was broken 
down by Downer. Tavan notes that Downer exercised a ‘greater willingness than his 
predecessors to discuss policy reform publicly’.288 Secretary Heyes was very concerned 
that these changes would produce ‘outbursts of criticism’, but Tavan argues that ‘such 
strategies were quickly abandoned’ when Downer became Immigration Minister in 
1958. Downer’s public discourse, such as his address to the Millions Club Luncheon in 
July 1959, contrasted with Immigration Department officials’ view that the changes 
should not be given ‘any publicity initially’. In this address Downer highlighted the 
 
287 Alick Downer, The Downers of South Australia, Wakefield Press, Adelaide,  2012, p. 
141. 




reform allowing high-achieving Asians to settle in Australia. 
Given that there was a moderate reformist tendency at work in Downer’s 
administration, this change was really only meant to maintain the continuity of the 
policy. Downer admitted as much himself in the second reading of the Migration Act 
Bill on 1 May 1958 when he declared: 
The purpose of this bill is to consolidate and amend Australia’s immigration 
statutes. It has nothing to do with the Government’s current immigration policy; 
its primary concern is with the mechanism by which national policy is 
implemented [candidate’s emphasis]. 289 
Neither party officially altered its policies during the Downer Immigration Ministry, 
although they were in agreement on what they described as ‘humanising’ the 
administrative means by which non-Europeans were excluded. 
If Downer was to make changes to the Policy, however modest, they would have to be 
achieved through the constraints of the wider cultural and bureaucratic institutions. 
Recent literature has tended to centre around the incremental nature of the changes to 
the White Australia Policy. The contention is that its demise was not brought about by 
any one event or entity, but rather by a series of related institutions of similar 
progressive perspectives often not in agreement with each other in many other respects. 
Bureaucracies such as the Immigration Department and Foreign Affairs as well as 
pressure groups such as the Immigration Reform Group influenced changes to policy in 
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a gradual, piecemeal fashion, and to varying degrees, in the 1950s and 1960s. All of this 
occurred against a wider international backdrop of changes to Australia’s role in Asia, 
the collapse of Britishness with the end of Empire and an international resistance to 
racism in public policy. By 1967 Prime Minister Harold Holt could declare: 
The issues before us are those of national growth, the welfare of the people, 
national security, our place in the international community…and the 
encouragement of a special relationship with Asia. These things carry us forward 
and others drop away into the midst.290 
Gwenda Tavan has argued that successive Australian Governments were all subjected to 
liberalising pressures from these Departments and groups to modify the Policy and did 
so in an ‘incremental manner’. However, Tavan contends that, after the election of the 
Menzies Government in 1949, it became apparent by 1953 that ‘the Menzies 
government’s approach would quickly prove too timid and ad hoc to effectively counter 
the pressures mounting on non-European immigration policy.’291 Under this view, the 
Menzies Government was more intent upon obscuring the actual figures surrounding 
non-European entry rates and avoiding any public debate which would lead to ‘domestic 
and international criticism. It was into this progress vacuum that Immigration 
Department senior officials such Secretary Tasman Heyes and Assistant Secretary 
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Harold McGinness stepped promoting more “substantive policy changes”.’292 
Furthermore, these officials interacted on a consistent basis with the Department of 
External Affairs, which shared similar goals, if not always harmoniously. The 
Department of External Affairs was driven by the increasing realisation that the foreign 
policy consequences of the White Australia Policy were harming Australia’s reputation. 
The more that Menzies opened up embassies in Southeast Asia, the more the 
Department of External Affairs had to deal with the growing resentments. 
This all led to something of a reform/resistance tension between these Departments and 
the Menzies Government. The outcome of the Departmental reform proposals was to 
allow ‘highly distinguished’ Asians to settle for a period of seven years but this stay 
then had to be granted renewal. Secondly, non-Europeans already settled in Australia 
could apply for naturalisation. Tavan concludes that these small changes contributed to 
the incremental nature of change, ‘The reforms of 1956-57 represented a moderate but 
nonetheless significant challenge to the White Australia Policy’.293 
The nation was being changed and Downer’s contribution in reforming the controversial 
Dictation Test may well be understood within this incremental. Changes were being 
progressed cautiously and conservatively. There were multifarious contributors in the 
journey towards dismantling the policy and Downer was but one participant. And yet 
Downer was not recommending wide policy change. His main concern was to make the 
process more dignified with the core restrictions remaining. Part of this process was the 
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role of bureaucracies such as the Immigration Department, which often led the 
discussion around the nature of change. 
In his 2006 analysis of the breakdown of the White Australia Policy between 1946 and 
1967, Matthew Jordan emphasises the influential, if not leading, role of the Immigration 
Department in pursuing change.294 He argues that the Immigration Department was very 
sensitive to foreign policy as it was driven by ‘recognising the need to accommodate 
Australia’s growing diplomatic and strategic relations with Asia’.295 Whilst accepting 
incrementalism, he further contends that the reforms pursued by Immigration officials 
Tasman Heyes in the 1950s and Sir Peter Heydon, Permanent Head of the Department 
of Immigration in the 1960s, had the further effect of minimising the role of colour as a 
criterion for rejection and that more emphasis was placed on skills and the ‘ability to 
integrate readily’.  Jordan argues that this was significant as it laid the ‘practical and 
ideological framework for Whitlam’s formal burial of “White Australia”.’296 The 
argument Jordan advances is that the geopolitical redefinition in relation to Asia had 
necessitated ‘incremental adjustments to White Australia’ and had thereby created an 
evolving environment in which Governments were ‘forced to compromise the absolute 
racial principles which had informed the policy for more than fifty years’.297 
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Alick Downer’s contribution also contained an element of how the growing Post War 
Australian nation would be viewed in international relations. Downer’s nation building 
demanded a reappraisal of the offensive administrative processes of the policy as it was 
being viewed internationally. In this direction, Sean Brawley’s study of the role of Sir 
Peter Heydon, Permanent Head of the Department of Immigration in the 1960s, includes 
a section on the role of Alexander Downer. For example, he distinguishes between the 
public face of Downer’s concern to minimise publicity and his private role in continuing 
to humanise the ‘Established Policy’, as it was known within the Immigration 
Department. Brawley argues: ‘While resistant to publicising the policy, Downer 
continued to focus on the issue of the “social problem of Asians living in Australia”.’298 
After a meeting with Downer in February 1962, Heydon was given ‘a fairly solid 
direction…to make proposals which would eliminate any inhumanities and 
anomalies’.299 Brawley goes on to suggest that Downer’s contribution to change, 
although modest and within an incremental framework, empowered Heydon to request 
Edward Charles, Officer in Charge of non- European immigration within the 
Department, to survey future options. These included the proposal that the time non-
European wives and minor children needed to qualify for citizenship be reduced. 
Brawley also contends that these initiatives flowed from talks with Downer and were 
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part of a ‘discussion that the changes of 1964 and 1966 were born.’ 300 
Whilst privately allowing for reforms to be made which streamlined the policy and 
ironed out some of its more glaring inconsistencies, Downer was anxious that this 
should remain covert. Brawley argues that ‘Downer was obsessed with the notion that 
any publicity for the policy, even that regarding a departmental inquiry, would be bad 
publicity’. He contends Downer had two reasons for his actions. The first was that any 
publicised changes would potentially ‘stifle necessary changes in the future’ and the 
second that it may have proved electorally damaging for the government. Brawley also 
argues that, prior to all this, Downer’s efforts in relation to the 1958 Migration Act had 
produced a flawed result. The earlier attempt to reform the ‘Established Policy’ had 
created a ‘bureaucratic nightmare’ and, rather than streamlining the policy, had actually 
‘only created more anomalies’.301 
This analysis of Downer is therefore one with a mixed outcome. Reforms were 
considered, postponed and then only partially implemented. When liberal and 
conservative instincts competed, the influence of Britishness often prevailed. The 
persistence of Britishness emanated in part from the considerable time Downer actually 
spent in Britain. Alick Downer was only five years old when his father died. John 
Downer had spent many years on and off in Britain, attending Imperial constitutional 
conferences. His former headmaster at Geelong Grammar, Dr. Francis Brown, 






Australian connection–Dr. Sampson, the principal, and he were old friends’.302 
During this time at Oxford, Alick Downer was to concentrate on politics and British 
history, including seventeenth century English parliamentary history. This, in turn, led 
Leslie Haylen to describe him as British-educated but with Australian citizenship. At a 
time when Keith Hancock was publishing his history, Survey of British Commonwealth 
Affairs between 1937 and 1942, Alick Downer was reading W. G. S. Adams and 
Edward Lipson as part of his history degree at Oxford.303 Sir Reginald Coupland had a 
significant impact on Downer’s view of Empire and had influenced him towards a more 
open view of immigration, based on Coupland’s teachings and publications, such as The 
exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890: The slave trade and the scramble. Downer’s 
Oxford background had sharpened his appreciation of Empire, whilst focusing on the 
importance of a sense of duty to humanise immigration policy within his conservatism. 
The central legacy of Downer’s work in humanising the Immigration Act 1901 was the 
Migration Act legislation passed in September of 1958. Whilst this focused on 
reforming the Dictation Test, what is not as widely known is the important legislative 
reform introduced in the repealing of the 1910 Emigration Act in the same year. The 
reform of the Emigration Act enabled Indigenous Australians, such as artist Albert 
Namatjira and vocalist Harold Blair, to leave the country for the first time without the 
requirement of special Government permits. 
Prior to 1958, all Indigenous peoples were prohibited from emigrating without permits 
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issued by the Commonwealth government. Alick Downer’s changes removed racial 
stereotyping and discrimination around this question. Labor Senator Percy Clarey 
recognised this profound reform and welcomed the changes: 
The third matter I wish to mention relates to clause 64 which deals with the 
emigration of certain aborigines. I express my pleasure at the fact that 
aborigines will now be freed of the restriction contained in the act of 1910 
which related to the emigration of young persons and Australian natives. No 
restriction or interference will be placed upon such aborigines, as was possible 
under the old Act.304 
Downer condemned the previous practice of pooling all Indigenous people who applied 
for emigration in the same negative category. In other words, regardless of whether 
there was a constraint on one emigrating to another country as an Indigenous person, 
they were categorised with everyone else. Downer argued: ‘[T]he Act fails to 
distinguish between those who have been freed of all disabilities and those who have 
not’.305 
Senator Henty commented upon the significance of this breakthrough in the second 
reading of the Bill on 23 September 1958 with the following observation: 
In regard to aborigines, the underlying principle of the Bill is that any aboriginal 
should be free to leave Australia if he is not subject to restrictions in the State or 
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territory in which he lives; or if he is otherwise exempted by the Minister from 
the need to apply for an emigration permit.306 
Clause 64 of the Act made a clear distinction in ensuring the breakdown of racial 
stereotyping of Indigenous people in this area of emigration. Downer went on to 
comment on the significance of this new provision removing racial generalisations of 
the Indigenous population. Change had been authorised from the community or, as 
Burke would have argued, authorised by the evolving ‘prejudices’ within the 
constituency. 
The Downer reforms in immigration comprised immigration, deportation and 
Indigenous elements. To achieve this, Downer was able to reach across the Chamber 
and work with Opposition members who were conscious of their reservations in 
reforming the immigration statutes but realised the necessity to do so. 
Percy Clarey, Member for Bendigo, in the debate around the Second Reading of the Bill 
in 16 September 1958, explained why the trade union movement had influenced Labor 
to resist changes to the White Australia Policy and was only now conceding to changes. 
Clarey argued their concerns centred on labour constraints: 
It might be well to mention at this stage the attitude of the trade union 
movement. From the 1850s until the beginning of the second world war, the 
trade union movement was critical of immigration. But since the second world 
war it has taken the stand that if there is room and opportunity in this country for 
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people to settle, they should be helped to settle, but always with the proviso that 
the policy, whatever it may be, shall not cause damage to Australia’s economic 
structure.307 
Prior to the Menzies Government, both the Curtin and the Chifley Governments in the 
1940s had declined to abolish the Dictation Test. Arthur Calwell, Minister for 
Immigration in 1946-1949, had not relaxed any of the major racial restrictions that led 
to a large inflow of European migration in preference to Asian. While Calwell built a 
very strong post-war immigration program, this was always based on a preference for 
European migrants, whether English, Irish or Scottish.308 Calwell explained his desire 
for this ‘Britishness’ to be fully appreciated: ‘My aim, and that of the Government, is to 
make the word, “Australian” mean all that it truly stands for to every member of our 
community. We shall try to teach the children that they are fortunate to be British, and 
even more fortunate to be Australian.’309 The active application of the Dictation Test 
ensured that Asians were not given every opportunity to settle in Australia. 
The Menzies Government’s strategy was to promote a suite of legislation, including the 
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Nationality and Citizenship Bill 1958, which also received faint praise from Calwell: 
In some respects I think the changes made in the act are too sweeping. There are 
one or two categories of persons in respect of whom the Minister should reserve 
some power to himself. He is assuming now, very generously, I think, that 
everybody who seeks Australian citizenship is well-intentioned and will act 
honestly and fairly towards this country. I am not so sure about that. I have a 
certain suspicion about some of these people.310 
Moreover, within the Migration Act debate, the reluctance of the Leader of the 
Opposition, Dr Herbert Evatt, showed further evidence that, although Alick Downer 
was taking positive measures for change, it was without complete bipartisan support. 
While Labor on aggregate supported the Bill, during the readings of the Bill it opposed 
some of the key measures, including the complete abandonment of the Dictation Test. 
In an exchange with Gordon Freeth, Member for Forrest, WA, Dr Evatt311 argued that 
the Dictation Test should be kept as a backup measure to be used on limited occasions. 
He would not accede to its complete removal, contending that ‘the test could always be 
held in reserve’.312 The second portion of this extract referred to an example of the 
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safeguards being introduced to protect the arbitrary use of the Dictation Test. Downer 
stated that, without an independent Commissioner recommending deportation, the 
current circumstances ‘are capable of the greatest abuse’. Clause 14 of the Bill made it 
mandatory for a Commissioner to initiate deportation recommendations. Downer 
asserted in the debate that deportation ‘can only be by the minister on the 
recommendation of an independent Commissioner’. The Commissioner himself ‘must 
be a serving or retired judge of the federal or state Supreme Court, a barrister or 
solicitor of five years standing on the High Court or Supreme Court’.313 This was one of 
several ‘important checks’ on the power of the Minister regarding deportation 
regulations. The Bill centred around three main areas: immigration, deportation and the 
emigration of children and aborigines. Throughout the debate over the Bill, Downer 
constantly referred to the arcane, ‘clumsy, creaking operation’ which had resulted in 
‘resentment outside Australia’ and needed to be replaced by the ‘neat, simple expedient 
of an entry permit’.314 
For Downer, a ‘thorough overhaul’ was required as the reputation of Australia had been 
affected and needed to be reformed with a ‘humanistic quality’. In defending the 
changes to the Bill, Downer referred to his own experience of incarceration in a 
Japanese prisoner of war camp. He was outraged by the practice in which those who 
might be deported were ‘cast into the most convenient gaol’. The new legislation 
provided for detention centres instead of prisons. His personal experience as a 
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noncriminal, incarcerated in a Japanese war camp, led him to believe that gaoling 
anyone who might have broken a statutory law was unacceptable. Downer commented 
in the debate: 
[T]here is a compelling case for reform in the treatment of those one might call 
statutory offenders. I have given much thought to their plight, along with four 
other members of this Parliament I found myself in a comparable situation 
during our incarceration by the Japanese for several years of the last war.315 
Downer argued that the ‘ameliorating effects of this legislation ‘will place Australia in 
advance of any other country in the world.’316 
Downer considered the timing was right for change. He stated that: 
Since the existing legislation originated, there has been a great advance in social 
thinking throughout the world. Certain practices which would be generally 
accepted 50 years ago are now questioned and regarded as matters for reform. 
So it is with these measures.317 
Downer sought to place ‘Australia in advance of any country in the world’, not only 
through the largest single change, the abolition of the Dictation test, but through a 
‘liberalisation of the law’ in relation to deportation regulations These deportation 
proposals were required to ‘humanise’ Australian immigration law and provide ‘justice 
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for the individual’.318 
Downer presented five examples of the way in which the deportation regulations would 
be humanised. As previously stated, it would now be necessary for an Independent 
Commissioner to recommend deportation to the Minister. The objective was to 
overcome the ‘extremely arbitrary’ practice of a series of government ministers acting 
without this due restraint. The second example related to ‘the arrest of suspected 
prohibited immigrants’. Under section 48 of the previous Act an officer was able to 
arrest an individual who he believed was a prohibited immigrant ‘offending against this 
Act’. He was not required to have a warrant for arrest and, as a result, the suspect could 
be incarcerated for any period without a timeframe. Clause 38 of the new legislation 
reformed this arbitrary policy by insisting that the individual  be brought in front of a 
‘prescribed authority’ within 48 hours to determine whether the individual should have 
his detention continued up to a maximum period ‘of seven days pending the Minister’s 
decision as to deportation’.319 
The third example proffered by Downer concerned the requirement to provide broader 
information and justification for the deportee. Under section 14c of the existing 
Immigration Act, individuals were often not given details of the deportation order, as 
this was not required under the statute. Downer argued that this denial of human rights 
meant that ‘such a power, naked and uninhibited, could cause great injustice’. It was 
reformed by requiring under section 39 that individuals arrested be provided with full 
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‘particulars of the deportation order.’320 Furthermore, should there be any claim of 
mistaken identity by the individual, ‘he would need to be taken before an independent 
authority within 48 hours’. Most importantly, should the ‘prescribed authority’ be 
satisfied that there does not exist reasonable grounds for the apprehended person to be 
held, then he needed to be ‘discharged’ immediately. Conversely, should the prescribed 
authority determine there were existing grounds for holding the individual, he would 
need to be taken into custody, but this was to be subject to the overriding powers of ‘the 
High Court or State Supreme Court’ to determine its validity or otherwise. 
The fourth change designed to ensure safeguards for the individual was Clause 41 of the 
Bill. Here, Downer was considering the case in which the individual, although not 
electing to contest the question of mistaken identity, sought to oppose the alleged 
deportation altogether. Hitherto, individuals had often been incarcerated without the 
normal legal protocols. Moreover, the right to obtain legal defence had not been 
practised to the satisfaction of the Menzies Government. Downer argued that ‘a hearing 
can of course already be secured by writ or habeas corpus or by injunction’, but the 
complementary provision of providing a robust legal defence was not in evidence. In his 
argument in the first May reading of the Bill, Downer appealed that this provision 
should exist and that ‘all reasonable facilities for obtaining legal advice and legal 
proceedings’ should be afforded.321 
The fifth example that Downer provided in his presentation to the Parliament for the 






to search ‘buildings, premises or vehicles’ first secure the necessary documentation, in 
particular search warrants. The strengthening of the legal processes for investigative 
police meant that further ‘arbitrary actions’ would be minimised by the need to obtain 
the necessary search warrants for ‘prohibited immigrants or deportees’. Downer argued 
this was in contrast with the current law under section 14b, ‘whereby an officer can do 
all these things without a warrant’. 
All of these new provisions represented a reversal of past policy. Highly-skilled non-
Europeans were permitted to enter Australia as citizens and the policy also allowed the 
non-European spouses of Australians to become citizens. This policy was continually 
opposed by the Labor Party for over a decade following the stands taken by John Curtin 
and Arthur Calwell in the 1940s.322 When Holt became Prime Minister in 1966, he 
terminated this policy, permitting entry of non-Europeans who had skills that were 
‘positively useful to Australia ‘ and standardising the qualifying period for European 
and non-Europeans for citizenship. 
Whitlam took the last step in this process with the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, 
but there had been incremental modifications implemented between 1949 and 1966. 
Prime Minister John Curtin had stated in 1941: ‘It is of utmost significance to the 
British speaking race that such a vast continent should have as its population a people 
and a form of government corresponding in outlook and in purpose to Britain’, and later 
in the same speech: ‘This country shall remain forever the home of the descendants of 
those people who came here in peace in order to establish in the South Seas an outpost 
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of the British race’.323 
When Downer was invested as Minister for Immigration by Viscount Slim on 20 March 
1958 in Sydney, he inherited a different immigration policy landscape from the one 
which had prevailed when he began his parliamentary career in 1949. A reversal had 
occurred between the two major parties that would make immigration reforms even 
more challenging. In the intervening years, his Liberal Party had softened its approach 
to Asian immigration, not through changes to policy but through Ministerial discretion, 
and had increased the ratio of Southern European to Northern European immigrants. In 
contrast, the Australian Labor Party, following its National Conference in Queensland 
in July 1958, decided to return to a smaller immigration intake and to focus 
predominantly on British migrants. 
The Migration Act saw the abolition of the Dictation Test and the review of the 
Emigration Act of 1910. However, the steps leading to these changes had commenced 
earlier. Prior to the appointment of Downer as Immigration Minister, his predecessor 
Harold Holt had begun a process of allowing more Asian immigration through 
Ministerial discretion.324 This process was understood within the Australia polity as a 
means of providing more flexibility for the White Australia Policy, safe beyond the 
glare of public examination. Holt doubled the number of Asian people allowed to stay 
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in Australia between 1950 and 1956 by intervening in his Department. Downer 
continued this approach. He had also attenuated the Policy by reversing the decision of 
Calwell to deport eight hundred Asian refugees who had remained in Australia after 
World War II, even after Calwell had acted to repatriate all Japanese war brides. The 
Liberal Party’s support of the High Court’s decision to overrule the O’Keefe deportation 
case following Labor’s election defeat in 1949 was further evidence of the political 
turnaround. 
The abolition of the Dictation Test during Downer’s administration raises the central 
question of whether this initiative was designed to consciously weaken the White 
Australia Policy and make its continuance ultimately unsustainable or whether it was a 
minor action which was in no way meant to undermine the policy’s significance. This 
thesis takes the view that it was an attempt to provide a more acceptable public profile 
in the light of international criticism of such an undesirable criterion for rejecting 
peoples from other countries. 
It is probably seen best as part of incrementalism which is not a conscious process but in 
which each small liberalisation of the policy leads to its dissolution. The major 
objective of Downer and Menzies in their understanding of Britishness was always the 
maintenance of the overall purpose of the Immigration Restriction Act.  
Nation building in this instance is understood as the continuation of primarily a white 
Australia. If the nation is to expand it must be essentially within this paradigm. 
Concessions can be made in particular with southern European sources of migration and 
ministerial exceptions but these are accepted at the margins. Incrementalism was the 
process that outlook Downer was working within either consciously or unconsciously in 
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response to the forces around him.  This thesis places this incrementalism in the context 
of the literature, particularly that of Gwenda Tavan, Sean Brawley and Matthew Jordan. 
Gwenda Tavan, in The Long, Slow Death of White Australia, argues that the often 
unpremeditated breakdown of the policy occurred at a gradual pace which in many 
ways ensured that it would be permanently ended.325 Tavan’s identifies the various 
pressure groups within Australian society such as the Immigration Reform Group and 
the role of bureaucracies such as the External Affairs Department and the Immigration 
Department as the key groups responsible for its demise.  Domestic and international 
pressures came to bear upon the policy as it was being dismantled by stealth. 
Gwenda Tavan in her analyses acknowledges both his strengths and his apparent 
weaknesses in regard to reform. Tavan identifies, for example, Downer’s willingness to 
publicise new reforms made to the Policy in the late 1950s at a time when others were 
reluctant to do so at a political level. Tavan observes that ‘Downer for his part appeared 
more disposed than previous ministers to discuss the White Australia’.326 She notes that 
the first time the reform allowed highly distinguished Asians to be able to settle in 
Australia was announced publicly by Downer at the Millions Club Luncheon in 1958. 
Utmost discretion had previously been the way of the Menzies government in handling 
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the communication of any policy changes. Downer’s break with this custom forms part 
of the conundrum which was his administrative approach. 
In contrast, Tavan observes that in 1959 Downer was reluctant to implement changes 
originally proposed by Tasman Heyes in 1956. Heyes had argued that the time was 
‘propitious’ for further reforms and urged Downer to implement the proposals so ‘that 
highly qualified Asians may be admitted as migrants without any immigration 
restrictions and naturalized after 5 years.’327 It was at this point that Downer hesitated 
and declined to implement Heyes’s proposals and he ‘continued to resist such 
demands.’328 
Tavan also identifies how the Migration Act of 1959 through Downer, in his work with 
this legislation, was ‘sensitive to the need for a more discretionary approach to 
immigration issues and clearly had some sympathy with the emerging liberal, 
internationalist, and rationalist values of the era.’329 However, she notes that these 
liberal sympathies were expressed with the assumption that the White Australia Policy 
was not to be challenged. Tavan describes this in the following terms: ‘Like his 
predecessors in the immigration portfolio and Menzies himself he was strongly 
committed to maintaining the traditional policy.’ 
Both Downer and Menzies were committed to the White Australia Policy and the 
evidence from this thesis is that any retrospective view of the Dictation Test’s demise, 
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as a significant turning point, was not intended by Downer or Menzies at that time. 
Menzies, in particular, rarely left the door ajar. However, when viewed together with 
other policy reforms of the 1960s, in particular the decision to allow non-Europeans to 
enter Australia, it forms a core contribution to the gradual breakdown of the policy. 
When ALP Immigration Spokesman Fred Daly described the major parties as sharing a 
‘Unity ticket’ supporting the broad provisions of the White Australia Policy in the 
House of Representatives in March 1966, he was articulating what both sides of the 
house had understood.330 To understand the slow nature of reform to the White 
Australia Policy one needs to appreciate the breadth and depth of this unanimity around 
its central proposition. 
The Australian Labor Party had always claimed consistent support of the policy and in 
the 1950s, when Downer was Immigration Minister, often took a more conservative 
position than the Minister himself. Why had the Labor Party maintained its resistance to 
immigration reform? Part of the answer can be found in the Australian Labor Party’s 
commitment to Britishness. 
The pan-Britishness of Australian society, described by Hancock as a state of ‘being in 
love with two soils’, was a doctrine originally held by both parties.331 John Curtin had 
championed Deakin’s description of ‘independent Australian Britons’ and, as Neville 
Meaney and James Curran have argued, Curtin’s aim was to interpret Britishness for 
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Australia’s role within the Dominions.332 
Arising from this, but not as closely examined, was Labor’s pan-Britishness in the 
sphere of immigration in the mid to late 1950s, when they vigorously competed with the 
conservatives for British loyalties. Downer did not see Britishness and the widening of 
migrant intake to embrace people from a wide range of nationalities as necessarily 
incongruous. Labor leaders were asking for them to be seen increasingly as mutually 
exclusive and sought to create a binary division. 
This pan-Britishness was embodied in the approaches of Labor parliamentarians Clyde 
Cameron and Leslie Haylen. Clyde Cameron welcomed an ‘Anglo- conservative’, such 
as Alick Downer, to his new position as Immigration Minister after the weak policy 
enforcements of his predecessors Athol Townley and Harold Holt. Surely Downer, 
educated as a proud anglophile from Oxford, would restore the integrity of the policy. 
Cameron described Alick Downer by stating: ‘At long last we have a Minister for 
Immigration who believes in Labor’s policy of giving preference to people of British 
stock–in keeping Australia British.’333 
Later, in the House of Representatives, Cameron stated: ‘The ALP does not believe it 
should apologise to anybody for wanting to keep Australia British any more than we 
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would expect the Poles wanting to keep Poland Polish’.334 Leslie Haylen had been 
authorised by the Chifley Government to research the scope and sources for migrants 
from Europe as an envoy in July 1946. He provided a research report for Calwell in 
1946 as Immigration Minister. As a Labor traditionalist, Haylen argued: ‘The number 
one priority was given to the British migrant because he did not need to be assimilated 
at all...In my father’s house there are many mansions for him.’335 Labor was widely 
critical of the Conservatives for going weak on Asian immigration. Even Billy Hughes 
could not escape the wrath of the ALP. As early as 1949, in the fifth Party of his 
political odyssey as Liberal Member for North Sydney, Arthur Calwell had condemned 
him for supporting Asian immigration. 
Calwell had accused Hughes of abandoning his principles on immigration. Hughes, 
Calwell argued, in ‘deserting the Labor Party for the flesh-pots of the conservatives’336 
decades earlier, now found himself in an untenable position. Hughes was an original 
participant in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and, as the sole survivor in 1946, 
was now betraying his contract with the Australian people. Calwell contended: 
‘Whereas today he pleads for tolerance of Asiatic people, in 1901 he sought their total 
exclusion’.337 At another stage of this debate, Calwell attacked prominent conservative 
Henry Barwell, a former Senator and Premier of South Australia: ‘Sir Henry Barwell 
became known as “Black Barwell” because he wanted to break down the White 
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Australia Policy. All the wreckers of the White Australia Policy have come from the 
Opposition Parties.’338 John Curtin, Arthur Calwell, Clyde Cameron and Leslie Haylen 
were all contributing to a Labor pan-British nationalism which, by its uncompromising 
nature, was seeking to marginalise the conservatives. The O’Keefe Case had earlier 
proved to be a lightning rod for differences between the major parties and framed the 
future debate. Non-Labor parliamentarians were not supporting wholesale change, but 
favoured incremental reforms through Ministerial discretion. 
The Australian Labor Party had begun to narrow its approach to immigration after the 
Brisbane National Conference of 1958. Conversely, Alick Downer was inquiring about 
new ways to build a bigger Australia. As Downer attempted to increase immigration, 
stressing a renewed focus on European sources of potential citizens, he met trenchant 
opposition from the Australian Labor Party. 
The inevitable cost of widening immigration sources would be to reduce the influence 
of British traditions and trading protocols within the Anglo-Australian relationship. 
Downer, as a confirmed Old Commonwealth supporter, was acknowledging that a 
sacrifice would need to be made in the English connection in order to expand the 
Australian population through migration. He argued that the cost of this would be to 
move away from ‘the traditional affection Australia has for the United Kingdom and 
place Australia’s membership of the British Commonwealth more on a basis of practical 
self- interest.’339 
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Given the controversial nature of this statement and the threat it posed to existing vested 
interests in Anglo-Australian relations, it may have been thought that the main 
opposition would have come from within the Liberal Party itself. However, the fiercest 
and most relentless commentary would come from the Australian Labor Party, as 
exemplified in this question posed by Eddie Ward on September 8, 1960 in the House of 
Representatives: 
Did you when delivering the 1960 Roy Milne Memorial Lecture state that the 
immigration plan being pursued by the government was weakening the ties 
between Britain and Australia and does the government look with favour on this 
development?340 
Eddie Ward, arguing as a member of the left of the Labor Party, was taking the view 
that, just as Leslie Haylen and Evatt had argued in 1957, the British migrant profile 
needed to be maintained at all costs. Downer’s attempts to widen Australian migration 
would be opposed by the same forces that Calwell had to overcome in 1946 as Minister 
for Immigration in his attempts to persuade the Party that alternative sources of 
immigration from southern Europe were required. Downer went on to argue that ‘if the 
immigration program is gradually to expand and if living standards continue upwards in 
Britain try as we shall I doubt whether we can achieve an intake many more that we are 
receiving now of 65,000 a year.’341 In other words, Britain, having become more 
attractive and successful in retaining its own people since the years immediately 
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following the end of World War II, had left Australia with a reduced pool of potential 
migrants, and, while Downer agreed with the desire to maintain the emphasis upon 
Britishness, alternative sources of migration needed to be pursued. The policy was never 
intended to abandon Britain, but rather to recognise its limitations because of the need 
for a ‘big Australia’. 
In a demonstration of bipartisanship, Downer had acknowledged earlier in the debate 
the contribution of Arthur Calwell to the immigration question since 1946. A young 
Gough Whitlam had, conversely, recognised in the same debate the achievements of 
Downer as Minister for Immigration, stating that, other than Calwell, ‘[y]ou are the best 
Minister since the War.’342 In this discussion Downer was appealing to the need for a 
wider policy imagination to continue the requisite immigration reforms. He was sensing 
the opportunity for change as the community now sought further reforms. 
Downer argued that ‘in the last 13 years we have seen perhaps the most spectacular 
increase in Australia’s population that our national history as known’.343 However, he 
argued that ‘we need to approach these matters in the spirit of self- examination’ and 
that ‘if we become self-satisfied, self-congratulatory and complacent about migration 
the danger signals will indeed be going up’.344 Downer was asserting that, although the 
population had risen from 7.4 million in 1946 to 10 million in 1959, with 1.4 million of 
these population increases from migrants, unless the policy continued to develop 
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creative solutions to the tightening of British immigration, Australia could not expect 
the same successful results. Had Downer not insisted upon this expansion of 
immigration at a time when Labor, under Evatt, was appealing for contraction, it is 
unlikely that the momentum for immigration reform would have continued and that 
ultimately the dismantling of the White Australia Policy would have been achieved. 
Downer argued that the current crisis required a ‘continual exercise of imagination, 
resourcefulness and a persistent willingness to try new methods’, all the time ‘mindful’, 
but not enslaved ‘to convention and precedent’. Downer was appealing to the 
Opposition to work with him to develop a recasting and rediscovery of European 
migration which would inevitably ‘attract new people to Australia whilst they are still 
willing to come’.345 Although British migration had slowed, European migration must 
not be allowed to do the same. 
When Alick Downer was challenged by Jim Cairns in the Parliament in May 1960 to 
justify the slow breakdown of the White Australia Policy, he outlined the various ways 
in which persons of non-European descent would become eligible to obtain permanent 
residence. In doing so, he provided over fifteen different examples where exceptions 
were granted. 
Prior to 1945, few of these conditions existed and this contrasted with the fact that 
Downer was able to outline a comprehensive set of clauses enabling non-Europeans to 
enter Australia. This was all meant to be indicative of the general policy weakening of 
the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. It had become the shibboleth within the 
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Parliament that the way to break down the monolithic nature of the policy was to 
increase the number of exceptions. The Parliamentary solution to complementing 
changes brought about by the Migration Act reforms of 1958, when the Dictation Test 
had been abolished, was the active use by Downer, and before him Athol Townley and 
Harold Holt, of change by ministerial discretion. This, indeed, was the approach taken 
by Downer during his time as Minister for Immigration and had the effect of eroding the 
certainty around restrictive policy provisions to enable Harold Holt, as Prime Minister 
in 1966, to legislate for the entry of non-Europeans as a distinct category. 
In responding to Jim Cairns on 10 May 1960, Downer made special mention of the 
clauses that had been widened to enable Asians to gain admission to Australia. During 
this discussion he mentioned that: 
Any general policy of allowing such businesses to stay as permanent residents 
would clearly give an incentive to many intending but ineligible migrants to 
come to Australia in the guise of visitors and would negate the rules relating to 
put to entry for permanent residence.346 
He then immediately went on to talk about ‘a special class of person where Asians were 
admitted permanent residence after some 15 years of being employed in an Australian 
business’. They would be allowed to stay in the country after the 1958 legislation for 
those who had managed to qualify could then be demonstrated. He further commented 
‘that such Asians could be granted permanent residence if they have been of good 
character, have adequate knowledge of English and the knowledge of the implications 
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of citizenship’.347 Furthermore, he argued for another category of people who could be 
granted full status of permanent citizenship where they had been admitted from 
countries which, since their entry, had come under communist domination. Downer 
argued that, rather than forcing these people to return to a compromised safety scenario, 
they should be allowed to stay within Australia. The effect of all this was to break down 
the uncompromising approach towards Asian immigration and to provide exceptions 
which could be effectively used by Asians and their agencies. 
All changes were in addition to the exceptions previously announced but were now 
widened to include qualified and distinguished persons of Asiatic background in the 
following categories. Increasingly, those possessing outstanding cultural attainments 
deemed to be an asset to Australia were allowed permanent residence. Additionally, 
those possessing high-grade technical qualifications which were apparent to the officer 
investigating to be not widely available within Australia were also provided with 
permanent residence. Those who had been able to occupy government positions and 
effectively provide public service contributions following a university education or 
international and humanitarian service were allowed to stay in Australia. Beyond the 
Colombo Plan there were those Asian people who had spent at least five years in their 
own countries after completing courses and tertiary qualifications in Australian 
universities and other higher education institutions. If they could also satisfy the 
contingency conditions, such as being of good character and having an adequate 
knowledge of English, they could be considered persons able to gain direct entry. 





attacks by Jim Cairns that Downer was arguing for migrant workers being allowed in 
from overseas, which threatened the jobs of Australian workers. Traditionalist Labor, 
prior to Whitlam in 1965, preferred to hold tight to the arguments of the union 
movement. It was the liberalism of Downer and Holt, as the two dominant Ministers for 
Immigration in the 1950s, which helped to prevent the narrowing of Australian 
immigration. 
The provisions in the debate outlined above were symptomatic of the new directions 
which would be adopted by an increasingly perceptive party leader in Gough Whitlam, 
who was able to read the winds of change and reformulate ALP policy, assisted by other 
Labor leaders, such as Don Dunstan in 1965. The argument of this chapter is that this 
gradualism was in part contributed to, but not wholly created by, Immigration ministers 
such as Alick Downer. To fully appreciate the extent of these changes, they need to be 
closely compared and analysed against the ALP’s new position. 
Conservatism is not merely about making gradual authorised changes when they are 
appropriate, but also about holding on to the changes already confirmed at elections 
authorised by the community. This was at the basis of Downer’s defence of southern 
European migration which came under criticism in the Parliament.The ALP had moved 
against that position, as confirmed by the following statement made in September 1958 
by Leslie Haylen. He summarised the new ALP position, referring to the July National 
Conference, in the following way: 
[W]e must not desert the principle of British migration. The discussions and 
decisions of the Australian Labor party, particularly at its Brisbane conference 
and other conferences, have been that because of the attitude and the breakdown 
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of Menzies Government migration, we believe that there should be a curtailment 
in migration.348 
It has often been contended that Arthur Calwell began and sustained an expansionary 
immigration policy position by the ALP, based on southern European sources, and that, 
without this policy, Australian post-war immigration would have floundered. This 
argument that the ALP and Calwell were the sine qua non for immigration success 
needs closer examination in order to understand the counterbalancing role of Alick 
Downer. 
The post-war immigration policy of the ALP is probably best understood in two stages. 
The first stage led by Calwell, as Minister for Immigration, focuses on the expansion 
beyond British migrants to include southern Europeans.The second stage is the reversal 
of this policy. While Calwell’s widening of immigration has been relatively well 
documented, what has not so clearly been identified is the major change which occurred 
in 1958 following the July National Conference of the ALP in Brisbane. At this 
conference, Labor decided to return to a minimalist position on immigration, rejecting 
the emphasis upon southern European migration. 
Following the Brisbane conference, Leslie Haylen, Labor spokesman, informed the 
House that ‘because of the attitude and the breakdown of Menzies government 
migration we believe that there should be a curtailment in migration’.349 Led by 
Opposition Leader Dr H.V. Evatt, the ALP conference now recognised that the party 
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had made many mistakes, although they had been well-intentioned. The ALP was now 
arguing that ‘in the early days we fell in to many grave errors’. Evatt argued at the 
Conference for a contraction of immigration and now Haylen was concluding in the 
Parliament, on behalf of the ALP, that they had been ‘naïve’ because Australia was ‘so 
remote from European affairs’.350 Labor was now moving away from southern 
European immigration and back to a pre-World War II exclusivist position 
recommending that only British migrants be preferred. 
In this crucial debate, which was a turning point for Labor, the party rejected the 
previous successes of Calwell and Curtin to return to a narrower position. Labor was 
arguing that they had been initially misled by ‘poker-work cushions and folk dancing 
outside the Albert Hall here in Canberra’, but now regretted that they had not screened 
migrants more effectively. Labor’s post-World War II immigration policy, he was 
arguing, had failed for three reasons. The first reason had been the emphasis upon the 
wrong migrant profile of southern Europeans, in particular Italians. The second reason 
was that ‘our migration screenings were bad’ and ‘we believe that in some cases our 
health screenings were bad’. 
Haylen constructed an argument around the undesirability of allowing migrants from 
countries such as Italy to enter Australia. He asserted: ‘How could it have been 
suggested to British people that within 10 years of the War the great bulk of immigrants 
would come from enemy countries?’ Southern European migrants do not possess the 
same qualities as British migrants who are preferable because ‘they more readily 
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assimilate into British communities’. He went on to argue that ‘Italian migrants from 
Mussolini’s Italy were streaming into this country and that would have been 
inconceivable a decade ago’.351 
These arguments represented a volte face from the position taken by the Curtin/Calwell 
administration in post-World War II Australia. It represented a new phase in Labor 
Party policy and, hence, a rejection of Downer, whereby a repudiation of the bipartisan 
agreements surrounding expanding immigration in the Holt/Downer Immigration 
Ministries was now being challenged and, in fact, actively opposed on the floor of the 
Parliament. 
In the middle of this debate on southern European migrants and, as further evidence of 
the Liberal Party’s new position on immigration, the policy proposal of Billy Snedden 
emerged. Alick Downer was not the only representative of the Liberal Party in the 
1950s seeking reforms to the White Australia policy. Billy Snedden, the future leader of 
the Liberal Party (29 December 1972 to 21 March 1975) and Minister for Immigration 
in the Holt and Gorton Governments (1966-1969), proposed in September 1958 that 
Asian immigration should be recognised within the Migration Act. It has not previously 
been highlighted that Billy Snedden called for explicit recognition of Asian 
immigration. Snedden argued that ministerial discretion had become something that the 
Minister could turn on or off, depending upon the Minister’s whim. This was 
inadequate, given that the country was increasingly recognising the place for some form 
of Asian immigration and Snedden argued: 
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In other words, the policy followed for half a century can be reversed overnight 
by administrative action. Leaving aside completely any arguments for or against 
the policy, I believe that this position should not be allowed to continue.352 
Importantly, for the first time since World War II, a member of the Australian 
Parliament was making the argument for Asian immigration as early as 1958. Snedden 
was calling for a reversal of the policy under which ministerial discretion was able to 
provide individual Asians admission to the country. His reversal was not to remove the 
provision for Asian immigration, but to actually legislate it so that individual 
Ministers could not interfere with legitimate claims by individual Asians for admission 
to Australia. He stated: 
I do not believe that a specific provision in legislation, especially the kind of 
code that I outlined earlier, would give any greater offence than the fact. I 
therefore feel that the matter should be removed from the category of ministerial 
discretion and be included in the legislation.353 
He was critical of the fact that individual Ministers with varying personalities and 
character emphasis could determine the outcome of the claims of individual Asians, 
contending that ‘the fact remains that whether individual Asians should be admitted to 
this country has always been, and continues to be, a matter of ministerial discretion.’354 
All parties within the debate recognised that what had previously been agreed upon as 
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an alternative way of allowing Asian migrants to enter the country through the 
discretion of the minister should now be made explicit in legislation. Had Snedden 
succeeded with this appeal to amend the Act, it would have changed the timetable of the 
reform of the White Australia Policy. 
The importance of Snedden’s policy proposal is not only to be found in the content of 
the policy but also in the fact that Snedden was asking for legislative changes to what 
had hitherto been quietly agreed between the parties as a discreet way to allow 
individual Asians to enter the country. Without an explicit change to the immigration 
policy in written legislation, many Asian individuals still found their way into 
Australian society through ministerial discretion. However, overtly making this a law on 
the parliamentary statute books would create, in the minds of many, the opening for 
large-scale immigration changes. To come forward so boldly and argue for reforms to 
legislation was pioneering a position that no one else was prepared to take within the 
Parliament. However, the ALP did not support Snedden’s reform proposal, returning to 
the argument that southern European immigration was the current urgent problem 
requiring rebuttal and setting forth a series of new arguments to roll back the Calwell 
reforms. These were all concerted attempts to oppose Downer and his refusal to let the 
policy be watered down. Downer was struggling to hold on to changes already 
confirmed at the 1951, 1954, 1955 and 1958 elections where the community had 
endorsed southern European immigration and found themselves under attack from the 
ALP. 
Leslie Haylen, for example, contended that when he had worked closely with Calwell in 
1946 and 1947 to expand the immigrant base for Australia, the first emphasis had 
always been on northern Europeans. Southern Europeans were a concession about 
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which he had reservations about and were finally conceded because the Nordic 
countries were successful in keeping their best citizens at home. This policy now needed 
to be reviewed. 
Australia had failed in the first instance to attract the northern European profile, not 
through the lack of desire on that part of Danes and Swedes to migrate to Australia, but 
through the ability of their respective governments to not allow them to migrate given 
the severity of their nations’ problems following the devastation of World War II. Later, 
then, the idea had turned towards a second-rate solution which Labor now regretted. 
Haylen argued that ‘Norwegians were practically prohibited from leaving the country’ 
and a similar situation obtained in Sweden and Denmark. Haylen related the situation 
one night in Switzerland where an Australian delegation was recruiting prospective 
Swiss immigrants and its hotel ‘was invaded day and night by people prepared to come 
to this country. We lost them all’.355 A protective Swiss Government prevented their 
departure. 
In 1949, a second wave of immigration recruitment was attempted within northern 
European countries with the same outcome:356 ‘the salt of Europe’ were denied an exit 
from ‘a war stricken Europe.’ Building the case further that northern rather than 
southern Europeans were the intended objective, Haylen maintained that ‘the emphasis 
of the Honourable Member for Melbourne (Arthur Calwell), he was then Minister for 
Immigration was on the Northern European, not on any grounds of racial superiority but 
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because of the ease with which they could be assimilated.’357 
In other words, the southern European option was a second-rate concession which had 
resulted in questionable results for Australia. Haylen went on to assert that the poor 
quality of southern European migration had resulted in such unsuccessful projects as the 
Snowy Mountain Scheme:‘occasionally schemes like the Snowy Mountains will peter 
out and this is having a very damaging effect.’ Labor was now critical of this scheme 
and what he envisaged would be resultant employment problems, stating: ‘The 
government has no plan to absorb these peasants.’358 
At the heart of the objection to the expanded immigration program was the perceived 
devastating effects upon Australian workers. Following the Brisbane ALP National 
Conference in 1958, the ALP reframed its objections to immigration to focus on the 
perceived devastating effects upon the Australian worker. Labor was now calling for a 
‘proper planned immigration scheme’ which understood the capacity of Australia to 
incorporate migrants based upon economic prospects, and more specifically, the 
employment capabilities of the various Australian states. Labor was now arguing, 
through Haylen’s address to the Parliament, that immigration should be restricted. 
Haylen argued for a slowing of the annual migrant intake, ‘not so many, not the 100 
000, break it down to one third, break it down to a small figure that you have decided 
upon and keep it on a measured, reduced basis until you find our absorptive capacity.’359 
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The key term here was ‘absorptive capacity’, indicating that Australia was unable to 
give migrants jobs and that, as a result, integration would need to change. This view was 
contrary to the Menzies Government’s position that immigration should expand and that 
new opportunities would flow from this new workforce capacity. 
Labor was also arguing that the government was now completely out of step with the 
average Australian and that the population had turned against immigration. Haylen went 
on to argue: 
If you want to find out the truth and genuine feelings about immigration you 
must go to the worker who does share his job and his limited housing with the 
newcomer. You will find that the worker is complaining bitterly, that he feels 
that immigration is reaching saturation point.360 
Labor was asking for immigration to be ‘reduced in a logical way’. They were now 
arguing that the government was flooding the country with ‘streams of immigrants who 
were not properly checked’ and the movement away from a British-centred immigration 
policy had opened the floodgates for concern about the nature and desirability of the 
southern European immigrants. 
Percy Clarey, an ALP member of Parliament, had made this point earlier on 8 May 
1958 in one of the first debates around the Migration Act, arguing: 
Today Australia was faced with a position that the countries that are not 
prosperous that have a surplus population and that are anxious for other 
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countries to take their surplus people are mainly in the Mediterranean area. The 
problem of finding the right type of immigrant is becoming increasingly 
difficult.361 
Percy Clarey was employing the same arguments that Labor had now confirmed in its 
July 1958 National Conference to step up the argument against Downer’s expansionary 
immigration program. Both were arguing that the southern European experiment had 
been desirable at one time, but it now was appropriate to terminate southern European 
migration. If it had not been for Downer’s insistence upon the policy as Immigration 
Minister, it might have come under further strain, not only from Labor, but from within 
his own coalition. 
For example, Western Australian Country Party member Hugh Leslie argued that 
Downer’s policy of expanding the immigration program, particularly through southern 
European migrants was undesirable. As Member for Moore he asserted: 
Australia it is generally conceded to be still a young country but I believe it is 
unfortunate that in this period in our history we have to resort to such an 
extensive immigration program as has been pursued during the post war years. 
The blame for this lies entirely in the door of the Australian people of earlier 
days. I’m going to suggest that the Minister for Immigration [Downer] should 
also be the Minister for Population.362 
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Expressed simply, from within the Country Party, members were also arguing for 
smaller immigration numbers, as the current rate could not be sustained by the 
economy. Furthermore, Labor was now adopting a more exclusivist pro-British 
position: ‘We must have a basis of worthwhile immigrants, and we must get British 
immigrants. After all Britain is the root and stem of our family and British immigrants 
are available’. Labor was also contending that there was an insufficient land program to 
match the needs of migrants. Leslie Haylen argued that the Liberal Party government 
had failed to develop the land plan program which would match the immigration 
expansion figures contained in Downer’s Migration Act: ‘Surely behind the ordinary 
plan of immigration there is a land plan and there is a plan of development that does not 
envisage crowding people into a secondary industries’. The argument also continued 
that it was unfair on immigrants to attract them to the country on a false advertising 
campaign which was not matched by reliability and certainty regarding employment 
and housing. 
The target profile of migrants was also weakening the country as the quality, 
particularly of southern European migrants, was yet to be clearly evident in Australian 
society. Haylen argued: ‘Surely if you look for numbers and not quality of numbers you 
are merely defeating yourself. The numerically strong countries of the world are the 
weakest in defence’. 
Perhaps the most considered response to Downer’s commitment to legislating for 
southern European immigration came from Member for Bendigo, Percy Clarey. 
Clarey’s intervention in the debate was notable for the policy defence role he had 
assumed in the ALP. His paper, prepared for the 1958 ALP National Conference and 
entitled ‘A History of Unions’, prefigured his wider concerns about immigration and 
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reflected the historical rationale Labor was seeking for its policy shift on European 
migration. Clarey had positioned himself within the ALP as a man of letters with a wide 
interest in Far Eastern cultural history. He was also close to Evatt, having been a keen 
supporter of him in the 1955 split with the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), and was 
understood to have his imprimatur on immigration matters. When he provided an 
intellectual justification for any policy change it was usually received with a certain 
gravitas by both sides of the Parliament. 
Hence, his address to the House of Representatives on 8 May 1958 contained a 
sustained historical analysis of the economic factors behind Australia’s immigration 
program which he argued needed to be reduced as ‘the problem of finding the right type 
of immigrant for Australia had become increasingly difficult’. More specifically, 
because the Downer policy was allowing in ‘Greeks and Italians’, Labor now opposed 
it, as ‘the whole economy suffers’.363 
To justify this withdrawal of support for the southern European immigration policy, 
Clarey provided an economic rationale which could only be understood and ‘fully 
appreciated if we consider them in the light of the history of immigration in Australia’. 
He identified four stages: ‘The first was the pastoral industry, the second the mining 
industry, the third the agricultural industry and the fourth industrial enterprises 
generally.’ Clarey’s essential thesis was that the economic conditions of the countries 
from which migrants would originate would determine the quality and success of the 
immigration program. 
 
363 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 May 1958, 




What has taken place during the last 100 years indicates clearly that when Great 
Britain was enjoying relative security or prosperity the tendency for people to 
leave to come to Australia was lessened. In periods when Australia was 
prosperous the tendency was for immigration to increase.364 
The converse was also true that, when difficult times were being experienced 
economically, such as in the case of Italy and Greece in the post-World War II period, 
Australia, he contended, was receiving the less desirable profile of migrant. This was 
compounded by the fact that, in his argument, Australia’s post-World War II prosperity 
had the general effect of attracting southern Europeans to a country which provided 
substantial promise when theirs was in a perceived state of decline. 
Clarey’s argument also referred to the ‘gold era and the period prior to World War One 
when the tendency was for immigration to increase’. This immigration program did not 
work effectively in all respects, as there was not enough ‘absorptive capacity’ when 
these growths peaked, and resulted in long periods of unemployment because we 
‘brought out people who do not possess the skill and knowledge.’ Reflecting on over 
one hundred years of immigration history, Clarey concluded that, unless changes were 
made, Australia would be condemned to the lessons of history and that its immigration 
program is ‘bound to lead to failure.’ 
Jim Cairns offered a similar warning regarding immigration intake and the need to 
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reduce it from the Government’s high figures: 
The Government has an optimum immigration plan to bring in 112 000 people 
this year, because it is budgeting for a deficit of £112 000 000. That is not the 
proper approach. The optimum number should surely be the number that we can 
employ, house and service without significantly harming Australian living 
conditions. Any other approach is bad for both the migrant and the Australian.365 
To make his point even clearer, Clarey contrasted northern European immigration with 
southern European immigration. He observed that the northern European countries, in 
particular the Scandinavian countries, ‘do not desire to see their skilled workers 
emigrating’. This meant that the best migrants were not being received in Australia for 
two reasons: first, the economic conditions had improved in those countries and, 
second, the government sanctions and protocols would make it difficult for migrants 
from Denmark and Sweden to leave. In contrast, it was becoming too easy for 
Mediterranean countries to release their peoples. 
Clarey contended: ‘So today Australia is faced with the position that the countries that 
are not prosperous, but have a surplus population, and that are anxious for other 
countries to take this surplus people, are mainly in the Mediterranean areas. I refer 
particularly to countries like Italy, Greece and Malta.’366 
His fellow Labor parliamentarians were often more guarded in the way they argued for 
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the need to reduce immigration from countries other than Britain. Clyde Cameron, for 
example, contended that ‘Australia did not need to apologize in any way for wanting to 
keep Australia British’ rather than explicitly identifying Greeks and Italians, as both 
Percy Clarey and Leslie Haylen had done. He expressed the argument in this way: ‘All 
we ask is that it should implement the British way of life in its entirety’ and, on other 
occasions, appealed to the Minister to ensure that migrants would not be allowed into 
the country who were ‘ignorant of what comprises the British way of life.’367 The 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 enabled government officials to choose a language 
other than that spoken by the prospective migrant to ensure that he could not enter the 
country. In a similar way, Cameron here was arguing that those who did not ‘comprise 
the British way of life’ should not be allowed entry to Australia. 
Dr Evatt, as Leader of the ALP, was also conspicuous now by his silence. Rather than 
making a number of detailed statements on immigration, he had chosen 
parliamentarians such as Percy Clarey and Leslie Haylen to make the case. Dr. Evatt, as 
Leader of the Opposition, declined the opportunity, at the citizenship convention in 
Canberra in January 1958, to outline the successes of the immigration policy, 
particularly in the Chifley/Calwell Government of 1946 to 1949. Alan Hulme observed 
that Dr. Evatt ‘disclaimed any credit whatsoever for that section of the immigration 
program which followed the bringing of the first 200 000 displaced persons into the 
country’.368 Hulme contended that the Labor Party had now reversed its position and 
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that the reason it had become silent on the matter was that the ALP was following 
exactly the same line of argument. He also argued that it was now through Evatt’s 
proxies, Clarey and Haylen, that Labor was calling for a ‘curtailment of 
immigration’.369 
Evatt, as Leader of the Opposition, was calling for a reduction in immigration consistent 
with his previous announcements regarding the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. As 
has been observed in the debate regarding the abolition of the Dictation Test, he had 
even called for the matter to be referred back to a parliamentary committee. 
The struggle for Alick Downer was therefore made more difficult by a reluctant 
opposition. Although Downer had recognised the achievements of Calwell throughout 
the immigration debates and his vision of developing alternative sources of migrants, 
particularly from southern Europe, he was the one now being left to defend Calwell’s 
vision. Alick Downer, in recognising the achievement of Calwell, sought to expand this 
platform, only to find that in the end his mission was to maintain it. 
The formative family influence of Alick Downer examined in this chapter therefore 
represents a complex picture. It is within a paradigm of incrementalism rather than a 
conscious process of progressive conservatism that Downer’s contributions can be best 
understood. Whilst liberal and conservative influences often conflicted, the persistence 
of Britishness was always pervasive. Alick Downer’s term as Minister for Immigration 
from 1958 to 1963 witnessed him as both a moderate reformer and as a conserver of the 





the electorate had previously authorised in federal elections in relation to Southern 
European immigration. 
Alick Downer was in broad agreement with the continuity of the White Australia Policy 
and, although he reformed the objectionable processes of denying entry such as the 
Dictation Test, he never wavered in his commitment to the overall direction of the 
policy. He did introduce small changes in practice regarding Asian exceptions and 
considerably increased levels of Ministerial discretion, but this was designed to ensure 
continued overall electoral acceptance of the policy. By removing many of the 
administrative anomalies and humanising its public profile, he strengthened it and 
ensured its continuity. Reviewing these complex policy positions pursued by Alick 
Downer, he may be better viewed as a statesman with a liberal heart and conservative 
mind than as a progressive conservative. 
This chapter has revealed that the core administrative reforms of Downer’s Ministry, the 
abolition of the Dictation Test, the repeal of the Emigration Act of 1910 and the 
maintenance of southern European migration, were achieved against frequent opposition 
from both within and outside his own party. Alick Downer had sensed both a shift in 
public sentiment surrounding the ‘archaic’ Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and a 
need to continue southern European immigration despite the fact that elements within 
the political polity disagreed. 
However, if the first stage of Alick Downer’s career as Minister for Immigration was 
characterised by a mixed picture of conservatism and liberalism, the second stage of his 
career as British High Commissioner removed any questions around reforming 
tendencies. This was evidenced most clearly in his unyielding commitment to the Old 
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Commonwealth, at a time when both the Wilson and Heath Governments were pursuing 





Chapter Six  
Formative British Experiences: The ‘Son of Empire’ and a Changing 
Commonwealth 
I am so disgusted by the double talk of Ministers, of their unending brazen 
breaking of promises to me personally as High Commissioner and to our 
Government in Canberra that I wonder if I can continue usefully here in my 
present position.370 
The Empire was a concept, and an institution, none of them approved of. Thus 
the present ministers, nurtured in this ideology and faced with the difficult 
economic circumstances of the second half of the 1960s, and backed by a 
majority of nearly one hundred in the House of Commons, seized the 
opportunity to implement a basic tenet of British socialist policy.371 
When Alexander Downer was asked to give his valedictory speech in London in March 
2018, he chose to commence his address with a reflection on his father and in doing so 
signalled his importance in his formative development. The speech was an opportunity 
to reflect upon his time as Australian High Commissioner to Britain following in his 
father’s footsteps between 1964 and 1972. The speech was also significant for the fact 
that it identified, through the Downers’ British service, different stages in the Anglo-
Australian relationship. Downer described his father as a ‘son of empire’ who had, sadly 
for him, witnessed the collapse of the traditional strength of the relationship.372 Downer 
then went on to elaborate his own experiences as Foreign Minister which had left him 
to a lesser extent disillusioned.  
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Alick Downer’s appointment as Australian High Commissioner in London in 1964 by 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies provided him with the opportunity to give his only son 
Alexander the formative British educational and cultural background he had 
experienced himself twenty-eight years earlier. Whereas Robert Menzies had to wait 
until the age of forty before setting foot in England as a delegate to the Silver Jubilee of 
King George V in 1935, Alexander Downer would commence his British experience 
at the impressionable age of twelve and subsequently change his future political 
life.373 What would be the formative influences for Downer, who was introduced to both 
Labour and Conservative governments during his father’s time as British High 
Commissioner? At what cost would the Australian nation be developed within the 
concept of Empire. To what extent in Australia need to sacrifice of position relation to 
Britain's entry into the European economic community. Alexander Downer witnessed 
these events in the late 1960s and 1970s and his father's response in both his bitter 
regrets and yet his intransigence regarding his continued support for Empire lead to a 
different response from Alexander Downer. In this chapter we will examine what were 
these events father and son experienced and what was the impact on Alexander Downer 
in his later policy positions in international relations with Great Britain. 
Alick Downer was High Commissioner in London whilst five Prime Ministers led 
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Australia and when the Liberal Party in Australia was undergoing considerable changes 
after a comparatively long period of stability. This period was also central to a maturing 
Alexander Downer as he witnessed first-hand how his father would approach the role of 
High Commissioner, a position he would later assume himself. 
Speaking of this, Alexander Downer has observed: 
Whilst it is true I was often involved in young conservative politics and 
Conferences all over England I was also drawn into my father’s approach to his 
role as he was always discussing his grievances with the British at a time when it 
seemed like Australia was being abandoned for the EEC. I couldn’t help but be 
influenced by the strident views of both he and Sir Robert towards this proposed 
change in Anglo-Australian relations.374 
In this second stage of Alick Downer’s career, the restructuring of Australia’s 
relationship with Britain, necessitated by the proposed entry to the EEC, saw him 
respond in an almost defiant manner. This response jars with the notion of him being a 
progressive with thoroughgoing reforming instincts. Whereas in the early stages of his 
career he had embraced the liberal tendencies of Menzies to restructure the party around 
freedom and personal responsibility, as outlined in the Forgotten People, Downer was 
reluctant to exercise the same liberal pragmatism with regard to Australia’s response to 
England’s entry to the EEC. The assertion that Alick Downer was a progressive 
conservative will be tested against this second stage of his career when he declined to 
join the wider reforming tendencies evident in both English and Australian public and 
 




As we observed in Chapter Five, Downer was not an advocate of wholesale changes to 
the White Australia Policy. He was, at best, attempting minor policy changes whilst 
introducing genuine structural reforms around Departmental implementation of the 
policy to make it look fairer to the international world. Ministerial discretion was his 
preferred modus operandi. It was Downer’s British race patriotism, his sense of being of 
‘British stock’,375 which fuelled his reluctance to weaken the policy and it was the same 
sense of ties with the mother country which led to his disillusionment with the new 
British position on the EEC. He viewed this new policy as an abandonment of what he 
considered a mutual sense of obligation within the British World. This sense of betrayal 
reached its apogee in a confrontation with Roy Jenkins, who was responsible for 
immigration between October 1964 and November 1967 through the Home Office, as 
described here by Alexander Downer: 
All this was encapsulated in a remark Roy Jenkins made to my father. During a 
heated discussion at a function at Hampton Court over Britain’s diminishing role 
in the world and links with its traditional family countries, Jenkins angrily shook 
his fist at my father and said ‘I have no time for kith and kin politics’.376 
Downer had felt a sense of betrayal. For him it was all about ‘kith and kin’. As a 
returning prisoner of war, having spent over three years in Changi Prison, Singapore, he 
expanded in the following way: 
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Australians have feelings of being let down, abandoned, unappreciated for their 
own voluntary efforts to assist the mother country not only in the two World 
Wars but in conflicts as far back as this is the Sudan in the 1880s.377 
This disenchantment with the changing Commonwealth world order was not located 
around the Labour Party and Wilson alone but extended to a disappointment with the 
conservative side of politics who were divided on the issue. He expressed this 
dissatisfaction in his criticisms of the Heath Government arguing that the ‘Heath 
Cabinet with their concentration on the EEC, made the majority of Commonwealth 
citizens aliens, a sorry commentary on modern Conservative thinking.’378 
The Britain Downer found himself working in was one of change at nearly every point. 
To understand the isolation of Downer’s conservatism one needs to fully appreciate the 
tumultuous times he found himself in. The confluence of forces undermining the old 
Commonwealth and Australia’s reliance on British race patriotism is well summarised 
by Carl Bridge: 
Everything fell apart in the 1960s and early 1970s. Japan and the USA became 
Australia’s main trading and investment partners as Britain’s economic strength 
waned. The Sterling Area had faded in importance to such an extent by 1966–67 
that Australia symbolically changed the name of its currency to the dollar and 
actually embraced the greenback as its main reserve currency. British migration 
to Australia was outstripped by flows from Italy, Greece and elsewhere. Britain 
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announced its military withdrawal from East of Suez and its economic intentions 
to join the European Common Market.379 
At the heart of Downer’s criticisms was the receding role of England in international 
affairs, particularly by the Wilson Labour government and the ‘Little Englanders’, as 
both Menzies and Downer described them. Alexander Downer was to make a similar 
criticism of Australian Labor over John Curtin and Abyssinia, asserting that Labor stood 
for a ‘Little Australia’.  At the heart of the Downer political credo stood nation building 
through a sense of international responsibility. To be taken seriously on the world stage 
and to have impact internationally Australian needed to build a nation through migration 
and a strong foreign policy. However not only Australia, but Britain in her commanding 
Commonwealth role, needed to exhibit the same priority. A big Australia and a 
prominent Britain were therefore essential to Alick Downer and this policy conviction 
flowed through to Alexander Downer and his approach to migration and foreign 
relations. 
Both Alick and Alexander Downer were advocates of the ‘Liberal Party tradition of 
foreign policy realism’.380 For Alexander Downer, like his father, Britian should not 
relax its international position in spite of all the post-world war changes. Even at the end 
of his term as High Commissioner, Downer was contending ‘With power comes 
responsibility. It is the responsibility of the British Government to be one of the great 
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leaders of the western world.’381 
Earlier in 2005 in his controversial Earle Page Lecture, Downer argued for a binary 
division between the isolationist policies of Australian Labor and the international 
participation of conservative governments. This is a contestable position since, as David 
Lowe argues, both parties ‘supported the U.S. Alliance from realist premises’.382 
Downer contended that ‘Australian conservatives have long shared a broad 
understanding of the world’s interconnectedness’.383 
The reasons for and sources of Alick Downer’s ‘Little Englanders’ depiction of Wilson 
Government’s changing policy over the EEC will also be examined in this chapter as a 
formative influence on Alexander Downer’s foreign policy approach. The first section 
of the chapter deals with how Alick Downer’s conservatism failed to evolve with 
changing circumstances, which can be witnessed in his interpretation of these events in 
Britain in the 1960s, both at the time and in his later reflections. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, Menzies and his father constituted the two most influential formative conservative 
influences upon Alexander Downer. Menzies visited Britain on six occasions and stayed 
with Alick and Alexander Downer at Wiltshire on three visits for extended stays during 
Alick Downer’s period as High Commissioner. Britain’s entry into the EEC was at the 
centre of their discussions and private correspondence. During this developing period 
for Alexander Downer in England between 1963 and 1972, how did they approach 
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the central issue of Anglo-Australian relations and the EEC? 
In 2014, the Downer Papers were released to the National Library of Australia, 
providing fresh insights into how Downer had revised his account of Menzies and the 
EEC in order to protect the reputation of Menzies. Downer’s first published record of 
these events was released in 1982 and provided a two-stage account of Menzies and the 
Common Market. The narrative developed by Downer depicted Menzies, although 
originally implacably opposed to the move, giving way to the inevitability of Britain’s 
decision. This revisionism sits alongside Downer’s generous recounting of Menzies 
‘behaviour in his Cabinet’.384 
However, this was not the original understanding between Menzies and Downer. In fact, 
their private correspondence reveals a different picture, one in which they share an 
angry disillusionment with the changes in British policy. Menzies relayed in private 
correspondence, revealed in the Downer Papers, his growing contempt for British 
foreign policy on both sides of the Parliament, declaring: ‘I fear that I have despaired 
about the Commonwealth for some time. It has been going to pieces for years now’.385 
In correspondence with Governor-General Casey, Downer had also made his views of 
the Wilson government clear when he stated that he doubted his own position as High 
Commissioner was worth continuing. Downer revealed his discontent to Casey, stating: 
I am so disgusted by the double talk of Ministers, of their unending brazen breaking of 
promises to me personally as High Commissioner and to our Government in Canberra 
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that I wonder if I can continue usefully here in my present position.386 
Furthermore, despite Downer’s attempts to protect Menzies in his later reflections, 
Menzies himself was angry and disillusioned with the British government. Menzies 
could not understand how Britain could claim to be leading the Commonwealth and still 
decide to join the EEC. 
The question remains, then, as to why Downer developed two different accounts of 
Australia’s entry into the EEC with regard to the response of its longest serving Prime 
Minister, Menzies. The answer to this question may be found in some of the private 
correspondence between Downer and Menzies immediately following Menzies’ 
resignation. In late January 1966, following the announcement of Menzies’ retirement 
after sixteen years as Prime Minister, he was greeted by a very effusive letter from 
Downer, asking Menzies not to retire. Downer pleaded with Menzies to reconsider his 
decision in a private letter written on 30 January 1966, in which he stated: ‘All of us are 
indebted to you. I am grateful for choosing me as one of your Ministers in 1958 and 
then as High Commissioner in 1963’.387 
Downer argued that Menzies should not move away from leadership, as many areas 
remained unresolved, including this area of the EEC. In this 30 January letter, Downer 
expressed his concern that Menzies had a rare appreciation of the Commonwealth which 
still required his advocacy. 
The timing and content of this letter indicated a complete commitment to Menzies 
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which was also reflected in Downer’s defence of Menzies’ Cabinet meetings, outlined 
in his later reflections. Menzies had been under attack from his opponents for being too 
autocratic in the cabinet and not allowing for enough ministerial responsibility to be 
exercised. Downer, in his account, refutes this criticism and describes a different 
Menzies. Perhaps this support helps to explain why Downer defended Menzies’ 
approach to the EEC and his argument that Menzies, in fact, was able to revise his 
approach to England. Downer seems to wear full responsibility for Australian 
opposition to Britain, whilst excusing Menzies. 
Downer positions Menzies as being a somewhat reluctant convert by the mid to late 
1960s to the view that Britain had to make its own response to the question of its 
relationship with Europe. Downer, in contrast, presents himself as a High Commissioner 
to the UK advocating Australia’s perspective as one of opposition. Downer defended 
Menzies in the following way: 
Menzies never departed from his original stance that the choice was one for Britain 
alone to make. It did not lie in the province of Australia or any other Commonwealth 
member to dictate what the British should do.388 
However, Menzies always maintained a vigorous opposition to Britain’s entry, 
commencing in the early 1960s. Menzies warned the Australian people as early as 1961 
that the consequences for ‘Australia’s trade considerations’ and other ‘legitimate 
interests’ would be dramatic. In his 1961 address to the nation, Menzies argued that any 
changes to Britain’s proposals would reorient Australia towards Asia. Menzies had 
 
388 Alick Downer, Six prime ministers, p. 45. 
244 
 
addressed the nation in 1961, following five successive general election successes, and 
was preparing the Australian public for the inevitability of Britain’s European 
reorientation, at the same time rallying Australian sentiment to oppose the move.389 In 
his argument, he outlined a number of areas where Australia would be 
immediately affected, particularly in relation to primary produce, including wool, 
wheat, and dried fruits. 
However, his central appeal was around the Commonwealth and defence: 
It is for these reasons that we have publicly expressed our grave doubts of the 
continuance unimpaired of the Commonwealth to which we are deeply attached, 
with which we have stood in peace and war, and the existence of which still 
means much to civilisation.390 
Menzies went on to express his reservations that Britain’s turn towards Europe could 
result in an isolationism which would have significant implications for Australia and 
necessitate a further reorientation towards Asia. As an Old Commonwealth supporter, 
Menzies was concerned that this proposal struck at the heart of Commonwealth 
viability: 
As a senior Commonwealth country, we have felt bound to say that we do not 
think that the Commonwealth as a political organism would be strengthened. We 
sincerely hope that events may prove us wrong. But, as much is being said about 
 





the impact of any accession to the Treaty of Rome on the Commonwealth in its 
present form, we think it proper to express our own view.391 
These arguments were also in evidence in the debates in the Australian Parliament with 
the Australian Labor Party, which was quick to identify the impotence of the Australian 
government in the face of these trade threats. 
In an interview with Michael Charlton from the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 
June 1962, Menzies continued the argument: 
But if a government of whatever party in Great Britain went into Europe, then I 
think there would be a heavy blow dealt to the Commonwealth association, and I 
think that so far as we are concerned, and other Commonwealth countries are 
concerned, we should have to engage then in salvage operations. We are not 
going to wander away from these industries. No industry like dried fruit or 
canned fruit need suppose for one moment that we are just going to dump it 
under those circumstances.392 
By the time Menzies had retired as Prime Minister in January 1966, he had refused to 
accept the inevitability of change. Menzies was immovable in his opposition to Britain, 
writing to Downer: ‘I fear that I have despaired about the Commonwealth for some 
time. It has been going to pieces for years now.’393 Despite Downer’s best attempts to 
cover it over, Menzies went even further, declaring: ‘At my age one must speak the 
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truth as one sees it and damn the consequences.’ Notwithstanding this, Downer 
would still advocate many of the arguments that Menzies had surrendered by 1966 in 
his representations to the Wilson Government between 1966 and 1970. 394 
Whilst Alick Downer and Menzies were in agreement about the decline of empire and 
Australia's role they were out of step with a growing Australian acceptance of the 
inevitability of change. Prime Minister's following Menzies during the time of Alec 
Downer’s tenure as High Commissioner to London all accepted the inevitability of 
change In Stuart Ward’s analysis of the transition stage in Australian and British 
diplomatic life when confronted by the decline of Britishness, Ward argues, Downer 
reacted as, in Lord Carrington’s words, a ‘violent Anglophile’. The economic and 
cultural transition occurring on Downer’s watch, centred on Britain’s proposed entry to 
the EEC and the withdrawal of British troops from East of Suez. For Downer, ‘[l]ong-
cherished ideas about an underlying Anglo-Australian community of culture–commonly 
expressed in the language and ritual of Australian “Britishness”–were subjected to an 
inevitable reappraisal.’395 
Ward’s argues Downer’s approach to questions of Britain’s entry into the EEC, the 
withdrawal of troops from Asia and the extent to which Downer was awkwardly out of 
step with the Australian government’s domestic acceptance of these changes. He paints 
a picture of reluctant acceptance by Australian leaders, such as Trade Minister John 
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McEwen, of the inevitability of Britain’s entry to the EEC, whilst Downer was still 
resisting any form of change. 
Harold Holt is cited as an example by Ward of a Prime Minister who was less hostile to 
Britain’s proposal and was in this sense representative of Australian domestic response, 
which was taking a more pragmatic line in relation to Britain’s decision. There is, 
however, very little reference to Menzies during this time, although Menzies remained 
Prime Minister until January 1966, and, from the correspondence with Downer it is 
quite evident that Menzies was not an indifferent observer. 
Menzies was in fact furious with Britain’s proposals, as his private correspondence with 
Downer reveals. In 1967, following his retirement, Menzies argued in a private letter to 
Downer: ‘I just cannot see how Britain can so drastically modify her own political 
sovereignty and still pretend that she is a sovereign independent nation for the purposes 
of the Commonwealth.’396 Menzies expressed his contempt not only for the Wilson 
government, but also for the Heath conservative government, which he felt showed no 
difference in their approach to disrespecting the Anglo-Australian relationship. It is not 
correct in all respects that, particularly in the first three years of Downer’s term as UK 
High Commission and his close personal relationship with Menzies, domestic opinion 
was completely out of step with Downer’s position. Notwithstanding the Menzies 
exception, there was undoubtedly a gradual evolution, particularly within the Australian 
Labor Party, towards the view that the nature of the relationship with England was 
changing and that the policy and diplomacy pertaining to the European Economic 
 
396 Letter, Downer to Menzies, 20 June 1967, NAA:M1003, 11563449.  
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Community needed a more practical approach. 
Ward also argues Downer was often out of step with change because of his close 
relationship with British conservatives. Ward contends that this relationship distorted 
the reality for Downer, in that he was hearing from those who were very much opposed 
to Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community, but were not completely 
representative of the bipartisan changes begun by Macmillan, accelerated by Wilson and 
finally implemented by Heath. The conservative, almost reactionary, circles of London 
society with which Downer was interacting, Ward argues, were distorting the picture for 
Downer and leading to his isolation from Australian domestic developments even 
further.  
As close as Alexander Downer has been to his father he has held reservations about 
Alick Downer’s unconditional commitment to Empire. Writing in 1981 Alexander 
Downer reflected upon his father contending that his perception of what constituted ‘a 
patriotic Australian’ was a combination of commitment to Australia within the strength 
of the British Commonwealth. However, this often meant he would choose to oppose 
many of the understandable and appropriate initiatives of the British government as it 
moved further away towards the European Economic Community. Downer describes 
this conflict his father felt in the following statement: ‘that overriding ambition often led 
him into gentlemanly conflict with British governments, not least over Britain’s desire, 
now fulfilled, to join the European community’.397 
Alick Downer had accepted the post of Australian High Commissioner in London in 
 
397 Alick Downer, The Downers of South Australia, pv11 
249 
 
1964 after a period of seven years as Australian Immigration Minister. Alick Downer 
had been educated at Oxford in 1935, graduating with a law degree and, after practising 
in London, he returned to Australia with aspirations to become Prime Minister. 
Although this was not to eventuate, future Prime Minister John Gorton (1968-1969) and 
Alick had attended Geelong College Victoria and Brasenose College Oxford, although 
four years apart at Oxford, and young Alexander would be given every opportunity to 
follow in their footsteps.398 
The formative educational and political influences on Alexander Downer's life, firstly at 
Radley College for his secondary education and then at Newcastle University for his 
university education would help establish the political philosophy foundations for his 
future career. The Australian speeches399 and writings of Alexander Downer are 
remarkably absent of references to Australian conservative figures, such as Edmund 
Barton or Joseph Lyons, with the notable exception of R. G. Menzies. In contrast, there 
are considerable references to British political philosophers, such as Edmund Burke, 
Adam Locke400 and John Stuart Mill and the political struggles of William Pitt the 
 
398 Sir Alexander Sir Downer, Six prime ministers (Melbourne, Vic.: Hill of Content, 
1982), p. 105. John Gorton also attended Brasenose College in 1927.  Alick attended 
Geelong Church of England Grammar School, (1927), obtaining honours in five subjects, 
including a first in British history. In 1928 Downer went up to Brasenose College, Oxford 
(BA, 1932; MA, 1947), where he studied economics. Alick was Member for Angas, S.A. 
from 1949-1964, Minister for Immigration 1956-1963 and Australian High 
Commissioner in London from 1964-1972. 
399 See for example Pioneers' Association of South Australia, 28 December 1993 or the 
Sydney Monarchist League, 1st December 1993. 
400 See Alexander Downer 'Liberalism and the Challenges of Building an Open Society', 
25th Annual Menzies Lecture, Parliament House, Melbourne, 10 October 2002.  In this 
25th year Menzies Address, Downer stated 'The ideas of Locke, Kant and Adam Smith 
have been equally antipathetic to the absolute monarch, the ultra-nationalist, the religious 
extremist and the authoritarian leftist. These forces shared a common cause in their 
opposition to liberalism'. 
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Younger (1759-1806). 401 Events, such as the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the 
political career of Pitt the Younger's response to the French Revolution form a 
consistent source of British conservative political history, upon which Downer chooses 
to draw and highlight the role of evolutionary British political change. As Edmund 
Burke had contrasted the 'organic reform' of British Conservatism to the revolutionary 
destructive forces of the French Revolution, Downer would emphasise the merits of 
'progressive conservatism' for newer Western societies, such as Australia. To 
understand Downer's appreciation of British history as central to this experience, the 
educational background of Alexander Downer needs to be more closely examined. 
The timing and choice of Radley College as the nominated school for Alexander 
Downer was again very much the deliberate planning of his father, Alick Downer.  
Alick Downer had in mind Oxford and in particular Brasenose College, since he had 
returned successfully to Australia from Oxford in 1935. He also sought one of the 
public schools in England to provide the necessary secondary education prior to Oxford.  
In selecting Radley College402, he inquired with the Provistor of Oxford University, Mr 
Allan Brown, to gain his recommendations on what would be the best public school for 
Alex to attend in preparation for Oxford.403 
Radley College, founded in1847, had established an enviable reputation as a feeding 
college for Oxford University. Alexander Downer records his time at Radley College as 
 
401 See, for example, the interview with Rob Linn interview with Alexander Downer. 
National Library of Australia. Oral History and Folklore Branch Research. Oral TRC 
6100/23 
402 Radley College is set on 800 acres near Abingdon and Oxford. The annual school fee 
for Alexander Downer in 1964 was five hundred pounds. 
403 Rob Linn interview with Alexander Downer, op. cit. 
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being of central significance in identifying the core subjects for his future tertiary 
studies and historical interests.404 His father had purchased a rural property at Oares in 
Wiltshire with the profits from the sale of Arbury Park in South Australia, prior to 
travelling to the United Kingdom. 405 As High Commissioner he had his London 
residence at Stokes, but Alexander was admitted to spend most of his time at Radley 
College, near Oxford. It was here that he developed his passion for history, in particular 
English and Byzantine history. The matriculation standards in Britain at the time 
required five O levels and two A levels. Under the guidance of Radley College, 
Alexander studied for eight O levels and three A levels. This would be more than 
necessary, if successful, to provide the qualification to institutions such as Oxford 
University. Alexander excelled in the humanities, as well as mathematics, but struggled 
in chemistry. In his final exam, he achieved 11% in chemistry and was forced to sit the 
exam again in December.  On the second attempt be achieved a result 5% in chemistry 
and his overall result was 7 O levels and two A levels, with the one failure in chemistry. 
Downer's academic achievement would prove to be unsuccessful in his aspiration for an 
elite British University, not altogether for his marks, as in their combination with his 
academic interviews. 
Although Alexander Downer records his disappointment at this Radley result, the 
greatest disappointment was to occur in his failure to gain acceptance to Oxford 
 
404 Ibid.  
405
 Premier Playford had legislated for a road through Arbury Park which Sir Alexander 
Downer unsuccessfully opposed. His father established Arbury Park in 1938. Resumed by 
the S.A. Govt. in 1962. 
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University.406  In fact, he describes it as the first great failure and disappointment that he 
had not fulfilled his father's expectations to follow in his footsteps to Brasenose College 
at Oxford University.407.  He had to complete three interviews to be successful to be 
invited to join the College and, although he felt the interviews had been conducted 
effectively, he was not admitted. 
Following this failure, he contemplated it was time to return to Australia and study at 
the Australian National University408.  However, his father was still continuing as High 
Commissioner in London and Downer was persuaded to try achieving admission again 
to other universities.  He accepted the opportunity which arose at Newcastle University 
in studying for an economics degree in 1971. 
Downer would later reflect: 
It was much better for someone like me with my wealthy, privileged background 
to be mixing around at Newcastle University upon Tyne for three years than to 
be grazing around with like-minded people at Oxford in Brasenose College.409 
Academically, Downer began to achieve again and was successful in being offered a 
Joint Honours program in Politics and Economics, in which subjects he graduated. 
Importantly, this research became a time for considerable personal and career reflection, 
 
406 Rob Linn interview with Alexander Downer. National Library of Australia. Oral 
History and Folklore Branch Research. Oral TRC 6100/23. 
407 Ibid. 
408 The acute disappointment for Downer is evident in this proposal to return to Australia 
when the original motivation for the Downer family had been to provide a specifically 
English platform for his planned rise to prominence in Australian political life. 
409 R Linn/ A Downer Interview, ibid. 
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with his dissertation being entitled 'The History of the Australian Liberal Party'. This 
tertiary study merged with his choice of British conservative political history, focusing 
on the lives of Charles Fox and Pitt the Younger, Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill. 
Alexander Downer had become particularly fascinated by Edmund Burke’s writings, 
which, in turn, would inform the progressive conservatism he would follow in his 
Australian political career. This political philosophy deserves closer attention in fully 
appreciating its formative influence, as it permeates much of Downer’s writing and 
speeches. One of Alexander Downer's clearest appreciations of Edmund Burke's 
writings was in his Adelaide Proclamation Day address in 1993. The timing of this 
speech is of critical importance in understanding Downer's positioning for any future 
opportunity that may arise to become Australian Liberal Leader. As Shadow Treasurer 
from March 1993 to May 1994, Downer was developing an increasingly attractive 
profile as a future leader.410 Criticisms that there was insufficient policy platform to 
determine his ultimate credentials as leader led in turn to an increasing number of 
speeches given on topics somewhat wider than his portfolio brief of Treasury.  These 
speeches included the address to the Pioneers Association of South Australia on 28th 
December 1993 and an earlier presentation to the Sydney Monarchist League on 1st 
December 1993. However, the central presentation in building his Burkean 
Conservatism was the 1993Adelaide Proclamation Day address which is revealing for 
its references to the political philosophy of Edmund Burke. In this address Downer 
contended: 
 
410 Personal Interview with Hon. John Howard OM CA, June 6, 2102, Sydney. John 
Howard describes Downer as being 'as effective a Shadow Treasurer as I can remember'. 
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Progressive Conservatives could see the French system of government had to be 
reformed but not destroyed. We progressive Conservatives do not oppose 
change.  The opponents of change are reactionaries.  Progressive Conservatives 
recognize the inevitability of change and the need to manage change in an 
appropriate way.411 
The echoes of Edmund Burke are clearly evident in these observations. As a 
conservative political philosopher within the government of William Pitt the Younger, 
Burke had positioned himself in the British House of Commons as a critic of English 
attitudes towards the American colonies which were arguing for their right to 
independence. Burke, in somewhat of a contrast, did not support the French Revolution.  
To appreciate the difference, one must first understand his emphasis placed upon 
political continuity as the basis of human rights and in legitimizing political change. 
Burke argued that the legitimacy of a political entity arises out of its traditional 
continuity.  How long it has been in existence creates a form of social contract for 'the 
living, dead and those to be born'. Sever this continuity between generations within a 
political society and one endangers the overall future of that entity. 
His main opposition was to the imposition of universal rights without reference to an 
historical context. He violently disagreed with Jean Jacques Rousseau and his doctrine 
 
411
 Adelaide Proclamation Day Address, May 1993. 
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of the social contract arising out of nature and the universal rights of the individual.412 It 
was also the concept of Rousseau's idealised 'noble savage' which formed a misplaced 
romantic optimism that he stood against. Central to Burke's opposition to Rouseau was 
their conflicting views of society. 
For Burke, as we have seen, society was the store of national consciousness in the 
history of a nation. This repository of human experience and wisdom was not to be 
overthrown through revolution, but to be respected within the ongoing institutions of a 
given society.  For Rousseau, the opposite was the case, with society being the construct 
of flawed and corrupt individuals who needed to return to the original state of nature.  
Given that was impossible, the social contract had then to be established and individuals 
needed to identify their commitment to this social contract. Burke viewed Rousseau's 
idealized notion that the noble savage acts as a virtuous creature removed from pristine 
society corrupted by the institution surrounding it as naïve at best and manipulative at 
worst. 
Burke’s position was in contrast to Rousseau’s, fighting with the House of Commons 
against French revolutionary change which opposed the continuity of the institutions 
creating the success of existing society, institutions which had been the product of many 
centuries of the current society’s evolution.  He was against the French Revolution's 
 
412 For a discussion of the individual and the common good in Rousseau's thought see D 
Cullen:  'How can men as they are, whose tendency is toward partiality, unite around a 
common good? Rousseau’s proposal involves adopting not a stance of impartiality but a 
preference for the general will that is also one’s own. This recognition and this will are 
possible if law is properly understood and respected. Rousseau abandons the quest for the 
best regime in favour of the legitimate regime that conforms to law. His realism consists 
in the clear-eyed elaboration of what is required to strengthen the operation of the general 
will within its proper and limited sphere and to contain without permanently destroying 
the particular will’. Daniel Cullen, "On Rousseau's Democratic Realism," Perspectives on 
Political Science, vol. 36, no. 4 (2007), p. 208. 
256 
 
complete disregard for the past Ancien Regime which served as the prevailing context 
for all change to be achieved from within.  His argument was for small gradual reforms 
to enable more freedom to be realistically achieved. It is here that Downer finds 
resonance for his views in Burke’s conservatism. 
These small freedoms could be more effective to bring about long term change, as 
sudden revolutionary movements may appear desirous in the shorter term, but could 
ultimately prove counter effective.413 This would prove to be correct with the Terror 
Regime of Robespierre to follow the Revolution and vindicate Burke with the violence 
reaped in France. It is, therefore, easy to understand why Burke opposed the English 
war against the American Colonies. He believed they were Englishman and had pre-
located rights based on English tradition. 
These rights needed to be respected, as Burke appealed in the following argument: 
The people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. They are therefore 
not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas and on 
English principles. The people are Protestants, a persuasion not only favourable 
to liberty, but built upon it.  My hold of the colonies is in the close affection 
which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, 
and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as 
links of iron. Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated 
with your government they will cling and grapple to you, and no force under 
heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once 
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understood that your government may be one thing and their privileges another, 
that these two things may exist without any mutual relation-the cement is gone, 
the cohesion is loosened, and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. 414 
At the heart of the disagreement between England and the American Colonies had been 
the area of taxation. Burke contended that the long-standing English tradition of 'no 
taxation without representation' was central to his argument, whilst other opponents, 
such as Charles Fox and other Whigs, would not concede this point.  There was little 
appetite to agree to this in the British House of Commons and Burke was forced to 
make several career-defining speeches on this cause.  In April 1774, he addressed the 
Commons with the following argument: 
Be content to bind America by laws of trade; you have always done it.  Do not 
burden them with taxes.  But you can intemperately, unwisely, fatally, you 
sophisticate and poison the very source of government by urging subtle 
deductions, and consequences odious to those you govern, from the unlimited 
and illimitable nature of supreme sovereignty, you will teach them by these 
means to call that sovereignty itself into question.  If that sovereignty and their 
freedom cannot be reconciled which will they take?  They will cast your 
sovereignty in your face.  No body of men will be argued into slavery.415 
This contrasted with the rationalist values of the French Revolution of Liberte, Egalite 
and Fraternite, which, Burke argued, were separating the French people from their 
 
414 Edmund Burke. House of Commons Address, March 22, 1775. 




traditional roots. Burke was to prove prophetic in France, with the undoing of the 
universal arguments of the French Revolution.  They had not occurred at the time of the 
writing of Burke's book, 'Reactions to the French Revolution' (1790), and its argument 
that gradual change can be more desirous to the population than radical change would 
prove to be correct in the period of Robespierre. 
The principles argued, therefore, by Burke around the nature and pace of political 
change lay at the heart of Alexander Downer’s conservatism. In the first section of his 
Proclamation Day Address in 1993, Downer captured the essence of this Burkean 
Conservatism, arguing: 
Progressive conservatives were not antipathetic to the French Revolution 
because the Bourbons lost their heads or the nobility lost their land.  They 
abhorred the French Revolution because it imposed on France a new regime 
based on a rationalist model (which in time proved unworkable) rather than 
encouraging evolutionary reform of the Ancien Regime.416 
The fact that Downer draws so heavily on this political philosophy of Burke emanates 
directly from his English educational experience. The British history Downer was 
exposed to in his secondary and tertiary studies largely shaped his approach to 
conservatism.  Events such as William and Mary replacing Charles the Second and 
reinstating an emphasis on representative institutions in the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 or the pivotal issues Burke addressed were representative of a distinctively British 
curriculum. Downer has reflected: 
 
416 A. Downer, Proclamation Day Address, Adelaide. 1993. 
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The events of seventeenth British history and the battle between King and 
Parliament left a forcible impression on me. My studies were primarily in British 
political and economic history during my term at Newcastle University.417 
These formative British educational experiences, therefore, provided an intellectual 
underpinning for his arguments supporting, for example, the pro-Monarchy position 
throughout his career. The transition for Downer from the French Revolution to the 
intellectual positioning in the leadership struggle for the Australian Liberal Party and 
surrounding debates over the Monarchy versus Republic were based on this argument 
that 'evolutionary reform of the Ancien Regime was preferable to wholesale change. 
Downer conceded that corrupt regimes needed to be changed, but not overthrown: 
When one goes back to 1789, the French Revolution, the Bourbons were decadent and 
out of touch but they were replaced by Robespierre and the reign of Terror and then the 
Emperor Napoleon who would plunge Europe into War.418 
Incremental changes would produce desired reform, but, just as Burke had argued for 
the 'American English', Downer was establishing a line of Anglo-Australian continuity 
through the monarchy. One would need to return to the writings of another Anglophile 
such as Robert Gordon Menzies as an aspiring leader to find such persistent references 
 
417 Personal Interview with Alexander Downer, September 5, 2013, Woollahra, Sydney. 
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 Alexander Downer, Rule for the People, Adelaide Advertiser, 24 October 2011. In this 
article Downer drew a line of argument through contemporary revolutions and the 
Chinese Communist Revolution 1949 back through the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to 
the French Revolution of 1789.  Downer argued that the overthrow of a corrupt Tsar 
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to British conservative political history.419 
Whilst Alexander Downer was studying Burke and British history, his father was 
fighting a battle to ward off imminent changes to the Anglo-Australian relationship. 
Few conservatives had more direct influence over the course of Anglo-Australian 
relations, as they underwent a fundamental realignment in the 1960s, than Alick 
Downer. He represented five different Australian Prime Ministers in London at a time 
when the Liberal Party in Australia was undergoing considerable change after a 
comparatively long period of stability. 
He began his High Commissioner role in 1964 at the same time as Harold Wilson was 
elected leader of a Labour government which was intent upon implementing a new suite 
of policies designed directly to oppose what Wilson had described as ‘an out dated 
Torie philosophy’. Wilson referred to: 
Their nostalgic belief that it is possible in the second half of the twentieth 
century to hark back to a nineteenth century free enterprise economy and a 
nineteenth century unplanned society in an age when the economy is no longer 
self-regulating and when the role of government must inevitably increase, they 
have tried and failed to turn back the clock.420 
The Labour Party’s self-described Fabian Socialism was, by definition, an affront to 
such a conservative as Downer. Britain’s entry into the EEC was joined by immigration 
 
419. See, for example, R. G. Menzies, The English Tradition in New York Times 
Magazine, 1949. 
420 ‘The new Britain’, Labour Party manifesto, London, 1964, p. 7. 
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and changing defence alignments to form a triumvirate of concerns for Downer as 
Australia’s High Commissioner in London. Labour had  commenced with a number of 
objectives contained in a document called The New Britain Labour Party Manifesto. 
However, the revaluation of sterling in July 1966 changed everything. This was a 
turning point for Labour, as flowing from it the decision was made to reorganise the 
military infrastructure east of Suez. 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Brown had estimated that, should Great 
Britain withdraw from Singapore, this would represent an annual saving of 100 000 000 
pounds. At a time when Wilson himself was under considerable pressure from the 
British electorate as to the wisdom of his new policies, the revaluation of sterling not 
only necessitated a rethink of British defence expenditure, but also had the flow-on 
effect of causing the government to ponder the necessity of entering the EEC. Wilson 
had made this clear in early 1964, when the Labour Party stated: ‘A Labour 
Government’s first concern will be to put our defences on a sound basis and to ensure 
that the nation gets value for money on its overseas expenditure.’421 This would prove to 
be a shibboleth to Labour’s left rather than a clarion call to early wholesale change. 
Although it would seem, then, that Wilson had considered that England would 
inevitably join the EEC, he had explicitly denied that in conversations with Downer 
himself right up to the time that the decision was made. However, the changes to 
Britain’s defence strategies in Asia were not preconceived, as they were essentially a 
response to the economic restraints caused by the crisis in sterling. Helen Parr has 





Beyond domestic wrangling, Wilson faced after the sterling crisis the presentational 
difficulty of the collapse of the government’s flagship policy, the National Plan. The 
deflation brought direct criticism from business leaders, unions and the party, the left 
demanding an immediate withdrawal from Britain’s world role and end to sterling’s 
position as a reserve currency, the right rallying behind George Brown.422 
Alick Downer made a number of representations to the Wilson government to try to 
prevent this withdrawal from Asia and in particular Singapore. Downer seemed to 
struggle with the new realities faced by Britain after the expense of World War II and, 
as Dennis Callaghan explained to Downer in 1967, the British people now ‘wanted a 
redirection of public expenditure toward social services and other domestic purposes’. 
Downer was critical of Labour and in particular that it had ‘never been defence 
minded’. Downer contended that, ever since Ramsay McDonald decided to close the 
Singapore naval base in 1924. there had been an inclination towards being ‘little 
Englanders’. 
This argument regarding a little England is similar to Alexander Downer’s criticisms of 
Labor’s foreign policy as reflecting a desire for a ‘small Australia’. In fact, in his 2005 
Earle Page Lecture, he examines Australian Labor’s foreign policy from a similar 
ideological perspective. For Downer, the ALP’s pre-World War II policy, reflected in 
the Curtin Opposition’s view of Abyssinia, would echo the future British retreat into 
Europe. In his address, Alexander Downer builds a narrative around Labor’s 
disinclination for Australia to broaden its international involvement, other than through 
 
422 Helen Parr, ‘A question of leadership: July 1966 and Harold Wilson’s European 
decision’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 19 (5), 2005, p. 449. 
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agencies such as the United Nations. Alexander Downer argues that its opposition to 
bilateral relationships, originally Britain and then the US alliance, was symptomatic of 
an isolationist strategy by Australian Labor. This is precisely the same criticism that 
Alick Downer employed in relation to England’s previous role of service and the 
widespread belief within traditional Labour in what he called ‘British socialist policy’. 
This ‘little Englander’ policy would advocate a smaller English involvement in 
international affairs, moving away from its previous international commitments. The 
influence of Alick Downer in stressing the international obligations of both England and 
Australia towards world peace led by Western democracies is also underlined in 
Alexander Downer’s 2005 Earle Page Lecture. However, this argument was not 
justified by the wide appeal that withdrawing from the east of Suez had for many other 
British. Liberal members in both the Commons and the Lords had similar views. For 
example, Lord Gladman and Jeremy Thorpe were opposed to Britain’s involvement in 
the east of Suez. The British press at the time, in particular the Guardian and the Daily 
Mirror which enjoyed even wider circulation, was supportive of the termination of east 
of Suez military arrangements. There was some disagreement from the conservative 
press, but it fell back on Lord Beaverbrook and the Daily Express to argue for the 
traditional British Commonwealth necessity for these defence arrangements. The 
conservative press outlined the arguments for the Old Commonwealth, in particular, to 
stand together, which was consistent with Downer’s position. However, Downer, in his 
conservatism, had failed to reinvent a liberal concern for a changing world order, 
instead retreating into a pre-World War II, Anglo-Australia position, which was now 
being superseded. 
The Wilson Labour Government had commenced its term with a specific mandate that 
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there would be no entry into the European Economic Community. Alick Downer, as 
Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, had been reassured by Wilson 
on a number of occasions that there would be no concession. Wilson had previously 
made this clear in the Labour Party Manifesto, The New Britain, when he attacked the 
Conservatives for proposing Britain’s entry to the Common Market: 
How little they were able to transfer their faith and enthusiasm from the old 
Empire to the new Commonwealth was shown when Harold Macmillan and 
Alec Douglas-Home both declared there was no future for Britain outside the 
Common Market and expressed themselves ready to accept terms of entry to the 
Common Market that would have excluded our Commonwealth partners, broken 
our special trade links with them, and forced us to treat them as third-class 
nations.423 
The turnaround occurred in July 1966, when Wilson was persuaded by the British 
Foreign Office to make this reorientation towards the EEC, which surprised Downer 
and engendered a quiet resentment after what he had been led to believe by Wilson 
earlier that year. In private correspondence with Menzies, Downer stated his distrust of 
Wilson: 
I am convinced the present Labour Government does not represent British public 
opinion on these great matters because Harold Wilson and several Government 
 
423 The new Britain’, Labour Party manifesto, London, 1964, p. 7.  
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Ministers have completely somersaulted on undertakings they have given.424 
In reflecting on his disillusionment with Wilson, Downer focused on his change in 
relationship to three areas: the EEC, immigration and defence. The inter-relationship of 
the devaluation of sterling, Britain’s decision to withdraw from its military engagement 
east of Suez and the proposed entry to the EEC were leading Britain away from 
Australia and the Old Commonwealth, not out of a primary desire to do so, but as a 
consequence of these quickly moving interconnected events. Downer had as much to do 
with the British Government on an ongoing basis between 1964 and 1972 as any 
Australian political, bureaucratic or ambassadorial figure, but, unlike the Prime 
Ministers he represented, he would not redesign his conservatism to accommodate a 
changing Anglosphere. 
Downer’s relationship with Wilson provides a key to understanding how this position 
evolved into an ongoing resentment about the changing nature of Australia’s 
relationship with Britain. While Downer was represented by the Australian press as a 
conservative reactionary, holding on to an imagined past, this needed to be balanced by 
Downer’s understanding that Britain had originally intended to support the status quo, 
based on his discussions with Wilson. Wilson had assured all stakeholders of this earlier 
when he declared: ‘Though we shall seek to achieve closer links with our European 
 
424 Letter, Downer to Menzies, 29 April 1968, NAA:M1003, 11563449. Earlier in 1964 
Downer expressed more confidence in Wilson: ‘He then had a talk about Oxford days 
(you will remember that after taking his degree he was a don at Jesus for a while) and I 
pulled his leg about half his Cabinet being Oxford men. Actually, this latter circumstance 
will, I think, prove a useful bridge between my rather Conservative views and the 
Government with which I shall have to associate over here.’ Letter Downer to Menzies,26 




neighbours, the Labour Party is convinced that the first responsibility of a British 
Government is still to the Commonwealth’.425 
A pivotal meeting in this regard for Downer was one with Wilson prior to his return to 
Australia for his first home leave in January 1967. At this meeting, Wilson reassured 
Downer that nothing had altered regarding British policy towards Old Commonwealth 
concerns. There were two major areas on which Wilson sought to reassure Downer. The 
first was in relation to defence. Wilson outlined the British Government’s defence 
policy, assuring Downer that it would remain consistent with the election policy outline 
of March 1966 and ‘as for the EEC they were very sceptical of whether membership 
would benefit Britain’. Downer, in response to Wilson, agreed that on his return to 
Australia: ‘I propose to counteract the growing impression, fostered by the press, that 
Britain was a nation in decline, losing her skills and generally her influence in the 
world.’ However, by the time Downer had returned to England from his leave on 7th 
April 1967, the scene had changed completely, in that not only had the British 
Government decided to reduce defence commitments, but the Cabinet had voted to 
explore the possibilities of joining the EEC. Downer had felt betrayed after Wilson had 
reassured him to the contrary, but what were the wider reasons behind these events that 
had forced the new decision by Wilson? 
To understand the causes behind this reversal in policy, one needs to return to the events 
of July 1966 and the sterling crisis. Investor confidence and changed economic 
conditions had created a crisis in the reserve currency and the decision to devalue the 
pound. Unemployment had risen to 2% and Wilson had been forced to abandon his 
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National Plan. In response to this crisis, Wilson announced that defence expenditure 
would be decreased by 100 000 000 pounds and Foreign Minister George Brown 
considered that the only way to achieve this saving was to withdraw Britain’s 
involvement in Singapore and pull back from all military engagements east of Suez. 
Elements within the left of the Party were calling for prompt withdrawal from Britain’s 
world-wide role and a termination of Britain’s commitment to sterling as a reserve 
currency. These pressures on Wilson led him to redefine Britain’s role in the world and, 
as Helen Parr has argued, ‘[t]he sterling crisis created pressure that made an initiative 
for full membership of the European community in the short-term irresistible.’426 
At the heart of Wilson’s diplomatic and political objectives was the desire to maintain 
Britain’s role in the world and, even within the EEC, Britain could still play a 
significant part. Wilson did not want to see England become a ‘greater Sweden’ 
removed from the primary world political stage. Financial constraints demanded the 
minimisation of international military obligations, particularly in the Australasia area, 
which rankled the Old Commonwealth members, Australia and New Zealand. But the 
revaluation of sterling meant that, with the revised economic circumstances, Britain was 
now facing markets which would need to be established within Europe and military 
realignment necessitated by the costs of overseas engagement would be solved within 
the European Community. 
Wilson had previously attended the Commonwealth Conference in September 1966 and 
had been disappointed by the confrontational approach adopted by the new 
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Commonwealth countries. The aggression shown towards Britain by the new African 
countries left Wilson with a feeling of acrimony and led him to distance Britain from 
immediately advancing Commonwealth interests. 
Downer argued that the British Foreign Office also exerted considerable pressure on 
Wilson to move away from dependency upon the Atlantic alliance and to build a 
stronger relationship with the European community as a means of also confronting de 
Gaulle’s influence and his desire to create a European closed shop. Wilson had met with 
US President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, in December 1964, when Wilson had expressed 
his solidarity with the struggle against communism in Southeast Asia. The turnaround 
decision to withdraw from Singapore angered Johnson and led to increasing frustration 
between the two countries by April 1967. Wilson had responded to the Johnson’s 
challenge by stating that Britain’s future lay in developing its own leadership within 
Europe. Wilson presented to his Cabinet the necessity for joining the EEC as a means of 
creating an independent power base for Britain. 
Events in 1966 had been fast-moving, and economic decisions and political resolutions 
had been interdependent. The declining nature of British investment and confidence and 
the collapse of the National Plan had been intimately involved in the decision to devalue 
sterling. This, in turn, led to demand within the party to cut expenditure, particularly 
around defence, which called for a realignment of British military objectives and 
economic partnerships. The decision to join the EEC, therefore, was not divorced from 
changing economic circumstances, but was a product of it. Ultimately, de Gaulle would 
frustrate Britain’s first attempt to enter the Community and membership of the EEC 
would become the Conservative Party’s achievement under Edward Heath in his first 
and only term of government. 
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Downer occasionally moved from being a diplomatic representative within London to 
being a participant in supporting the representation of a strong and unchanging Britain. 
In a meeting with Wilson on 5 January 1967, Downer made it clear to Wilson that he 
wanted to see Britain as unchanged by the economic events challenging the country. 
Downer in fact ‘proposed to counteract the growing impression that Britain was a nation 
in decline’.427 He formed a compact with Wilson that he would present to the Australian 
public ‘a factual brief of British achievements’. Wilson was to provide Downer with the 
necessary statistics and ‘official figures’ which would enable him to create a picture of 
the government’s defence policy as non-negotiable and a belief that Britain would not 
enter the common market. He even went so far as to say to Wilson that he could assist 
in the threats to the Anglo-Australian relationship by stating to the Australian 
community that ‘despite my conservative political philosophy his [Wilson’s] views on 
Commonwealth and European problems would have attracted my vote to exercise it at 
the last election.’428 
However, the volte face by Wilson and his Foreign Secretary, George Brown, offered an 
opposite rationale. In a speech at a meeting of the Council of the Western European 
Union on 4 July 1967, Brown outlined the reasons Britain would be applying for 
membership of the EEC. Whilst the economic context was fundamental, he argued for 
wider considerations, stating: 
We are aiming at something far more than national prosperity. We see this 
leading to a greater political purpose for Western Europe. And if that purpose is 
 




to be realised Britain must share it. We want as soon as we can to develop really 
effective political unity with our fellow West Europeans.429 
Brown was arguing that Britain needed time to move away from a sole reliance on 
membership of the Commonwealth without ignoring it altogether. Britain, in joining the 
community, would strengthen its diplomatic positioning vis-à-vis other alliances. Brown 
expressed it this way: 
We believe that Europe can emerge as a Community expressing its own point of 
view and exercising influence in world affairs not only in the commercial and 
economic but also in the political and defence fields.430 
Circumstances had changed Brown’s approach to such an extent that he had visited six 
countries of Europe, together with Prime Minister Wilson, to investigate whether 
Britain should now proceed to lodge an official application. Although Downer, in his 
role as Minister for Immigration between 1956 and 1962 in the Menzies government, 
had initiated a liberalising of the White Australia policy, he had always been pro-British 
in terms of the core source of immigration. Attempting to break down the Dictation Test 
and allowing ministerial discretion for Asian exceptions were always balanced against 
the primary drive of preference for European, particularly British, migrants. 
Having spent the formative years of his life being educated at Oxford in the 1930s, 
Alick Downer had graduated with a deep conviction that British parliamentary 
democracy was the key cultural driver in Australia’s success. It therefore came as a 
 




great surprise to Downer to find Wilson, also an Oxford graduate, abandoning the 
commitment to the Old Commonwealth countries, such as Australia. At the heart of 
Downer’s discontent with the British government was its bipartisan approach to 
Australian immigrants. Three successive British Governments, the Macmillan 
Government, the Wilson Government and the Heath Government, had variously 
introduced and reinforced a Commonwealth multi- racial approach to immigration 
entry. Although this approach was originally not directly aimed at countries such as 
Australia, its indirect effect was to exclude Australians other than Patrial migrants. 
Downer’s reaction to these decisions in particular to the Heath Migration Act of 1971, 
was viewed by Heath himself as contributing to the problem. 
The Macmillan Government was originally faced with a crisis of increased immigration, 
with a flow of settlers from the Caribbean, Africa and Asia, which had increased from 
an intake of 42 700 in 1955 to 136 400 in 1961. Until 1962, Australians, as 
Commonwealth citizens, could enter Britain virtually unhindered. The Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act of 1962 implemented a new range of restrictions. 
Commonwealth citizens could now only be allowed into Britain if they had a job 
waiting for them on arrival or had a narrow range of educational qualifications or skills. 
Alternatively, they would be allowed to enter Britain as part of a quota determined by 
the Government. While this new Act was not primarily directed at nations formerly 
known as members of the Old Commonwealth, its far-ranging provisions swept up 
countries such as Australia in its restrictions. Opposition from the British Labour Party 
at the time had made the Macmillan conservative Government sensitive to criticism and, 
therefore, the restrictions were applied to all Commonwealth countries, whether they 
were Republican or Crown Commonwealth. Central to Downer’s opposition to this 
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ongoing British reformist approach to immigration was the treatment of Australians. 
Downer argued that by not distinguishing between the Crown Commonwealth and the 
Republican Commonwealth, the approach penalised loyal supporters of the 
Anglosphere. 
Downer expressed his view in this way: 
In order to avoid charges of racial discrimination the government applied the new 
restrictions to all Commonwealth citizens irrespective of origin, heedless of the fact that 
a high proportion of them would just as much the Queen’s subjects as the inhabitants of 
Britain.431 
In other words, to avoid being seen as giving preference to white Commonwealth 
members for access to British citizenship, the Macmillan Government had initiated a 
policy which would cause ‘lasting damage to the traditional feelings of Australians 
towards Britain’ and, when compounded by the Wilson Labour Government’s broken 
promises regarding defence east of Suez and British membership of the EEC, would, in 
his opinion, potentially irrevocably rupture Anglo-Australian relations. The priority 
established by the Macmillan government to avoid ‘accusations of racism’ created what 
Downer described as a ‘firestorm around immigration’ which would last another twenty 
years. Downer went further and argued that the original Conservative Macmillan 
Government’s failure to address questions of alleged racism clouded the future of the 
Commonwealth. Downer argued: 
Had the British bravely faced accusations of racism and given preferential 
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treatment to the Queen’s subjects not all of them are white, in any case, for 
example, Jamaicans and Papua New Guineans much of the heat over 
immigration cases in the last 20 years would have been avoided’.432 
Downer understood, as ‘a former immigration minister’, that the Conservative objective 
of limiting immigration in the case of Britain was the converse of Australia’s need for 
more immigration, but he objected to the British rationale. It seemed to him that 
Australia was being made to pay the price for the appearance of a multiracial, 
Commonwealth immigration policy which all the time masqueraded as being even-
handed. In fact, the original objective of the Macmillan Government was to limit the 
number of Asian, Caribbean and African settlers, which had tripled between 1955 and 
1961. 
The Wilson Government’s Immigration Policy, administered between October 1964 and 
November 1967 by Roy Jenkins through the Home Office, had vindicated the entry 
restrictions of the Conservative Butler’s 1962 legislation. Wilson only strengthened the 
provisions of the 1962 Immigration Act with a series of categories, using a voucher 
system, to enable limited migration to Britain. In Category A immigrants with a specific 
vocation were allowed entry and in Category B specific qualifications, such as medicine 
and dentistry, were required. However, what was even more important was the rate of 
issue of these vouchers, which was dramatically reduced from 20 888 to 8 500 a year. 
Moreover, no more than 15% of a category of vouchers were allowed to be issued to 
any one country. The hardening of the Wilson Government position to see a multiracial 





White Paper presented to the British Parliament in 1965. As a monarchist, Downer was 
appalled that Republican Commonwealth countries were receiving the same treatment 
as the Old Commonwealth countries, even though they were opposed to the Queen as 
Head of State. 
Downer was again unable to adapt to changing international approaches to multicultural 
immigration reforms and maintained his conservative opposition to the Wilson 
Government’s progressivism. Downer, in his analysis of Wilson, was confounded by his 
inability to reciprocate all the benefits that the Australian government had provided to 
British migration in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Downer’s expectations for the incoming Heath Conservative Government in 1971 
contained different hopes from those he held of the Wilson Government. Heath had 
once stated that if he were not an Englishman he would have wished to be an 
Australian. After six years of a disappointing Labour Government under Wilson and 
Callaghan, Downer expected that the Conservative Heath’s approach to immigration 
would be much more sympathetic to the Old Commonwealth and, in particular, 
Australia. Downer was to be disappointed and, in fact, in correspondence with Menzies, 
he had predicted that there may be little difference. 
Menzies, somewhat surprisingly, agreed with Downer’s assessment: 
I share your anxieties about our Conservative friends in England that they should 
line up with the Wilson Government in seeking what will obviously be 
275 
 
unconditional accession to the Treaty of Rome horrifies me.433 
Heath’s Immigration Act of 1971 did include a revision of the restrictive prohibitions 
implemented by the Wilson Government, but not to the satisfaction of Downer. Alick 
Downer really wanted a return to the pre-1962 Macmillan Government reforms. The 
loyalty of Australia to the Commonwealth required recognition and this needed to be 
witnessed in the restoration of Anglo-Australian relations. The Immigration Act of 1971 
followed the Butler Immigration reforms of 1962 and Wilson’s revisions of 1966. The 
centrepiece of Heath’s Immigration Act was the Patrial Clauses which gave 
considerable concessions to Australians wishing to emigrate to the United Kingdom. 
The actual provision stated that Australians who had a father or grandfather living in 
England were allowed to gain residency. This was available to all members of the 
Commonwealth but in practice favoured Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders, as 
few Africans or Jamaicans would have parents or grandparents satisfying these 
conditions. Harold Wilson had originated the idea of Patrial ties when he introduced the 
necessity for Kenyan Asians in 1968 to identify a Patrial link. Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers 
of Blood’ speech in 1968 had created a sense of siege in the minds of many Britons, and 
the immigration restrictions were aimed at settling voter uncertainty. 
Alexander Downer concluded that his father’s career had influenced him in two distinct 
areas. What he had described as his father’s progressive conservatism had initiated the 
dismantling of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 with the removal of two major 
provisions: the abolition of the Dictation Test in 1958 and the repeal of the Emigration 
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Act which had prevented Indigenous Australians from leaving Australia without Federal 
Government permission. Alexander Downer contended: 
My father had achieved, despite fervent opposition to his reforms to the White 
Australia Policy, what the Curtin and Chifley Governments before him had not 
considered. He also stressed for me through the reduction in Britain’s 
international standing brought by Wilson’s changes to the EEC and defence 
policy East of Suez the shortcomings of the ‘Little Englanders’ and hence for me 
a ‘Little Australia’.434 
Alick Downer’s inability to appreciate a changing world order and the strategies needed 
for Australia to realign away from Britain was understandable, particularly when 
viewed through his wartime experience. However, his loyalty to the British world had 
led to an almost personal sense of betrayal during the Wilson years, which hardened his 
response to progressive calls. Downer declared: ‘All shades of Australian opinion 
accused the Wilson Government of bad faith, breaking oft-repeated promises and of 
neglecting fortunes in part of the world with infinite future possibilities.’435 
Nevertheless, by November 1927, when his period as High Commissioner concluded, 
many Australians had moved forward and embraced alternatives. Downer stood in 
contrast to different sentiments being articulated by an Australian Opposition led by a 
revitalised Gough Whitlam. 
It is ultimately unhelpful, then, to view Alick Downer as a progressive conservative 
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who grew into a more hardened conservative unwilling to recognise the wider changes 
in the world at large. For the policy positions around immigration in Australia in the 
1950s and immigration in Britain in the 1960s were not fundamentally different. As 
Immigration Minister, Alick Downer was a reform-minded liberal in the sense that he 
wished to ensure that the structures and processes were fair, but his British race 
patriotism endured throughout and he did not relax his grip on the White Australia 
Policy. This same sense of Britishness pervaded his views on Australia’s ties with 
Britain. Both Downer and Menzies were in many senses emblematic of an unchanging 
conservatism which failed to show the same vibrancy as Menzies’ forty-niners had done 
in resurrecting the fragmented conservatism from the ashes of the United Australia 
Party in 1943. The dynamism which gave rise to a new Australian conservatism in 1949 




436 Downer admitted as much in the following correspondence with Sir Robert Menzies: 
‘I am longing to have a talk with you about the dramatic events at home. They have 
tarnished our overseas image, and proved damaging to Australia in a number of ways. I 
cannot help feeling that the fundamental trouble is too long in Office. However 
unpalatable the truth, surely the whole of the British system of constitutional Government 
depends on a periodic alternation of political parties in power.’ Letter, Downer to 
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Chapter Seven  
Conclusion 
In examining the three generations of the Downer family this study has revealed a 
consistent leadership credo around nation building. A leadership credo embracing the 
values, mores and themes which have influenced Alexander Downer’s approach to 
policy. To varying extents each generation has embraced the idea of a bigger Australia 
drawing on policies which would support a larger immigration policy. International 
relations have also been identified as a source of raising the profile of the Australia 
nation for the world stage. However, the theme of nation building hasn't always meant 
an uncritical following by Alexander Downer of his father’s and grandfather’s views. 
For example, Alexander Downer’s disillusionment with Britain for the fact that he was 
never visited by British foreign secretaries during his time as Foreign Minister 
consequently turned him away from following his father's footsteps.  He had, in a 
similar way, opposed his father’s view that England should not join the European 
Economic Community.437 Therefore the theme of nation building can be interpreted 
with different emphasis by particular members of the Downer family depending upon 
their contextual imperatives and perceptions.  
Within this paradigm of nation building is there sufficient evidence to argue that the 
Downers were more than conservatives with liberal instincts derived from South 
Australian origins? Is the case for a philosophy of progressive conservatism 
sustainable? Reflecting on the state of the political landscape in Australia thirty years 
 




after Federation, W.K. Hancock observed of the non-Labor parties: ‘If a politician 
declares that he is liberal his audience will understand that he is by nature conservative 
and if he is a conservative this signifies reactionary’.438 This equation has made it 
difficult for individuals, and in this study families, to differentiate themselves within 
Australian conservatism.  
The evidence of this thesis is that the policy positions of the Downers have been mixed 
and inconsistent. There have been significant moments when liberal positions were 
articulated against the mainstream and then marked by reversals, such as in the case of 
John Downer’s approach to female suffrage. Similarly, Alick Downer’s reforms, which 
helped humanise the White Australia Policy at a time when it was receiving 
international criticism, were always undertaken with the unconditional premise of the 
fundamental importance of the policy. 
This study has examined these major family policy influences for nation building 
through the prevailing lens of Britishness and in 2018, in his valedictory speech as 
Australian High Commissioner to Britain, Alexander Downer reflected further upon the 
British influence from both his father and his time in Australian public life. Downer 
concluded with some final observations regarding the experiences which had led him to 
turn away from closer expectations of the Anglo-Australian relationship prior to his 
appointment as High Commissioner. When he arrived in London in 2014, he stated that 
he did so ‘with low expectations of the priority Britain would give to Australia’.439 What 
had created such disenchantment in the mind and heart of an Australian steeped in the 
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In this valedictory speech Downer outlined some of the reasons for this. Firstly his 
father’s bitterness and sense of being rejected ‘as kith and kin’, as Roy Jenkins 
described it, in spite of Australia’s loyalty to Britain and what he personally had done to 
sustain the relationship.440  He expressed the way his father’s generation felt the sting of 
British withdrawal from the Old Commonwealth countries and its move towards 
Europe. He provided the example of the trade reversal: 
At the practical level Australian exporters suffered grievously as a result of 
Britain joining the European Economic Union but also over the following 
decades British trade progressively diverted away from markets like Australia to 
Europe.’441 
Perhaps more emotionally hurtful, when added to the economic consequences for his 
father’s generation, were the impacts for Australians demoted in the queue for visas to 
Britain. The personal shock to the Downer family at seeing Australians being denied 
preference in the issuing of visas was expressed by Alexander Downer: 
The British government gave preference to European Union Nationals over 
Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders. Given the heritage of so many 
Australians I think you can imagine how people like my father felt about this.’442 








Secondly, Downer proferred his own experience as Foreign Minister. During his time as 
Foreign Minister of Australia for nearly twelve years, he noted that ‘never during that 
period did a British foreign secretary choose to come to Australia.’443 Whilst he was not 
expressing the same sense of passionate outrage that his father had felt, he connected his 
own experience with his father’s as a continuum. He also expressed surprise that during 
his time as Australian Foreign Minister ‘Britain seldom became engaged in major issues 
in East Asia and the Pacific.’ Whilst this may have been a disappointment for Downer, 
it is not at all surprising given the European change in British interests following the 
decision to move away from defence initiatives east of Suez. His father’s influence laid 
the groundwork for higher expectations of what should be achieved in the Anglo-
Australian relationship. He noted that his father’s reaction was a deep-felt grievance 
and, even though his own response was more moderate, it was nevertheless a product of 
his family culture and expectations. The fact that Britain had moved away from a close 
foreign policy connection with Australia in the Asia Pacific may have been predictable 
to other observers but, as stated here by Alexander Downer, it was experienced by him 
and his father as something of a personal regret. Nation building for Australia then 
would need to be pursued through the Australian-American relationship for Alexander 
Downer. 
The Downers have nevertheless been primarily an Anglo-Australian family for whom 
Britishness has played a central role in their understanding of nation establishment. In 





that Britishness has known no particular political preference or ideology in Australia’s 
past and could reach either into the liberal reform instincts of John Downer around the 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, or, just as easily, into the British race patriotism of 
his colleagues when calling for non-white exclusion. In choosing to support a non-racial 
immigration stance, he was pursuing a different understanding of Britishness. It was an 
understanding more in keeping with his South Australian origins, which produced a 
liberal emphasis upon personal freedoms and personal conscience, as outlined by 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the South Australian Association. However, 
whilst the distinctive elements of this South Australian backdrop can be noted, the 
differences are often ones of identity and self-perceptions. In terms of political systems 
and its bicameral legislature, South Australia held much in common with the eastern 
states. 
Further, in Chapter Three we examined how John Downer developed a liberal reform 
emphasis, which then broke down at several key points, particularly at the end of the 
policy initiatives. Downer’s position on immigration, for example, included 
contradictory positions. At the beginning of the debate on immigration, he could see no 
reason why races should be treated differently and yet, towards the end, he made some 
opposing statements on racial difference. 
He was an independent mind in relation to the function of the High Court. In his 
rejection of the Privy Council as a final court of appeal, he displayed a Britishness 
which confounded those critics who viewed him as an uncritical advocate of all things 
British. He helped pioneer issues such as gender rights for South Australia but baulked 
at the final hurdle, for what appeared to be a tactical reason, in the South Australian 
Parliament and actually voted against the ultimate passing of female suffrage by the 
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Stirling South Australian Government in 1895. Such inconsistencies challenge the case 
for viewing him as a progressive conservative. 
Chapter Three also observed that South Australia was characterised by the intersection 
of E.G. Wakefield’s systematic colonisation and the progressive philosophies of John 
Stuart Mill and the Benthamites. These rapid, but at times uneven, changes to society, as 
Pike describes them, in South Australia’s development not only influenced the liberal 
origins of South Australia’s politics and public administration, but also had a self-
perceived effect upon the Downer family. 
These philosophical foundations enabled the development of a new social order which 
rejected the eastern Australian experience of penal settlement. The new Wakefield plan 
attracted individuals who invested their capital and labour, thereby emphasising the 
values of personal responsibility. Combined with electoral reforms, such as the secret 
ballot and the widening of the franchise, South Australian electoral pioneers had taken 
the liberal inheritance of Britain and accelerated change ahead of the mother country. 
This study noted how the South Australian Association, in rejecting the limitations of 
the penal settlements in Sydney and Brisbane, was motivated to create alternative 
solutions to the pressures on English societies arising from industrialisation and 
urbanisation. These factors combined with what Pike has described as the desire of free 
settlers to create a more liberal society with institutions that would not only be free but 
would serve all citizens, not just those with social privilege. 
Britain’s new Poor Law Reforms had proved determinative for the British government 
in suggesting different solutions for the new colony in South Australia. John Stuart Mill 
was proposing South Australia as an alternative to Britain, as a ‘means of relieving the 
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industry of their country from the evils of an over-crowded society, or as individuals, in 
withdrawing themselves personally from those evils.’444 This study also identified how 
John Stuart Mill was successful in advocating the replication of British institutions in 
their entirety, not partially. Mill was driven by the failures of the British Poor Laws 
Amendment Bill of 1834 to cope with mass movements from the rural areas to the cities 
and the associated unemployment, low wages and accompanying social problems. 
While we have established John Downer’s often ambiguous positions on female 
suffrage and the Immigration Restriction Act in this study, one of his primary 
contributions to the development of a family credo for Alexander Downer had been his 
opposition to executive overreach, as witnessed in his position on the Judicial Bill of 
1903. Again, Britishness for John Downer was to be interpreted within an Australian 
framework where he rejected deferring to Britain through the Privy Council, and argued 
for the sovereign power of the states and a strong ‘vindicatory power’.445 His argument 
was that the overwhelming numbers held against South Australia by the more populous 
states would militate against its best interests, unless there was an independent arbiter 
‘above politics’. Downer argued: ‘In our campaigns I pointed to the High Court as being 
the protection we should have against your greater numbers.’ In this sense, ‘the High 
Court was to be above Parliament’ and had a unique role to play in South Australia’s 
future. The Constitutional inclusion of the High Court together with the achievement of 







South Australia would never have supported Federation without this assurance, as ‘the 
result of Federation would be that they would be merged in New South Wales and 
Victoria’.447 
The analysis of the debate with other South Australians, such as fellow Senator Patrick 
Glynn, revealed a nationalism which advocated for the independence of the High Court 
in order that Australia could be ‘self-contained’. Furthermore, the arguments forwarded 
by Downer through a comparison of the US and Canadian models were instrumental in 
passing the Bill and establishing the survival of the High Court at a time when it was 
being seriously questioned by reactionary supporters of the sufficiency of Britain’s 
Privy Council. Downer vigorously debated the case for the establishment of a High 
Court and its central constitutional position. He asserted the supremacy of the role of the 
High Court over the Privy Council at Federation, because ‘an endeavour was made to 
alter that state of things. We thought that the time had come when Australia in these 
matters be self-contained.’448 
We have seen how Downer, in his defence of the Judicial Bill, adopted a wider 
approach, whereby he criticised Canadian model after Confederation in 1862. He 
contrasted this with the situation in the United States, where judges were appointed by 
the States, in contrast to the Canadian judges who were appointed by the central 
government. Downer argued that this left the Canadian states ‘subject to the Dominion 
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government and liable to have its acts of Parliament vetoed by the Central executive’.449 
As a federalist, he opposed the centralisation of power. 
Chapter Four examined the contribution of Menzian liberalism as a formative family 
influence on the Downer leadership credo. Menzian liberalism, as focused in the 
‘Forgotten People’ speeches, placed an emphasis on the ideological priority of the 
individual and away from government intrusion through interventionist social programs. 
Menzies and Downer wanted less activity, less Government ‘visibility’ and more trust 
in the creative ability of the individual.450 This study has revealed that, beyond his 
family, Robert Menzies had a significant influence on Alexander Downer, particularly 
in the development of his political philosophy around the individual. Menzies endured 
through this period over six re-elections and reluctantly understood the declining, but 
still evident, Britishness of Australians. The Australian electorate’s preferences had 
been conditioned by war and Depression and the choice of Burkean conservatism 
authorised incremental reforms to immigration, tertiary education and national security. 
There was also a sense in which the new Liberal Party, by 1949, viewed intrusion into 
the lives of the Australian electorate as desirable only when essential. This form of 
conservatism limited the amount of activity for governments and relied on the ability of 
the individual to solve challenges. Chapter Four analysed how Alexander Downer 
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success of the ALP in attracting writers and historians, Mayer argued ‘The whole 
movement is, so to speak, much more “visible” and on the surface, seems easier to study. 
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been interested in saying anything about non-Labor’s role in Australian politics. Given 
the bias in favour of activity, “resistance” has seemed barren and of no interest.’ 
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understood, from his father’s experience in war, that Menzies too had been heavily 
influenced by the London bombings and war. Personal liberty subsequently formed the 
foundations for his public reflections in the Three Pillars of Liberalism. Downer 
summarised this position in the following way: ‘There is a natural battle within liberal 
societies between those who would seek greater state control, and those who seek 
greater individual and intellectual freedom.’ We have analysed how Downer identified 
Menzian Liberalism as providing for him in his career the ‘three great pillars of 
liberalism’, as he described them: ‘economic freedom, political freedom and security 
that makes possible the expression of those freedoms.’ 
This study also examined how the Britishness previously outlined influenced Alexander 
Downer and persisted as a family value through mentors such as Robert Menzies. 
Alexander Downer’s appreciation of Menzies was firstly one of a person who advocated 
individual freedoms and liberalism; however, Menzies was also a role model for 
Downer’s British race patriotism given the time he spent around the Downer family. 
Reflecting on his term as High Commissioner, Alexander Downer demonstrated a 
belligerent belief in the vestiges of British race patriotism and resurrecting the 
possibilities of the Old Commonwealth. He noted that the opportunity still existed in 
Anglo-Australian relations to afford more priority to the Old Commonwealth countries. 
In an echo of Menzies’ passionate commitment to the Old Commonwealth, Downer 
suggested that Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand could once again close 
ranks. In his valedictory speech, Downer identified the potential for the renaissance of a 
fading British race patriotism in what could have been Menzies speaking: 
For all the redirection of British foreign and economic policy since the late 
1960s, the public remained firmly attached to relations with countries like 
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Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Of course they see us as sporting rivals–or 
something worse these days–but there is that sense of family exuded by the 
British public towards us that does not translate to other relationships beyond 
Canada and New Zealand.451 
Downer’s speeches and writings continually referred to Menzies as a source of 
inspiration regarding the foundations and preservation of liberalism. Downer argued 
that the formation of the Liberal Party and its rationale were based on the personal 
freedoms emphasised in the liberalism espoused by Menzies. 
For Menzies, John Downer and Alick Downer there were few problems in pursuing a 
vigorous sense of being an Australian-Briton. There was no sense of mutual exclusivity 
between being loyal to Australia and loyal to Britain. In practice, one loyalty sometimes 
fuelled the other in the manner that Hancock had referred to as being ‘in love with two 
soils’.452 This dualism was implicitly understood by most Australians until the 1950s, 
when the pressures of post-colonialism and the end of Empire began to emerge. Robert 
Manne has observed: ‘Menzies was unproblematically loyal to both the British Empire 
and to Australia. Only a later generation would discover in this kind of double loyalty 
something shameful’453. 
However, the vista for Alexander Downer was more complicated than for Menzies’ 
generation. His parliamentary life in Australia from 1984 to 2007 occurred during a 
 
451 Alexander Downer, Valedictory Speech, Policy Exchange, London, 28 March 2018. 
452 W.K. Hancock, op. cit. 
453 Robert Manne, ‘Allan Martin’s Menzies’, Quadrant, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1993, p. 67.  
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period in which most Australians had moved away from an unqualified endorsement of 
Britishness in public and private life. And Downer was no real exception, despite his 
emotional predisposition towards his British influences. His family ties had created an 
emotional bridge to Britain which could not be sustained in office as Australia’s longest 
serving Foreign Minister. 
In Chapter Five we observed that whilst migration was considered the means for 
building a bigger Australia the process was heavily qualified. The reform of the 
Dictation Test in the Migration Act of 1959 may be viewed as a turning point in the 
White Australia Policy. However whilst its importance should not be underestimated, it 
is best viewed as a contribution to the process of incrementalism, sitting between the 
even more significant liberal reforms undertaken by Harold Holt, first as Immigration 
Minister in 1956 and secondly as Prime Minister in 1966, when his reforms allowed 
non-Europeans into Australia. 
We identified in Chapter Five that Alexander Downer, following Menzies, had an 
unshakable belief in the White Australia Policy and in many senses saw it as the 
foundation stone for wider social and economic policy. This expression of Britishness 
was evidence of the impact of this core value from the family credo upon policy. 
Viewed in this light, Downer could see that the international distaste for the Dictation 
Test needed to be addressed and, in doing so ,he was conscious that this would 
strengthen the policy overall. There was never any intention to unwind the White 
Australia Policy during Alick Downer’s administration. 
Alick Downer was consistently confronted with decisions about continuity and change 
in his time both as Immigration Minister and as High Commissioner. Chapter Five also 
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argues that there is more evidence of continuity than there is of change in immigration 
reform. 
Continuity was the policy imperative in maintaining the cohesion of the White Australia 
policy. Alick Downer’s liberal instincts led him to humanise the policy but all within a 
framework of continuity. Similarly, with southern European migration, once the policy 
had been established and accepted by the electorate, his primary concern was with its 
continuity despite opposition from forces within his own party and external to it. Alick 
Downer was more a humaniser than a liberal and the argument that he was a progressive 
conservative is more difficult to sustain. There were attempts to clean up the 
bureaucratic contradictions of the policy but this does not necessarily endorse an overall 
political philosophy of progressive conservatism. 
This theme of continuity was evident in Downer’s unwavering commitment to the 
family value of the Anglo-Australian relationship. He had no desire to change the 
previous success of what he saw as the wider British world acting in harmony, even 
given the challenges he faced in Britain in the late 1960s. Considering the policy 
continuity observed in the above three areas, it is difficult to validate the proposition 
that his position could be described as progressive conservatism. 
Nevertheless, Downer did make public, as Gwenda Tavan has noted, changes to the 
Policy and was prepared to wear and take responsibility for the reforms that he had 
made. He also had a deep sense of grievance about incarceration based upon his own 
experience in war and was determined to ensure that any migrants awaiting clarification 
of their immigration status would not to be kept in gaols and subject to these 
deprivations. Again this is further evidence of the work of a humaniser rather than a 
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liberal-minded widening of the White Australia Policy to allow in a wider range of 
racial groups. 
Alick Downer’s preference in providing for exceptions and being more generous with 
immigration was always that it occur through the process of ministerial discretion. He 
was aware that Menzies would allow this but did not want any public airing of major 
changes to the Policy. Indeed it was not until Menzies left in 1966, as Matthew Jordan 
argues. that the major watershed occurred in the direction of the Policy. 
In Chapter Six of this thesis, it was argued that the influence for Alexander Downer was 
to witness Menzies and Alick Downer struggling to negotiate a path between their 
liberalism and conservatism in a changing Commonwealth. From the correspondence 
between the two, we see an obstinence in relation to Anglo-Australian relations and the 
entry of Britain into the EEC. This study also uncovered the extent to which Alick 
Downer was prepared to maintain a defence of Menzies, who himself had also been 
unwilling to adapt to a changing Commonwealth. The correspondence between Menzies 
and Downer revealed Menzies’ complete disillusionment with Britain in joining the 
EEC. Alick Downer, in his account of that period, represented Menzies as a flexible 
conservative who had changed when the evidence demanded change. However, the 
primary documents analysed in this study, in particular the correspondence between the 
pair, revealed that, perhaps out of loyalty to Menzies, he had all but given up on the 
Anglo-Australian relationship by 1967. 
Downer and Menzies shared a common understanding and commitment in their view 
that the source of Australia’s freedom was this British heritage. And yet, when one 
reads the writings of Menzies and the speeches of Alick Downer’s family and political 
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biographies, one is struck by a sense of an almost burdensome responsibility to 
communicate the importance of the British heritage to Australian success. It is as if the 
Downers and Menzies had been given the privileged responsibility, as the custodians of 
the Anglo-Australian relationship, to ensure, throughout their public life, that this 
relationship continued untarnished. This background helps to explain the almost 
evangelical approach of Alick Downer, analysed in Chapter Six, when Anglo-Australian 
relations were at breaking point over Britain’s entry into the EEC. As we observed in 
Chapter Six, both Menzies and Downer were appalled that Britain was, as they 
perceived, sacrificing the Anglo-Australian relationship in seeking British entry to the 
EEC. Gone was the vibrant liberalism that had brought the two leaders together after 
World War II and had created, in the 1950s, significant reforms to areas such as the 
White Australia Policy and the Emigration Act. As they began to struggle with these 
new issues in the 1960s, they reverted to the foundations of their conservatism. The 
correspondence we have examined in Chapter Six between Alick Downer and Menzies, 
in spite of public declarations to the contrary, contained a bitter sense of betrayal in 
what they saw as their faithful defence of the British heritage. For Downer and Menzies, 
the British heritage meant an Anglo-Australian commitment to the wider British 
Empire, to the ideal of Empire above the individual interests of both countries. 
Although, for both of them, Empire might have been partly imaginary in its ideal, 
similar to Menzies’ imperial imagination prior to his first visit to Britain in 1935, this 
idealised world was, nevertheless, the home of Australia’s institutions, language and 
customs. 
Menzies described what it meant for the Downers and himself, as Australian-Britons, to 
follow in the traditions of the Englishman: 
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For tradition, to the Englishman, is not a barren pride in departed glories; it is 
something from which he derives a profound assurance, a sense of destiny, and a 
determination never to abandon what has been purchased with such valour and 
endurance by those who have gone before him.454 
Alexander Downer was witnessing both his father and Robert Menzies, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, believing that their ‘sense of destiny’ had been threatened. While there 
was an emotional dimension to their feelings of abandonment, their more deeply-held 
Burkean conservative values stemmed from a Britain which represented the source of 
Australia’s legal and parliamentary institutions and values through language, literature 
and customs. For the Downers and Menzies this had been all at stake. 
Alexander Downer has described the influence of his family background in the 
following metaphor, ‘Man is an omnibus in which all of his ancestors travel.’455 Downer 
had witnessed his father’s conclusion that by 1972 ‘Britain no longer wanted to be a 
great global power and was retreating into a regional player’.456 The long held value of 
British international importance, deeply embedded in the family leadership credo,  re-
emerged during Alexander Downer’s time as High Commissioner after lying dormant 
during his Australian parliamentary years. He concluded his valedictory speech with an 
appeal to rally the British ‘sense of destiny’ in 2018: 
People who claim Britain is past its best; people who say Britain no longer has a 
 
454 R.G. Menzies, ‘The English tradition’, New York Times Magazine, 10 July 1949. 
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South Australia, 2012, p. x. 
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major role to play in the world; people who described Britain as ‘a middle 
power’. You must never allow yourselves to be dragged down by this pervasive 
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